1. Medley, Dudley Julius, A Student's Manual of English Constitutional History (Oxford, 6th ed., 1925), p. 273.Google Scholar

2. Taswell-Langmead, Thomas Pitt, English Constitutional History from the Teutonic Conquest to the Present Time (London, 8th ed., 1919), p. 294.Google Scholar

3. The definition of an “international organization” is not beyond controversy. The scope of Peaslee, Amos J.'s International Governmental Organizations: Constitutional Documents (The Hague, Rev. 2d ed., 1961)Google Scholar has guided the selection of treaties that have been examined as sources for this article.

The following abbreviations are employed in the text or footnotes of this article:

African Development Bank (AfDB).

Asian Development Bank (AsDB).

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

European Economic Community (EEC).

European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

International Coffee Agreement (ICA).

International Monetary Fund (IMF).

International Sugar Agreement (ISA).

International Wheat Agreement (IWA).

Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

4. E.g., IMF, Article VII, Section 3(b); GATT, Article XVIII, Section C, par. 17 and Article XIX, par. 1; ISA, 1959, Article 7, par. 2. References hereinafter to an Article, preceded by an abbreviation, are to a provision of the treaty referred to in footnote 3.

5. E.g., IMF, Article VIII, Sections 2 and 3.

6. E.g., EEC, Article 73, par. 1; EFTA, Article 31, par. 5; GATT, Article XII, par. 4(c) and (d).

7. E.g., EEC, Article 73, par. 2; GATT, Article VI, par. 6(c).

8. EEC, Article 226. See Campbell, Alan, Common Market Law, Vol. II (London, 1969), pp. 155–57Google Scholar; Common Market Law Supplement, No. 2 (Vol. I, Chapter 11, 1971), p. 278.Google Scholar

9. ICA, 1968, Article 57, par. 3.Google Scholar

10. Compare, for example, Article 3 of EFTA and Article XXIII of GATT.

11. Kravis, Irving B., Domestic Interests and International Obligations: Safeguards in International Trade Organizations (Philadelphia, 1963), pp. 23–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12. Ibid., pp. 367–68.

13. ICA, 1968, Article 57, par. 2Google Scholar; EEC, Article 226, par. 3; LAFTA, Article 26.

14. ICA, 1968, Article 57, par. 1Google Scholar. The Convention establishing EFTA provides for waivers by majority decision (Article 10, par. 8, Article 31, par. 5) whereas the normal rule for other decisions requires unanimity (Article 32, par. 5).

15. ISA, 1959Google Scholar, Article 25; IWA, 1959, Article 10; ICA, 1968, Article 35, par. 4; LAFTA, Articles 23 and 24.

16. ISA, 1968, Article 28, par. 5.Google Scholar

17. ISA, 1968Google Scholar, Article 56, under which the power may be exercised, by special majorities, if there are “exceptional circumstances or emergency or force majeure not expressly provided for” and the organization is satisfied with the party's explanation of undue burden.

18. OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, Article 14(b). See also OECD Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations, Article 14(b).

19. GATT, Article XVIII, par. 1. See also LAFTA, Article 32.

20. GATT, Article XVIII, Section C, par. 16. See also pars. 17–22 of Article XVIII.

21. GATT, Article XVIII, pars. 17 and 21. See also Jackson, John H., World Trade and the Law of GATT: A Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Indianapolis, 1969), pp. 654–55.Google Scholar

22. ECSC, Article 88.

23. GATT, Article XII, par. 4(c)(ii).

24. GATT, Article XII, par. 4(d).

25. GATT, Article XXIII, par. 1.

26. GATT, Article XXIII, par. 2. See also Jackson, , op. cit., pp. 706–707, 178–87, 378, 763–64.Google Scholar

27. Dam, Kenneth W., The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization (Chicago, 1970), p. 352: “The system of sanctions built into the General Agreement conditions not only the manner of resolving disputes but also attitudes toward violations by a contracting party … ‘Illegality’ is an uncertain and ambiguous concept when applied to the General Agreement. Although the substantive provisions … are drafted in conventional terms, including a rather liberal use of prohibitory language, the remedy provisions are not drawn in terms of sanctions. Rather, the organizing principle is … a system of reciprocal rights and obligations to be maintained in balance.”Google Scholar

28. Ibid., p. 358.

29. EFTA, Article 31, pars. 1–4. See also Lambrinidis, John S., The Structure, Function, and Law of a Free Trade Area: The European Free Trade Association (New York, 1965), pp. 202–205.Google Scholar

30. Ibid., p. 224: “EFTA is the kind of treaty that cannot be made to operate on the basis of coercion of one sort or another, or through constant pressure. Such measures are made available to the Council by the Convention, in the sense that they may serve only as safety-valves and not as instruments for the promotion of the aims of the Association. They have been incorporated in the Convention in the expectation that the mere possibility of their employment may exercise a preventive rather than a corrective influence or, at most, a discreet occasional pressure on a ‘partner’ who displays a tendency to be neglectful of bis obligations. Once their use ceases to serve these limited purposes—and is no longer only occasional—and they are relied upon to ensure the operation of the Treaty, they clearly defeat their purposes and the Treaty should be either re-negotiated or withdrawn from.”

31. EEC, Article 8.

32. EEC, Article 226.

33. EFTA, Article 31, par. 5.

34. Lambrinidis, , op. cit., pp. 226–31.Google Scholar

35. ICA, 1968, Article 57, par. 1.

36. Jackson, , op. cit., pp. 543–45.Google Scholar

37. Ibid., p. 541. See also White, Eric Wyndham, “Note on the Effectiveness of Decisions Adopted by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” in The Effectiveness of International Decisions (edited by Schwebel, Stephen M.: Leyden and Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1971), pp. 306–307.Google Scholar

38. Dam, , op. cit., p. 354.Google Scholar

39. Ibid., p. 356.

40. Jackson, , op. cit., pp. 138, 543–52.Google Scholar

41. IMF, Article VIII, Section 2(a).

42. IMF, Selected Decisions of the Executive Directors and Selected Documents, Fifth Issue (Washington, 07 10, 1971Google Scholar; hereinafter cited as IMF, Selected Decisions), pp. 94–95.Google Scholar

43. IMF, Article VIII, Section 3.

44. IMF, Selected Decisions, pp. 100–102, 104, and 113.Google Scholar

45. GAIT, Article XXX.

46. Jackson, , op. cit., pp. 138–39.Google Scholar

47. Ibid., pp. 547–48: “Some waivers do not have any expiration date. These operate much like an amendment to GATT or a treaty reservation, favoring the recipient of the waiver over long periods of time, even with respect to newer GATT members who never had an opportunity to vote on the waiver. The United States agricultural waiver is perhaps the prime case in point, since its impact on world trade probably has been more extensive than any other waiver.” See also pp. 735–37.

48. IMF, Article IV, Sections 3 and 4(b).

49. IMF, Selected Decisions, p. 15.Google Scholar

50. IMF, The Role of Exchange Rates in the Adjustment of International Payments: A Report by the Executive Directors (Washington, 1970Google Scholar; hereinafter cited as IMF, Report on Exchange Rates), pp. 56–63, 74–75Google Scholar. See also IMF, Reform of the International Monetary System: A Report by the Executive Directors to the Board of Governors (Washington, 1972Google Scholar; hereinafter cited as IMF, Report on Reform), pp. 19–21.Google Scholar

51. IMF, The International Monetary Fund 1945–1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation (Washington, 1969Google Scholar; hereinafter cited as IMF, History), Vol. II, pp. 152–73.Google Scholar

52. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 240–41. Cf., p. 228. See also p. 273.

53. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 274–75

54. IMF, Annual Report, 1951, pp. 39–40.Google Scholar

55. IMF, History, Vol. I, p. 376.Google Scholar

56. Ibid., vol. III, pp. 222–24. See also IMF, Selected Decisions, pp. 7–10.Google Scholar The decision was replaced by a new decision in 1972. See Decision No. 3637-(72/41) G/S, May 8, 1972 in IMF, International Financial News Survey, vol. XXIV (1972), p. 196.Google Scholar

57. IMF, Article IV, Section 1(b).

58. IMF, History, vol. II, p. 167.Google Scholar

59. IMF, Annual Report, 1962, pp. 58–67.Google Scholar

60. IMF, Report on Exchange Rates, p. 76.Google Scholar

61. IMF, Selected Decisions, p. 108Google Scholar; IMF, Article VIII, Sections 2 and 3.

62. IMF, Report on Exchange Rates, pp. 27–28.Google Scholar

63. IMF, History, vol. II, p. 170.Google Scholar

64. Ibid. See also pp. 505–510.

65. Cf. Jackson, , op. cit., p. 758.Google Scholar

66. Ibid., pp. 539, 756; Kravis, , op. cit., p. 135.Google Scholar

67. Jackson, , op. cit., p. 710Google Scholar; Dam, , op. cit., p. 166Google Scholar: “When violations can be listed, one after another, for more than one hundred pages, the concept of illegality loses whatever moral connotations it might ever have had.”

68. Jackson, , op. dt., pp. 711–14Google Scholar: Tariff surcharges “have become almost a de facto part of the General Agreement. Although technically illegal when applied to bound items and imposed without a waiver from GATT, nevertheless, despite considerable verbal pressure such as condemnatory speeches and diplomatic representations, the surcharges have been tolerated at least for temporary periods, without significant retaliation in kind. The GATT contracting party that finds itself in a balance-of-payments difficulty in which a surcharge looks like an attractive policy may well find that appraisal of the situation makes the surcharge device employable without dangerous consequences other than embarrassment.” (P. 714).

69. IMF, Report on Exchange Rates, pp. 76–78.Google Scholar

70. IMF, Rules and Regulations, Rule K–2.

71. IMF, Report on Exchange Rates, pp. 26–28, 54–55, and 76.Google Scholar

72. For a discussion of the idea that GATT should be amended with respect to tariff surcharges, see Jackson, , op. cit., p. 714Google Scholar: “… a strong case can be made that the GATT should be amended to allow surcharges, and to regulate them. A Working Party has considered this possibility … An argument against amendment is that the existence of the technical illegality of the surcharge enables other countries to bring more pressure on the surcharging country to dismantle the surcharge. But this is a dangerous argument. It is an acknowledgment that the legal norm is unrealistic and that the law will be violated. It may also acknowledge that affairs are so arranged that violation is forced upon a country. Yet the violator is criticized for his activity. After a while, however, ears become deaf to such criticisms and the violation of other provisions of the General Agreement become easier …”

73. IMF, Report on Reform, Chapter II, Section 6, pp. 20–21.Google Scholar

74. IMF, Article VIII, Section 3.

75. Kafka, Alexandra, The IMF: The Second Coming? (Princeton University, Essays in International Finance, No. 94, 07 1972), pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

76. Re Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Pork Products into Italy: Commission of the E.E.C. v. The Italian Government (Case 7/61), 1962 C.M.L.R. 39, at p. 56Google Scholar; Re Import Duties on Gingerbread: The Commission of E.E.C. v. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of Belgium (Consolidated cases 2/62 and 3/62), 1963 C.M.L.R. 199, at p. 214.Google Scholar

77. IMF, Article VIII, Sections 2 and 3.

78. IBRD, Article VI, Section 5; AsDB, Articles 44 and 45; AfDB, Articles 46 and 47; IDB, Article X, Sections 1 and 2.

79. Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944 (Dept. of State Publication 2866, International Organization and Conference Series I, 3, Washington, 1948), pp. 57–58.Google Scholar

80. Ibid., pp. 570–71, 576–77.

81. Ibid., pp. 651–52, 697, and 825.

82. IMF, Article XVI, Section 2(b).

83. This statement is a paraphrase of the present provision. The original provision, which was amended on July 28, 1969, was more restrictive in permitting the use of the Fund's resources to meet capital transfers.

84. Under the amended Articles, some gold tranche purchases may involve an element resembling credit. See Gold, Joseph, The Reform of the Fund (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 12, Washington, 1969), p. 17.Google Scholar

85. There are similar connections between provisions that appear in different lines. For example, if the operation of Article V, Section 3 in line (ii) were suspended, Article VI, Section 2 in line (iii) would become inoperative. The reason is that all purchases of currency in return for the purchasing member's currency are made under Article V, Section 3. One of the conditions under that provision is a representation by the purchasing member that the currency requested is for making payments that are consistent with the provisions of the Articles, and Article VI, Section 2 is one of the provisions referred to. It would be possible, however, to suspend the operation of Article VI, Section 2 but not Article V, Section 3.

86. The reference to the initiative of members in Article V, Section 2 was meant to express the passivity of the Fund in financial transactions, and therefore one purpose of the power to suspend the operation of the provision might have been to enable the Fund to take the initiative in proposing certain transactions because it considered them to be in the general welfare.

87. IMF, Article XII, Section 5(d).

88. IMF, Annual Report, 1972, pp. 40, 44–46, 85–89.Google Scholar

89. IMF, By–Laws, Section 13.

90. IMF, Article XV, Section 2.