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Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism: The “Theory-Informity” of Observation and the Quine-Duhem Thesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

John D. Greenwood
John D. Greenwood*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, City College, City University of New York
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Abstract

It is argued that neither the “theory-informity” of observations nor the Quine-Duhem thesis pose any in principle threat to the objectivity of theory evaluation. The employment of exploratory theories does not generate incommensurability, but on the contrary is responsible for the mensurability and commensurability of explanatory theories, since exploratory theories enable scientists to make observations which are critical in the evaluation of explanatory theories. The employment of exploratory theories and other auxiliary hypotheses does not enable a theory to always accommodate recalcitrant observations to preserve evidential equivalence with a rival theory. Explanatory theories become rapidly degenerating if exploratory theories or other auxiliary hypotheses which inform the original confirmation base are modified to accommodate recalcitrant observations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 4 , December 1990 , pp. 553 - 574
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

My thanks to Jarrett Leplin, Cecilia Wee and two anonymous reviewers for their critical comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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