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Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David Christensen
David Christensen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Vermont
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Vermont, 70 South Williams Street, Burlington, VT 05401.
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Abstract

Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representation Theorem arguments which avoids the untenable premises. It then develops a parallel approach to Dutch Book Arguments, and compares the results. In each case preference-defects serve as a diagnostic tool, indicating purely epistemic defects.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue 3 , September 2001 , pp. 356 - 376
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks to Mark Kaplan, Hilary Kornblith, and Patrick Maher and three anonymous referees for helpful discussions or comments on earlier drafts.

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