I heartily thank Jeffrey Winters for his sharp and insightful, generous yet critical, review of Machiavellian Democracy. I will confine my response to Winters's two most penetrating criticisms of the book.

Despite increased attention to the linkages between domestic politics and international relations in political science literature over the last 20 years, considerable debate remains about how well equipped citizens are to act as informed constraints on governments or how attentive and responsive government actors are to public opinion. Debates about citizens' ability to act as a check on government behavior are not new, of course, and have a long tradition in political philosophy and in public discourse. Yet the proliferation of theories of domestic–international linkages in contemporary IR scholarship has unfortunately been accompanied by incomplete dialogue between public opinion and IR scholars and often by claims of unidirectional or unconditional causality regarding domestic constraints, elite framing and opinion leadership, citizens' informational capacities, and the role of the media. The relationship among these factors in shaping foreign policy is quite complex, however, and fortunately Thomas Knecht acknowledges this complexity and advances a conditional argument about the relationship between public attitudes and presidential decision making.

I want to thank Terrence Chapman for his insightful comments. The core of our respective arguments is similar: We both find that public opinion can shape international affairs in important, and perhaps unexpected, ways. Nevertheless, he offers some constructive criticism that has prompted me to think more deeply about my work.

Why do states go through the trouble of seeking authorization from multilateral institutions to use military force when they are not required to do so? How do states choose the international organization through which to work? Why do citizens sometimes demand a multilateral response to an international crisis, yet at other times seem content when their leaders act unilaterally? Terrence Chapman takes up these questions in his persuasive and important book Securing Approval. The answer, he says, is domestic politics. Using a game-theoretic approach supported by a wealth of empirical evidence, Chapman shows that international organizations (IOs) provide important information to domestic publics. This information can affect public opinion and, by extension, foreign policy. A short review does not do justice to this nuanced and smart book. Nevertheless, I will outline the author's central argument before discussing the book's contribution to the literature. I conclude by raising three issues that might serve as avenues for future research.

Thomas Knecht provides a thoughtful and fair assessment of my book, Securing Approval. He raises three reasonable critiques that I respond to here.