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Discussion: Probabilistic Causality: A Rejoinder to Ellery Eells
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
In an earlier paper (Dupré 1984), I criticized a thesis sometimes defended by theorists of probabilistic causality, namely, that a probabilistic cause must raise the probability of its effect in every possible set of causally relevant background conditions (the “contextual unanimity thesis”). I also suggested that a more promising analysis of probabilistic causality might be sought in terms of statistical relevance in a fair sample. Ellery Eells (1987) has defended the contextual unanimity thesis against my objections, and also raised objections of his own to my positive claims. In this paper I defend and amplify both my objections to the contextual unanimity thesis and my constructive suggestion.
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- Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association
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