On March 12, 1996, President Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 also known by the names of its principal sponsors, Senator Helms (R-NC) and Representative Burton (R-IN), as the Helms-Burton Act. The United States thereby enacted a Bill that ‘internationalizes’ an essentially bilateral conflict with Cuba, which can be traced back to the Cuban Revolution, 37 years ago. The Act strengthens economic sanctions against Cuba, intending to protect property rights of Americans, eventually improve the human rights situation, cause the removal of the Castro regime3 and lead to the establishment of a democratically elected government.

International law as it applies to armed conflict necessarily treads a fine line between irrelevance to and complicity in its subject matter. The emergence of this body of law has been slow and painful, its foundational irony being that the treaty establishing the basis of modern international humanitarian law – the Nuremberg trials – was signed by the Allies on the same day that the United States dropped its second atomic bomb on Japan. This uncertain beginning, combined with the central role that nuclear weapons came to play in Cold War foreign policy, render it hardly surprising that the legal status of this most devastating class of weapons remained unclear for over half a century and is likely to remain so for some time to come.

The Protocol on Economic Relations (hereinafter: Economic Protocol or Protocol), signed between Israel and the PLO, reflects the schizophrenia that afflicts the agreement as a whole. Is it an agreement to separate Israel from the Palestinians, politically and economically, or is it an agreement of cooperation that will bring about an integration of their economies? These questions can hardly be answered before the parties have reached a shared view of the final status. In the meanwhile, the economic interim solution may dictate the political result. The Protocol provisions are not conducive to economic cooperation. Furthermore, its implementation so far raises serious doubts regarding its viability.

More than fifty years ago, some fifty States met in San Francisco to draw up the blueprint for the management of the future relations between States. Acting under the influence of the long and bloody conflict that was just coming to an end – a conflict which had left no doubt about the enormous capacity of States for oppressing, torturing and killing large numbers of individuals – the States present at San Francisco radically departed from the past by granting to the new institution certain powers and duties relating to human rights. Prior to the Second World War, there had been virtually no international standards that States were required to respect or observe in dealing with their own people, a void that was made painfully obvious by the Holocaust and other acts of mass brutality and death. Because the term ‘human rights’ basically describes and relates to the relationship between a State or its government and its own people, a relationship that is second to none in being ‘domestic’, the States at San Francisco were ploughing the deepest of all possible inroads into the affairs of sovereign States.

The 1996 report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) concerning Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages constitutes a landmark decision on the matter of precedent in world trade dispute settlement. The Appellate Body operates within the framework of the world trade dispute settlement system, originally consisting of the customary practices pursuant to Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the field of dispute settlement and presently set forth in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlements of Disputes (DSU) administered by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. This system has evolved since the entry into force of the Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT on 1 January 1948. It is probable that the prospect of this system building up its own case law and the practical implication of that case law for the development of world trade law was not initially foreseen, yet it is not surprising that, just as the effects of the jurisprudence of the World Court on international law, the panel reports became part and parcel of the legal sense of the multilateral trade community. Even though previous panel reports do not legally bind subsequent panels, panel reports are replete of references to precedent, just as in the case of the standing international courts and tribunals. Panels rely on such precedents as authoritative expressions of their views on decided points of international trade law. Similarly, parties in world trade dispute cases are themselves guided by previous panel reports in framing and presenting their cases. In short, as Jackson has indicated, certain international law effects emanate from panel reports.

In recent years the religious skyline of Dutch cities has changed considerably. Besides traditional Protestant and Catholic churches new buildings of worship (e.g., mosques, Hindu and Buddist temples) have been built. Newly-established religions have contributed considerably to a religious diversification in society. How does law reflect these changes? Does it take this pluralism into account? Generally speaking, law always lags behind developments in society. There is a good reason for this: society as a whole has to adapt to these changes, and law, which is an institutional form of basic social norms, must moderate this adaptation. The presence of these newly or not established religions puts tolerance to the test: both the tolerance of society as a whole and the tolerance expressed in the law.

The scourge of illegitimate governance in its many forms is, and always has been, globally endemic, constituting, in a contemporary sense, the single most important impoverishing and destabilising element in our ‘global neighbourhood’. If, in the view of nations, the major mandates of the law and common institutions of nations, as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations, are to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, to maintain international peace and security, and to be a centre for the harmonisation of the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends, then it is pertinent that international legal scholarship cast and maintain its powerful gaze upon this intensely pernicious phenomenon. It is also important that such scholarly enterprise be directed at the elucidation of the existing international regulatory framework for the control and perhaps elimination of such conduct; as well as at the construction of such a paradigm where none already exists.

The various provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) envision import regulations being triggered because of features or characteristics of products seeking entry into a country's customs territory, not because of the processes utilized in producing or harvesting such products. The origins of this emphasis on products rather than processes dates from at least the GATT decision in the Belgian Family Allowances case, and was explicitly articulated in the well-known and controversial 1991 GATT panel decision in United States – Restriction on Imports of Tuna from Mexico. The precise language of the panel decision in that latter case provided that import measures must be designed to regulate the imported item because of its features or characteristics ‘as a product’, and not because of ‘harvesting’ techniques that may have been employed in gathering or collecting the item. Obviously, this product rather than process oriented approach makes it difficult for non-product based national environmental laws to pass muster under the GATT. By excluding such laws from the ambit of what the basic substantive provisions of the GATT permit in the form of import regulation, national governments are forced to seek the protection of the exceptions of GATT Article XX. These, however, have been very narrowly construed, with the impression given being that of unreceptivity to measures aimed at protecting the environment.

During the last decade Dutch tort law has developed at such a monumental rate, that an overview might benefit readers that practice the law in other legal systems. These developments are not confined to the numerous judgments of the courts, but have resulted jointly from these decisions and from the activities of the legislature, i.e., (the judicial committees of) the Houses of Parliament conjointly with the Special Section for the New Civil Code of the Department of Justice. The work to renew the BW,1 commenced in 1947, involved a fundamental rethinking of the law of torts to be enacted in Book 6. This resulted in the publication of a proposal for Book 6, published in 1961, followed by a government draft bill in 1976. This draft bill was extensively discussed in the legal journals and it was later modified by a later draft bill. In all, it took Parliament some 15 years to finally amend and enact these drafts, together with those of Books 3, 5 and 7 (in part), and they finally entered into force in 1992.

When the UN Security Council (the Council) authorises military action under Chapter VII of the Charter, question marks arise concerning the legality and purpose of such operations. The contents of Chapter VII of the Charter are not literally being complied with, and States contributing to the force can be accused of using force in pursuit of their own national interests as opposed to the collective interests of the UN. When a State, or a group of States is authorised to use force to combat aggression, as against North Korea and Iraq, or to deal with threats to the peace, as in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Zaire and Albania, there is also confusion as to whether the States in question are simply exercising their inherent rights of self-defence, or are operating under the cloak of the controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention with the encouragement of the Council, or whether these are UN military operations somehow distinct from the forces of blue helmets that the UN is more famous for. Such confusion is further compounded by the new functions of the military option in the post-Cold War era. The collective security system that has evolved in practice is inevitable in a world where powerful States jealously harbour their military strength, thereby only allowing its collective use within a system that respects their interests. However, despite clear deficiencies, it is the contention here that UN-authorised actions are collective enforcement operations with a sound constitutional basis in the UN Charter. Internal regulation of such operations is ensuring UN control and a system of accountability to the Council. Practice shows that States regard these operations as serving the UN's purposes and not simply promoting national interests. This can only prove to strengthen the decentralised system and legitimise military action.

During the last few years, constitutional democracy has again become a hotly debated issue among constitutional scholars, political scientists and philosophers in Europe and the United States. Several scholars have written profound comments on the ideals of constitutionalism and democracy, and their place in contemporary political systems. While many proclaim the enduring validity of constitutional democracy, others make a plea for a radical redefinition of the concept.

Non-retroactivity of treaties is well-established in international law. Provisions of a treaty do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place, or any situation which ceased to exist before the treaty enters into force for that party. This principle precludes the possibility of litigation arising out of situations or facts dating from a period when a State could not have foreseen that the circumstances might give rise to legal proceedings.

What makes international law binding? This is a question that has often interested theorists and jurists. It has been regarded as identical with the question of what is the basis of obligation in international law. The meaning of the question being asked is sometimes not entirely clear. Being concerned with the binding force of international law may be easier to understand than speaking of the basis of obligation. It would be reasonable to assert that to talk of the binding force of law has a more accurate and specific connotation than referring only to the impact of obligations under the law. The meaning of the question being asked is sometimes not entirely clear. Being concerned with the binding force of international law may be easier to understand than speaking of the basis of obligation.1 It would be reasonable to assert that to talk of the binding force of law has a more accurate and specific connotation than referring only to the impact of obligations under the law. This is a minor point but is worth noting.

a) On p. 250, third line: ‘De Nederlandse exterritorialiteit in Siam’.

b) The UN Convention of Vienna of 24 April 1963 on Consular Relations: Official Records of UN Conference on Consular Relations, vol. I (Summary Records of Plenary Meetings and of Meetings of First and Second Committees): A/CONF. 25/16; vol. II (Annexes, Final Act, Convention, Optional Protocols, Resolutions): A/CONF.25/16 Add. 1.

c) Case law, p. 253, to be added:

President of the District Court of The Hague, 19 February 1988, Kort Geding 1988 No. 123; NIPR 1988 No. 407:

The Republic of Zaire had been declared bankrupt. In summary proceedings, the State of the Netherlands requested some injunctions to be given to the ‘curator’ (the trustee in bankruptcy). President Wijnholt, when giving the judgment as requested, considered the following: It is presumed that the State, in being a participant to the diplomatic intercourse has an interest of its own that the requested measures be taken. This can be inferred from statutory provisions of Dutch National law, such as Article 479a of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 13, para. 4 of the Regulation for Bailiffs (deurwaarders).

d) See for consular marriages, among others, Kosters, J., Dubbink, C.W., Algemeen Deel van het Nederlandse Internationaal Privaatrecht, ch. XXV, pp. 874–895.

e) The present Supreme Court decision was published in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1997 No. 469, with a comment by Th.M. de Boer.

f) The Dutch Government filed a bill on 28 October 1997 (Parliamentary Documents No. 25703) in order to have the Act on the Conflict of Laws in the field of Marriage (Wet conflictenrecht huwelijk) modified. As from the date of entering into force of the proposed statutory provisions, a Dutch national, regardless of other nationalities which he or she may have, can enter into a contract of marriage in the Netherlands before the registrar only. This is in line with the policy the government adhered to before the Supreme Court's decision.