1. Whether the terms ‘armed aggression‘ and ‘armed attack‘ are coterminous is largely irrelevant to the discussion here since the invasions of South Korea and Kuwait were both.

2. Stone, J., Legal Controls of International Conflict (1954) pp. 234–237;Google ScholarStone, J., Aggression and World Order (1958) pp. 189–192;Google ScholarMalanczuk, P., Akehurst‘s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edn., (1997) p. 392, p. 397;Google ScholarRostow, E.V., ‘Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?‘, 85 AJIL (1991) pp. 506–510;CrossRefGoogle ScholarSchachter, O., ‘United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict‘, 85 AJIL (1991) p. 452, pp. 459–460;CrossRefGoogle ScholarLavalle, R., ‘The Law of the United Nations and the Use of Force under the Relevant Security Council Resolutions of 1990 and 1991 to Resolve the Persian Gulf Crisis‘, 23 NYIL (1992) p. 3, p. 62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. Quigley, J., ‘The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New Order or Disorder?’, 25 Cornell ILJ (1992) p. 1 at pp. 20–28.Google Scholar

4. see Stein, T., ‘Decentralized International Law Enforcement: The Changing Role of the State as Law Enforcement Agent‘, in Delbrück, J., ed., Allocation of Law Enforcement Authority in the International System (1995) p. 107.Google Scholar

5. The decentralised military option was also recognised by the General Assembly when it adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution, GA Res. 377, UN GAOR 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, p. 10 (3 November 1950).Google Scholar See Simma, B., ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (1994) p. 235.Google Scholar

6. Teson, F.R., Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd edn. (1997) pp. 228–234.Google ScholarLillich, R.B., ‘Humanitarian Intervention through the United Nations: Towards the Development of Criteria‘, 53 ZaöRV (1993) pp. 563–569.Google Scholar

7. Gill, T.D., ‘Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter‘, 26 NYIL (1995) p. 46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8. This is not the same as the contention by Freudenschuss that the actions against North Korea and Iraq were hybrids, a cross between those provisions of Chapter VII dealing with collective self-defence (Art. 51) and those dealing with collective security (principally Art. 42). See Freuden-schuss, H., ‘Between Unilateralism and Collective Security: Authorisations of the Use of Force by the UN Security Council‘, 5 EJIL (1994) p. 522. The point here is that the actions were not truly collective in the original Charter sense.Google Scholar

9. Gill, , loc. cit. n. 7, p. 57.Google Scholar

10. Sakensa, K.P., The United Nations and Collective Security (1974) pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

11. Mander, L.A., Foundation of a Modern World Society (1948) p. 59.Google Scholar

12. Looking simply at the numbers, in the case of Korea the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, stated on 16 February 1951 that ‘[military] sanctions have been imposed by a truly international army, almost half of whose members are American, it is true, but at least 52 per cent of them are from Korea and a dozen Member countries‘, see Cordierand, A.W.Foote, W., eds., Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Volume I Trygve Lie (1969) p. 381.Google Scholar More realistically, however, Goodrich states that the US had a ‘dominant role‘ in Korea contributing ‘roughly 90 per cent of the non-Korean forces in the field’ in Goodrich, L.M., ‘Korea: Collective Measures Against Aggression‘, 494 International Conciliation (1953) p. 162.Google Scholar In the case of Iraq, the Joint Commander of Operation Granby (the UK's contribution to the Coalition), reported on 28 June 1991 that ‘the Coalition forces numbered over 700,000 men and women drawn from 30 nations. The US provided the majority of the personnel—some 540,000 people— and consequently took the lead in formulating the operations plans‘ in Weller, M., ed., Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and their Aftermath (1993) p. 312.Google Scholar

13. Claude, I.L., Power and International Relations (1962) pp. 110–168.Google ScholarKupchan, C.A., ‘The Case for Collective Security‘, in Downs, G.W., ed., Collective Security Beyond the ColdWar (1995) pp. 42–44.Google Scholar

14. Franck, T.M., “The Bona Fides of Power: Security Council and Threats to the Peace‘, 240 Hague Receuil (1993 III) p. 190.Google Scholar

15. The Korean action received support from the General Assembly in GA Res. 376, UN GAOR 5th Sess. (7 October 1950). Less obvious support was forthcoming in the military response to the invasion of Kuwait. See for example GA Res. 46/135, UN GAOR 46th Sess. Supp. No. 49, p. 207 (17 December 1991). See further GA Res. 49/27, GAOR 49th Sess. Supp. No. 49, p. 32 (5 December 1994) on Haiti; GA Res. 49/206 UN GAOR 49th Sess. Supp. No. 49 p. 227 (23 December 1994) on Rwanda; GA Res. 48/146, UN GAOR48th Sess. Supp. No. 49 (20 December 1993) re Somalia; GA Res. 50/193, UN GAOR 50th Sess. Supp. No. 49 (22 December 1995), on Bosnia. Clearly, most of these endorsements were retrospective. Ideally, prospective approval by the Assembly should be given although this is a little difficult to achieve within the current framework given that the Assembly only normally meets in annual general session.

16. Singh, J.N., Use of Force under International Law (1984) p. 82.Google Scholar

17. Diehl, P.F., International Peacekeeping (1994) p. 7.Google Scholar

18. For the requirements for collective self-defence see Case Concerning Military and Paramili-tary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, ICJ Rep. (1986) pp. 118–123.Google Scholar But see Bowett, D.W., Self-Defence in International Law (1958) p. 209.Google Scholar

19. Art. 5 of the NATO Treaty 1949, 34 UNTS p. 243; Art. 4 of the Warsaw Pact 1955, 219 UNTS p. 3.

20. Russell, R.B. and Muther, J.M., A History of the United Nations Charter (1958) p. 96, p. 105.Google Scholar

21. UN SCOR, 2nd Sess., Special Supp. No. 1, 1947.Google Scholar

22. See US Presidential Decision on US Participation in UN Operations, 33 ILM (1994) p. 795.Google Scholar

23. United Nations Blue Book Series, The United Nations and Somalia 1992–1996 (1996) p. 33.Google Scholar

24. Cot, J.P. and Pellet, A., eds., La Charte des Nations Unies, 2nd edn. (1991) pp. 709–711.Google ScholarMalanczuk, , op. cit. n. 2, p. 389.Google Scholar

25. Simma, , op. cit. n. 5, p. 633.Google ScholarGill, , loc. cit. n. 7, p. 55.Google Scholar

26. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, ICJ Rep. (1962) p. 151, p. 168.Google Scholar

27. SC 3046th meeting UN SCOR 47th Sess.(31 January 1992).

28. But see Quigley, loc. cit. n. 3.

29. Gill, , loc. cit. n. 7, p. 61.Google Scholar

30. Stein, , loc. cit. n. 4, p. 125.Google ScholarArend, A.C., ‘The United Nations and the New World Order’, 81 Georgetown LJ (1993) p. 491, pp. 507–511.Google Scholar

31. For example, the US withdrawal from the Adriatic Naval Patrol in November 1994 authorised to prevent the sanctions against Serbia from being breached by SC Res. 787, UN SCOR 47th Sess (16 November 1992). In the case of Zaire the multilateral force under Canadian command decided not to intervene in 1996–1997 upon its own assessment of the refugee crisis, despite receiving authorisation from the Security Council in SC Res. 1080, UN SCOR51st Sess. (15November 1996).

32. Russell, and Muther, , op. cit. n. 20, p. 688.Google Scholar

33. The US argument that the OAS's recommendation of military measures in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was not subject to UN authorisation is rightly dismissed by Akehurst, M., ‘Enforce-ment Action by Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the Organisation of American States’, 42 BYIL (1967) p. 175, p. 202.Google Scholar

34. See also Art. 103 of the UN Charter.

35. Witness the domination of the ECOWAS force in Liberia by Nigeria—see Weller, M., ed., Regional Peace-keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis (1994) pp. 84–87, 97–98, 101–102, 373–374. See also the Arab League force in Lebanon since 1976 dominated by Syria-I. Pogany, The Arab League and Peacekeeping in the Lebanon (1987).Google Scholar

36. 35 ILM (1996)p. 73. SCRes. 1031, UNSCOR 50th Sess. (15December 1995). Resolution 1031 referred only to Chapter VII of the Charter. Previous resolutions authorising NATO action referred to Chapter VII. See for example SC Res. 770, UN SCOR 47th Sess. (13 August 1992). However, SC Res. 816, UN SCOR 48th Sess. (31 March 1993) did refer to Chapter VIII as well.

37. Blokker, N.M. and Muller, S., ‘NATO as the Security Council';s Instrument: QuestionMarks from the Perspective of International Law’, 9 Leiden JIL (1996) p. 417.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

38. On the question whether the Soviet' s absence undermined the legality of the UN authorisation to undertake military enforcement action against North Korea, in particular that die Resolutions lacked die ‘concurring’ votes of die permanent members required by Art. 27(3) see Bailey, S.D., Voting in the Security Council (1969) p. 70.Google Scholar A similar argument has been made in relation to Chinese abstention on Resolution 678 in die Gulf Crisis—see Quigley, , loc. cit. n. 3, pp. 28–32.Google Scholar However, abstention has not been treated as a veto under Art. 27 in die practice of the Council—see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)ICJ Rep. (1971) p. 16, p. 22.Google Scholar On the compatibility of diis practical interpretation widi die text of Art. 27(3) see Amerasinghe, C.F., Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organisations (1996) p. 54.Google Scholar It would appear logical for absence to be treated in the same way as abstention, particularly when the Soviet Union was, itself, probably in violation of Art. 28(1) of the Charter. The UK, for instance, made strenuous efforts to rebut die Soviet argument in die case of Korea thereby reflecting the importance the contributing States attached to Council authority. See Farrar-Hockley, A., The British Part in the Korean War. Volume I. A Distant Obligation (1990) p. 57.Google Scholar

39. However, it has been argued that die UN action against Iraq was less clearly based on the collective security provisions because in die case of Korea die Council authorised the creation of a Unified Command and allowed the UN flag to be flown—SC Res. 84,7 July 1950. See Quigley, , loc. cit. n. 3, p. 42;Google ScholarLavalle, , loc. cit. n. 2, pp. 62–64.Google Scholar However, Gill, , loc. cit. n. 7, at p. 58 appears to be correct when he states that such matters are not important but ‘radier what the source or aauthority for die operation is and whether it is carried out with the object and purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security’.Google Scholar

40. UN Docs. S/21492, S/21501 (1990).

41. See for example, Prime Minister Thatcher's statement in the House of Commons, Hansard, H.C., 6th series, vol. 7, p. 737. For the US position see SC 2937th meeting, UN SCOR45th Sess. (18 August 1990).

42. The Independent (London), 9 November 1990, USSR; The Observer (London), 11 November 1990, France and China. See also The Independent (London), 9 November 1990 for statement to this effect by the Secretary-General.

43. SC Res. 665, UN SCOR 45th Sess. Resolutions p. 21 (25 August 1990).

44. SC Res. 678, UN SCOR 45th Sess. Resolutions p. 27 (29 November 1990).

45. SC 2938th meeting, UN SCOR 45th Sess. (25 August 1990). This appears to be incorrect in that the enforcement of an embargo imposed by the Council is only possible by a further resolution of the Council. See Gill, , loc. cit. n. 7, p. 99.Google Scholar

46. Schachter, , loc. cit. n. 2, p. 460.Google Scholar

47. See Amerasinghe, , loc. cit. n. 38, p. 50.Google Scholar

48. SC 477th meeting, UN SCOR 5th Sess.(25 July 1950).

49. Farrar-Hockley, , op. cit. n. 38, pp. 83–84.Google Scholar

50. Ibid., p. 100, p. 102, p. 191.

51. GA Res. 376, UN SCOR 5th Sess. (7 October 1950).

52. Farrar-Hockley, op. cit. n. 38, p. 209.

53. Ibid., p. 402.

54. Bowett, D.W., United Nations Forces (1964) pp. 45–47.Google Scholar

55. Lie, T., In the Cause of Peace (1954) p. 334.Google Scholar

56. See Transcript of Radio-Press Conference on the Korean Crisis, in Cordier, and Foote, , op. cit. n. 12, pp. 321–322.Google Scholar

57. UN Doc. A/1287 (1950). See also his reference to UN ‘collective security action’ at a Press Conference,16 Feb 1951, Cordier, and Foot, , op. cit. n. 12, p. 381.Google Scholar

58. The Secretary-General stated that ‘even if the Security Council had been blocked by the use of the veto, the General Assembly, where there is no veto, could have made the same recommen-dation‘. Ibid., p. 351.

59. Ibid., p. 397.

60. Ibid., pp. 519, 521. On the negotiations leading to the armistice and the involvement of the UN General Assembly and the Unified Command see Bailey, S.D, The Korean Armistice (1992) chapters 3 and 4.Google Scholar

61. Also found in SC Res. 84 (1950) regarding the Korean operation.

62. SC 2963rd meeting, UN SCOR 45th Sess.(29 November 1990).

63. Bowett, , op. cit. n. 18, p. 46.Google Scholar

64. SC 2981st meeting, UN SCOR 46th Sess.(3 April 1991).

65. The subsequent military operations by Western States against Iraq in 1991,1993 and 1996, as well as the imposition of no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq by those same States do not have the same authority. Reliance on SC Res 688, UN SCOR 46th Sess. (5 April 1991) is insufficient to create a constitutional link between the Council and the military operation given that the resolution did not explicitly authorise any ‘necessary measures’ to protect the Kurds in the north or the Shi'ites in the south.

66. Murphy, S.D., ‘The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security After the Cold War’, 32 Columbia JTL (1994) p. 275 n. 227.Google Scholar See also Scheffer, D.J., ‘United Nations Peace Operations and Prospects for a Standby Force‘, 28 Cornell ILJ (1995) pp. 649–651.Google Scholar

67. Ibid. An enforcement action, like a peace-keeping operation, may be deployed with the consent of the government, for example in Albania. However, this does not affect its status as an enforcement action, since such an action is defined by its coercive mandate and capacity. A peace-keeping force has a non-coercive mandate and capacity.

68. For example, the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) signed by President Clinton on 2 May 1994 sets out strict guidelines for US involvement in UN military operations, loc. cit. n. 22. See also Scheffer, , loc. cit. n. 66, pp. 652–655.Google Scholar

69. The UK Ambassador to the UN, John Weston, identified humanitarian intervention as a major role for the UN in the 21st century. The Times (London), 11 04 1997.

70. At the 1992 UN Summit of Council Members a declaration was issued recognising that ‘the absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not in itself insure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian, ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters’. New York Times (New York), 1 February 1992. See SC 3046th meeting, loc. cit. n. 27.

71. SC Res. 794, UN SCOR47th Sess. (3 December 1992) (Somalia); SC Res. 816, UN SCOR 48th Sess. (31 March 1993) (Bosnia-Herzegovina); SC Res. 836, UN SCOR48th Sess. (4 June 1993) (Bosnia-Herzegovina); SC Res. 929, UN SCOR49th Sess. (22 June 1994) (Rwanda); SC Res. 940, UN SCOR 49th Sess. (31 July 1994) (Haiti); SC Res. 1031, UN SCOR 50th Sess. (15 December 1995) (Bosnia-Herzegovina); SC Res. 1080, UN SCOR 51st Sess. (15 November 1996) (Zaire); SC Res. 1101, UN SCOR 52nd Sess. (28 March 1997) (Albania).

72. White, N.D., Keeping the Peace: the United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 2nd edn. (1997) p. 48.Google Scholar

73. SC Res. 688, UN SCOR 46th Sess. (5 April 1991).

74. The Hungarian representative at the Council meeting for the adoption of SC Res. 794 pointed out that the resolution marked an important step from SC Res. 678 proving the possibility of UN-authorized wide-scale humanitarian action. See SC Res. 3145th meeting, UN Security Council Provisional Records(S/PV) 47th Sess. (3 December 1992) p. 48.

75. For further discussion on implications of SC Res. 794 see Hutchinson, M.R., ‘Restoring Hope: UN Security Council Resolutions for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention‘, 34 Harvard ILJ (1993) pp. 624–640.Google Scholar

76. See comments of Zimbabwe representative, SC 3145th meeting, loc. cit. n. 74, p. 7, and the speech be the Austrian representative calling for similar action to be taken in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 3173x2013;32.

77. See speech by Indian representative, loc. cit. n. 74, p. 51, and the British representative's emphasis on the uniqueness of the Somali case, pp. 34–35.

78. See Zimbabwe representative's speech, loc. cit. n. 74, p. 7.

79. SC Res. 713, UN SCOR 46th Sess. (25 September 1991).

80. Emphasis added. Schachter, O., ‘The United Nations and Internal Conflicts’, in Moore, J.N., eds., Law and Civil War in the Modern World (1974) p. 403.Google Scholar

81. For a detailed discussion of American pressure for the adoption of Resolution 678 see Weston, B.H., ‘Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitima-cy’, 85 AJIL (1991) p. 516.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

82. Loc. cit. n. 71.

83. Member States at the Council meeting for the adoption of SC Res. 816 admitted that the lack of enforcement mechanisms in many of its resolutions concerning the former-Yugoslavia had permitted ‘the intransigent party to act with impunity, unafraid of any consequences of its deeds’ (Djibouti representative). By authorising ‘all necessary measures’ to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina the Council signalled that it was not prepared to have its resolutions flouted, (UK representative), SC 3191st meeting, UN S/PV 48th Sess. (31 March 1993) pp. 12, 16.

84. See the speech by the Venezuelan representative at the Council meeting for the adoption of SC Res. 816 on me enforcement of me no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, ibid., pp. 8–11.

85. Kelly, C., ‘Responding to disaster during conflict: need for changes in disaster management techniques‘, Paper presented at me International Emergency Management and Engineering Society Conference1994Google Scholar in Wood, W. B., ‘From Humanitarian Relief to Humanitarian Intervention: Victims, Interveners and Pillars‘, 15(8) Political Geography (1996) p. 679.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

86. Letter dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/24868 (1992).

87. Hutchinson, , loc. cit. n. 75, p. 632.Google Scholar

88. Ibid., p. 631.

89. Rowe, P., ‘The United Nations Rules of Engagement and the British Soldier in Bosnia‘, 43 ICLQ (1994) p. 947.Google Scholar

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., pp. 947–949.

92. The concept of ‘safe areas‘ was extended to areas in the Republic of Croatia under SC Res. 958, UN SCOR 49th Sess. (19 November 1994) which authorised the use of air power by NATO to protect such areas.

93. See speech by the Bosnian representative at SC 3228th meeting, UN S/PV 48th Sess. (4 June 1993) p. 5.

94. See speeches by the French and British representatives, ibid., pp. 11–14, pp. 56–58, respectively.

95. Venezuela and Pakistan abstained disagreeing with the way in which SC Res 836 proposed to implement ‘safe areas’. Venezuela had been at the forefront in the adoption of SC Res 819 and 824 and agreed with the concept of ‘safe areas’, but felt the concept had lost all credibility since these areas were ‘nothing more than ethnic reservations under the wing of the United Nations’ synonymous with prisons, concentration camps and ghettoes. Instead, it favoured a more determined resolution which would guarantee freedom of movement into and out of the areas wim an interna-tional military presence. Security against military attacks would only be possible by seizing or neutralising the heavy armaments of the Serbs, loc. cit. n. 93, pp. 22–23.

96. Loc. cit. n. 86.

97. Loc. cit. n. 93, p. 16.

98. See speech by the Venezuelan representative, loc. cit. n. 93, p. 21.

99. Art. 47(3).

100. Although proposals have been put forward to the UN for such an arrangement, see SC 3046th meeting, loc. cit. n. 27. Furthermore, the Dutch Government proposed the establishment of a ‘UN Rapid Deployment Brigade’ to be deployed immediately following a Council resolution, and not only used for peace-keeping operations but Chapter VII operations too. The Canadian Government recommended the creation of a standby ‘UN Vanguard Force’. See Scheffer, , loc. cit. n. 66, pp. 657–658.Google Scholar

101. Murphy, , loc. cit. n. 66, pp. 223–224.Google Scholar

102. See Hutchinson, loc. cit. n. 75.

103. Para. 12.

104. Murphy, , loc. cit. n. 66, pp. 222–235 and 278.Google Scholar

105. At the Council meeting for the adoption of SC Res. 794, the Hungarian representative recognised that international action, especially important offers made by a number of States, had led to the adoption of the Resolution, loc. cit. n. 74, p. 47.

106. Murphy, loc. cit. n. 66, p. 278 n. 236.

107. SC Res. 1080, UN SCOR 51st Sess. para. 3 (15 November 1996).

108. Murphy, , loc. cit. n. 66, p. 283.Google Scholar

109. Ibid.

110. Murphy believes that closer cooperation will enhance the ability of a regional organisation to bring pressure to bear on the potential aggressor, whilst at the same time keeping in the front line the organisation best equipped to resolve the problem, loc. cit. n. 66, pp. 283–284.

111. Teson, , op. cit. n. 6, pp. 264–265.Google Scholar

112. The Times (London), 30 August 1995.

113. See Zimbabwe representative's speech, loc. cit. n. 74, p. 7.

114. See, for instance, speech by the Indian representative at the meeting for the adoption of SC Res. 794, favouring a UN commanded and controlled action but welcoming the compromise for political control by the UN and strategic control by the Commanders, loc. cit. n. 74, p. 51. The Chinese representative took the view that SC Res. 794 authorised certain countries to take military action ‘which may adversely affect the collective role of the UN’, loc. cit. n. 74, p. 17.

115. Although the representative from me Ukraine called for IFOR's right to self-defence to be interpreted restrictively, SC 3607th meeting, UN S/PV 50th Sess. 15 December 1995) p. 29.

116. See speeches by the British representative, ibid., p. 8; the US representative p. 20; and the French representative p. 21. For conflicting views on the legitimacy of IFOR's power to detain indicted persons, see Scheffer, D.J., ‘International Judicial Intervention’, 102 Foreign Policy (1996) pp. 34–51;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Ciechanski, J., ‘Enforcement Measures under Chapter VII of die UN Charter: UN Practice after the Cold War’, 3(4) International Peacekeeping (1996) pp. 82–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

117. The Nigerian representative at the Council meeting for the adoption of SC Res. 1031 argued that multinational forces should be placed at the disposal of the UN and operated under the command of the Secretary-General. The UN should not continue ‘to contract out what would normally be a UN responsibility to a group of powerful states’, loc. cit. n. 115, p. 15.

118. The Russian representative at the Council meeting stated that ‘Russia will consistently defend the need to avoid unjustified use of force in the course of the operation’, loc. cit. n. 115, p. 25.

119. For example, operative para. 8 of SC Res. 940 on Haiti states that ‘the multinational force will terminate … when a secure and stable environment has been established and UNMIH has adequate force capability and structure to assume the full range of its functions; the determination will be made by the Security Council, taking into account recommendations from the Member States of the multinational force, which are based on the assessment of the commander of the multinational force, and from the Secretary-General’. For a discussion on the confusion between peace-keeping and peace-making mandates, see Ciechanski, , loc. cit. n. 116, pp. 89–93.Google Scholar

120. Adopted by 10 votes in favour and 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan), 22 June 1994.

121. Emphasis added.

122. SC 3413th meeting, UN S/PV 49th Sess. (31 July 1994) p. 5. The resolution was adopted with 12 votes in favour and 2 abstentions (Brazil and China).

123. Adopted with fourteen votes in favour and one abstention. China abstained on the grounds that it ‘had never been in favour of the Security Council frequently invoking Chapter VII of the Charter in authorizing action’ in a country. However, in view of the requests made by the Albanian government it did not want to prevent the adoption of the resolution. See SC 3758th meeting, UN S/PV 52nd Sess. (28 March 1997) p. 3. In contrast, China voted in favour of SC Res. 1031 on Bosnia-Herzegovina and justified this on the grounds that the ‘urgent wishes of the parties concerned‘ must be considered, loc. cit. n. 115, p. 14. Thus, the issue of consent is not a legal prerequisite for military action, although some States may use it as a political justification. In any case, with or without consent, the military action is still recognised as a Chapter VII operation, even by those States abstaining. See, for instance, the speech by the Chinese representative at the meeting for the adoption of SC Res. 940 on Haiti where it abstained, yet recognised that the proposed action was a Chapter VII operation, ibid., p. 10.

124. Established to oversee political control of the operation. Consisting of the Political Directors of the troop-contributing countries, the Commander of the operation, and chaired by Italy with France as Vice-Chairman.

125. Letter dated 14 June 1997 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1997/460 (1997).

126. Member States at the Council meeting for the adoption of SC Res. 794 supported enforcement action, so long as this was controlled by the UN and subject to rigorous reporting to the Council by the Secretary-General and an ad hoc commission composed of Council members. See comments of French representative, loc. cit. n. 74, pp. 28–31.

127. Letter dated 27 September 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN SCOR 49th Sess., UN Doc. S/1994/1107 (1994).

128. Murphy, , loc. cit. n. 66, p. 280.Google Scholar