Despite almost universal recognition within the international community of the importance of international environmental law, many complex issues continue to elude an appropriate legal response. A particularly controversial issue – and one that is proving increasingly difficult to resolve – is the question of how to reconcile the principle of environmental protection with that of free trade. Moreover, despite such positive platitudes as that contained within the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, nation states are quickly discovering that the issue is not simply one of abstract interest, but is actually beginning to influence both their domestic and international regulatory behaviour. This article seeks to present a broad overview of this issue as it relates to the European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, the article will critically discuss some of the more recent jurisprudence on this issue arising from these two, very different, ‘groupings’ of states. As will be noted, there are important similarities and differences between each ‘grouping’ in terms of its approach. And, of course, whilst it is acknowledged that many of these differences can be resolved by reference to the different aims and objectives of the different ‘groupings’, nevertheless, this article will try to move beyond a strictly comparative approach of the issues, and place them in a broader analytical framework. This is not an attempt to show which approach is ‘best’, but rather, to highlight the tensions between environmental protection and free trade.

In September 1958 the Venezuelan Ministry of Justice created a Commission, comprising Professors Roberto Goldschmidt, Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren and Joaquín Sánchez-Covisa, assigning it the task of preparing a Draft on Private International Law. A preliminary document was drawn up after ten months of intensive work, but the Commission decided to reflect on the Draft and it was only in April 1963 when it was completed, with an ‘Explanatory Report’ annexed.

The People's Republic of China (hereinafter: China) does not have a special statute on private international law. The relevant rules can be found mainly in China's Civil Procedural Law and the General Principles of the Civil Law. The rules of international jurisdiction are included in the former. In Part IV of the Civil Procedural Law entitled ‘Special Provisions for Civil Procedures Involving Foreign Parties’, there is a special chapter that is dedicated to the rules of international jurisdiction. This chapter has altogether four articles, all of which concern international jurisdiction over contract disputes.

The ILA approach to the progressive structuring of international society, so typical of later 19th Century social optimism, has from the very first found a warm advocate in its oldest national branch, the NVIR. The idea to assemble legal luminaries and captains of industry into a single body might not be quite representative of the Dutch, rather compartmentalized, tradition of legal thinking, but even so, the NVIR, after a first abortive attempt in 1875, from its ‘re-launch’ in 1910 invariably met with a thoroughly welcoming intellectual climate in the Netherlands.

Over the past century, the Society's (board) members have not consistently proved themselves visionaries in their anticipation of, or reaction to, social change, be this in the domestic sphere or the international domain. Symptomatic of this were the fairly conservative views they held on such issues as Neutrality or the League of Nations in the 1920s; on the conflict with Indonesia, also regarding New Guinea, in the post-WWII years; on the Benelux experiment and the Schuman Plan in the 1950s; or on the decolonization process in the 1960s.

Even so, in the final analysis, the views represented by the NVIR have invariably been a welcome, indeed fairly refreshing contribution to the Dutch social debate. Also, and in spite of the progressive institutionalization and codification in the international arena auspicated by a wealth of intergovernmental bodies, ILA and the NVIR never did, nor will they presumably, fail in carving a very respectable niche of their own in aspiring to help the implementation of the Rule of Law in this world drawing nearer.

Professor Rolin discusses the content of the Indonesian Nationalization Act and the Decrees for its implementation, and notes, inter alia, the following:

that the taking is confined to Netherlands enterprises, the implementing Decrees leaving open the possibility that it will not be restricted to property within Indonesia;

that the contemplated compensation does not represent the value of the enterprises, because it will evidently consist of only a part of the revenue from them, and that the payment of this compensation is deferred until some future date as yet unspecified.

It is also clearly indicated that the motive for the taking is “the struggle for the liberation of Western New Guinea”. According to official statements, the payment of compensation will also depend on there being a settlement satisfactory to Indonesia of the dispute over Western New Guinea. The taking is therefore an unfriendly, or even hostile act in reply to the attitude adopted by the Netherlands with regard to Western New Guinea.

The purpose of this lecture is to identify and investigate two things: (1) the centre of the intellectual activity described in its title as the defining and development of international law, and (2) the fundamental concept around which both defining and development revolve. The centre as indicated will be found to consist of (representatives of) what is to be called the three “legal archetypes”. The fundamental concept alluded to is the “normative concept of law”. The two notions are, of course, highly abstract as compared to the realities they are designed to help understand. They will be set forth as clearly as possible within the strict limits of this lecture, although it is realized that a truly satisfactory treatment cannot be imagined outside a full-size methodology. An apology beforehand is, therefore, in place. One particular question relating to the normative concept of law in international relations will be dealt with in some detail: it has to do with “tragedy in law” as resulting from the clash between competing normative concepts. As a final observation, the need for a maximum degree of flexibility in the international lawyer's way of thought will be stressed.

Since 1 March 2002 the EC Regulation No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation) operates in legal practice. On 1 May 2004 the new EU Member States had to accept the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation as acquis communautaire. The Regulation is now in force in all EU Member States, with the exception of Denmark. As mentioned in the previous survey, it is the intention to conclude eventually a convention with Denmark in which the solutions reached under the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation will be laid down. Then the necessary unity in the application of the rules of jurisdiction and of recognition and enforcement will be restored again. According to Article 68 EC the EC Court of Justice can give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation. Although the first questions are put before the ECJ, there is no decision as yet in which the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation has been interpreted. In one decision regarding the interpretation of Article 5(3) Brussels Convention concerning the forum delicti, the ECJ referred to the solutions reached under the same provision in the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation. The Court decided that Article 5(3) Brussels Convention could also be used in case the harmful event might occur.

The International Court of Justice, in its two successive guises, has on several occasions already had to deal with cases in which its own jurisdiction in the dispute brought before it was at issue. In nearly every instance when its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the merits of a case was challenged, the proceedings were divided, according to a provision in the Court's Rules of Procedure now embodied in Article 62, into a preliminary and a final phase, although such a division is not obligatory in the sense that the defendant party retains its freedom to raise its objections to the Court's jurisdiction not as a preliminary but simultaneously with its defence on the merits.

The Convention relating to the arrest of seagoing ships entered into force for the Netherlands on 20 July 1983. Its purpose is, first of all, to limit the possibility of arrest to maritime claims, as summed up in Article 1 (inter alia, claims arising from: collisions, salvage, carriage, wages, mortgage). In addition, Article 7 grants jurisdiction on the merits to the courts of the country where the arrest was made, if the domestic law of that country so provides, or in any of six situations enumerated in that Article.

In the following pages I intend to survey the judgments of the International Court of Justice pronounced in the course of 1959.

Owing to the differing degrees of importance from the legal point of view of the individual cases dealt with, their discussion will necessarily vary in length and thoroughness.

The purpose of this paper is the comparative study of the jurisdictional functions performed by attachment and garnishment under Belgian and American law. In other words, an attempt will be made to ascertain how and to what extent Belgian and American courts may adjudicate upon claims involving foreigners whose assets are found within their respective jurisdictions.