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Discussion: On The Coherence of Instrumentalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Andre Kukla
Andre Kukla*
Affiliation:
Division of Life Sciences, Scarborough College, University of Toronto
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Abstract

According to a certain type of instrumentalist, we may have good reasons for accepting scientific theories, but never for believing more than their empirical consequences. Horwich (1991) considers several attempts to capture a difference between acceptance and belief, and claims that none of them succeed. He concludes that instrumentalism has not been shown to be a coherent position. However, in the course of his discussion, Horwich himself deploys a conceptual apparatus which is sufficient for formulating the instrumentalist doctrine in a coherent manner. The worst accusation that can be laid against instrumentalists is that they have violated common linguistic usage.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 59 , Issue 3 , September 1992 , pp. 492 - 497
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

This work was supported by a research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Division of Life Sciences, Scarborough College, University of Toronto, Scarborough, Ontario, M1C 1A4, CANADA.

References

Horwich, P. G. (1991), “On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment”, Philosophy of Science 58: 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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