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Staying the Course: Presidential Leadership, Military Stalemate, and Strategic Inertia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2010

Andrew J. Polsky
Andrew J. Polsky
Affiliation:
Hunter College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Military stalemate in Iraq and Vietnam presents a puzzle: why do presidents persist in a strategic course that has failed to secure the goals they defined when they chose to embark upon war? In the face of a quagmire, presidents might choose among three broad strategic options—disengagement, escalation, or continuity. I argue that the first alternative, to withdraw, is made impossible by the inflated rhetoric presidents invoke to sell a skeptical public on the necessity for a limited war and by their own conviction (reinforced by core supporters) that the price of defeat is too great. At the opposite pole lies the possibility of full-scale mobilization. But because presidents during the Vietnam and Iraq wars believed they could also pursue expensive domestic agendas, they did not reserve the resources needed for large-scale escalation. In the both cases, too, civilian leaders were deeply skeptical about their military counterparts and discounted their caution that a greater military commitment would be needed. Finally, as wars drag on, public disenchantment prevents presidents from mustering the political support escalation would require. Their early decisions thus leave them with no alternative to their current strategic commitment.

Type
Research Article
Information
Perspectives on Politics , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , March 2010 , pp. 127 - 139
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2010

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