Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty is void if it conflicts with jus cogens. It is theoretically possible that two or more states would conclude such a treaty, yet this is not very likely in practice. The question thus arises how jus cogens operates outside of Article 53 situations and outside of treaty law in general. A ‘trumping effect’ of jus cogens over all other norms of international law has been proposed in some writings and judicial decisions. Such views have been shattered by the ICJ, most recently (but not exclusively) in Germany v. Italy. Jus cogens seems to be back to Article 53 and its (rather theoretical) voiding powers. Considering the latest judicial decisions, this article aims to place jus cogens within the international legal system. It demonstrates that jus cogens is not a futile concept; but it is wrong to see it as a trump card.

The most important political priority of the European Commission in the recast of the Brussels I Regulation has been the abolition of exequatur. The policy to gradually abolish intermediate measures for the enforcement of judgments within the EUflows from the desire to enhance the free movement of judgments and the establishment of a genuine European area ofjustice. Whilst fundamental debate remained absent from the abolition of exequatur in several specific instruments, the abolition of exequatur including the grounds of refusal met with resistance during the negotiations on the recast of Brussels I. As a result of these negotiations, the new Brussels I Regulation – Brussels I-bis – will abolish the requirement to obtain a declaration of enforceability prior to enforcement, but will preserve the grounds of refusal at the enforcement stage. This article evaluates the discussions regarding the abolition of exequatur in the broad context of the EU regulatory and legislative framework, and analyses and assesses the new rules on cross-border enforcement in the Brussels I-bis Regulation. It seeks an answer to the questions (a) whether the new Regulation strikes the right balance between the premise of mutual trust and the need for national control over fundamental rights, (b) to what extent the new regime increases the rights of the judgment debtor while protecting those of the judgment creditor, and (c) whether the outcome of the Brussels I recast will or should have further repercussions for other instruments on cross-border enforcement.

This article discusses some problems arising from the proposed conferral of international criminal jurisdiction on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. While it is uncertain whether the AU will ever adopt the Draft Protocol amending the Statute of the Court, it is worthwhile examining certain provisions of the Protocol which, in addition to the myriad political hurdles that will militate against the adoption and/or entry into force of the Protocol, will most likely prevent the Court from exercising that jurisdiction. The article concludes that the future of international criminal justice in Africa lies not in the duplication of international criminal justice systems, but in the AU ensuring that its member states take the prevention and domestic prosecution of international crimes more seriously, and in the ICC improving its modus operandi vis-à-vis its member states.

The privatization of essential services such as water and electricity has raised a number of questions with respect to the role of the state and how these services should be regulated. An obligation to regulate from the perspective of human rights law may clash with the right to regulate within certain limits under international investment law. The importance of these services for society requires the adoption of positive protection measures that guarantee their quality and universal accessibility. At the same time, the rights of investors under bilateral investment treaties need to be respected. However, under international law it is not self-evident that human rights concerns will trump the legal obligations flowing from bilateral investment treaties. A way to reconcile these potentially competing legal obligations is required under international law, and may lead to the development of what may be called ‘international public service law’.

Existing literature on the developing countries' experience with the WTO dispute settlement system (DSS) has paid scant attention to the participation issue of the least developed countries (LDCs), which currently form one-fifth of the WTO membership but constitute less than one per cent of participation in DSS. This article fills this gap by examining several dimensions of LDCs' participation. Upholding the significance of LDCs' participation it explores the challenges faced by LDCs at the pre-litigation, litigation and implementation stage emanating from power asymmetries, resource constraints and flawed DSS remedies. The article particularly looks into the nature of LDCs' participation, which is mostly in the category of third parties. In doing so, it evaluates the third-party participation of Benin and Chad in US – Upland Cotton to ascertain whether third-party participation could be an alternative for LDCs to participate as co-complainants. It analyzes the special and differential treatment provisions of the DSU to further scrutinize whether these provisions and the way they are interpreted and applied in the WTO Panel Reports and the Appellate Body Reports are facilitative for LDCs' participation. Finally, the article makes recommendations to address the challenges on the part of LDCs and to reform DSS so as to make it effective for LDCs' participation.

This article addresses the issue of whether the international criminal tribunals are under an obligation to fund family visits for indigent detainees. It examines the concept of positive obligations and its relation to the detention situation and describes the practice of funding family visits as it has developed at the International Criminal Court. It further analyses relevant developments in the Court's case law. It argues that the Court is indeed obliged to fund family visits. In this regard, the mere recognition of a detainee's right to family visits in the tribunals’ legal frameworks and in international soft-law penological standards can be said to inadequately reflect the particularities of international detention.

Compared to other international dispute settlement bodies, the European Court of Human Rights' case law is relatively rich in situations involving a single injury and multiple contributing states. This contribution examines how the ECtHR decides such cases and explores to what extent its approach corresponds to that of the work of the International Law Commission on the topic of international responsibility. The article critically discusses the substantive criteria and doctrinal foundations employed by the ECtHR for allocating responsibility. It reflects on the adequacy of the doctrines used and examines how they can contribute to the general law on shared responsibility.

On 1 February 2011, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea handed down its first advisory opinion, namely, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area which concerns the responsibility and obligations of sponsoring states with regard to activities in the Area, i.e., the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Significantly this advisory opinion clarified the obligations of sponsoring states concerning activities in the Area. It will also provide important insights into, inter alia, the inter-relationship between the obligation of due diligence and the precautionary approach, the preferential treatment of developing states, the liability of sponsoring states and obligations erga omnes concerning activities in the Area. Thus the ITLOS advisory opinion is thought to make an important contribution to the development of the deep seabed régime. Focusing on these issues, this contribution will seek to examine the significance of and questions concerning the advisory opinion of 2011.

This article examines the legal status of armed forces present in friendly foreign territory with a special focus on criminal jurisdiction. Traditionally, this issue has been considered from the perspective of public international law in which immunities play an important role. However, this perspective does not fully cover the criminal jurisdiction provisions in the international agreements dealing with the status of visiting forces (Status of Forces Agreements). This article introduces military operational law as an additional perspective to better understand this specific approach of Status of Forces Agreements.

Maritime embargo operations implement economic sanctions adopted by the UNSC by means of naval forces at sea. In order to implement such sanctions in line with international law, it is essential for states that the legal basis in maritime embargo operations is clear. Since the UNSC has authorized states to use force in the enforcement of economic measures at sea, the precise legal basis of a certain category of maritime embargo operations has, however, been the subject of debate. Commentators have argued in a variety of ways to either categorize these military operations under Article 41, or Article 42 of the UN Charter, or even somewhere in between. This article first categorizes the different types of maritime embargo operations to underline that such maritime embargo operations can have different legal bases. Secondly, it considers under which circumstances maritime embargo operations can fall within the context of Article 41 or 42. It is argued that against the background of the evolved scope of Article 42 there may now be less reluctance to position explicit maritime embargo operations that also authorize the use of force within Article 42 of the UN Charter.

García Amador, the first Special Rapporteur on the topic of state responsibility, was of the view that in international law, special circumstances denote situations of exemption from the secondary rule which attaches disadvantageous consequences to breach of obligation under any primary rule. By contrast, his successor, Roberto Ago, advanced the notion that the exceptional circumstances characterise situations of exemption from the obligations arising out of primary rules. In departure from both conceptions, James Crawford, the last Special Rapporteur on the law of state responsibility, submitted that it is only after having established that a certain course of behaviour is contrary to the terms of a prohibition that it becomes possible to enquire whether the actor had a justification for acting as he did. If affirmative, the conduct in question is to be regarded as conduct which neither conforms with the obligation nor constitutes a violation thereof. If negative, then the act amounts to an unjustified wrongdoing and accordingly forms the basis for the operation of the various disadvantageous consequences envisaged by the law of international responsibility. This contribution first examines the process of the development of the notion of exceptional circumstances in the edifice of the law of international responsibility ex delicto. It then shows that from the three competing conceptions, only that advanced by Ago proves capable of accurately accounting for the circumstances of consent, self-defence, and the legitimate application of a countermeasure.

This article examines the 2011 reform of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure (CCP), which introduced new provisions on international adjudicatory jurisdiction. After considering the salient features of major jurisdiction rules in the CCP, the author analyzes the regulation of international parallel litigations. The relevant rules of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) are taken into consideration from a comparative perspective. In conclusion, the author points out that the basic structure of Japanese jurisdiction rules is in line with that of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast), whereas some important jurisdictional grounds clearly deviate from the latter.

In consultation with the ‘Permanent Bureau’ (Secretariat) of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Hague Conference), the Board of Editors has decided that this section, which has appeared in the Netherlands International Law Review since 1974, will be discontinued as from next year (2014). In view of the almost global access to the internet nowadays, the need for a hardcopy overview with information concerning the Hague Conventions on Private International Law, in particular their current status and their States Parties, has become less pertinent. This information can be obtained at the website of the Hague Conference: <www.hcch.net>. The Board of Editors wishes to thank the Secretariat of the Hague Conference, which kindly provided the annual updates.

Entries into force subsequent to this date and pending the expiration of time consequent upon already executed formalities are indicated by the use of italics.

This list does not include declarations made by States, territorial extensions and the acceptance of them by Contracting States, acceptances of accessions (for some Conventions, the accession only has effect in relations between the acceding State and those Contracting States which have accepted the accession), or details of designated competent authorities. A full status list for each Convention including all this information, together with the texts of the Conventions and the texts of a number of Explanatory Reports, can be found on the Internet site of the Hague Conference on Private International Law: http://www.hcch.net

The following States and Regional Economic Integration Organisations have accepted the Statute of the Conference which entered into force on 15 July 1955 and have consequently become Members of the Organisation: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, European Union, Finland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Nether lands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam and Zambia.

Supreme Court, 13 April 2012, Mothers of Srebrenica Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations