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Retroactive Application of Treaties Revisited: Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

Adrian Chua  and
Rohan Hardcastle
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Extract

Non-retroactivity of treaties is well-established in international law. Provisions of a treaty do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place, or any situation which ceased to exist before the treaty enters into force for that party. This principle precludes the possibility of litigation arising out of situations or facts dating from a period when a State could not have foreseen that the circumstances might give rise to legal proceedings.

Type
Articles
Information
Netherlands International Law Review , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , December 1997 , pp. 414 - 420
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1997

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References

1. This principle was applied in the Ambatielos Case (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Rep. (1952) 28 at 40, and codified in Art. 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS p. 331. It is recognised as a general principle of international law by tribunals such as the European Commission of Human Rights (De Becker v. Belgium, App. No. 214/56, [1958] 2 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 214 at 230) and the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement panels (United States - Countervailing Duties on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil, 4 October 1989, GATT Doc. SCM/94, at para. 4.10) and Appellate Body (Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, 21 February 1997, WT/DS22/AB/R).

2. Phosphates in Morocco (Preliminary Objections), 1938 PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 74, at p. 23.

3. Supra n. 1.

4. International Law Commission, Commentary on the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, Adopted by the International Law Commission at its Eighteenth Session, 2 ILC Yearbook (1966).

5. Art. 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra n. 1.

6. De Becker, supra n. 1; Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) No. 40/1993/435/514, European Court of Human Rights, 18 December 1996. For a comprehensive analysis as to what constitutes a continuing act see Pauwelyn, J., ‘The Concept of a “Continuing Violation” of an International Obligation: Selected Problems’, LXXI BYIL (1995) p. 415.Google Scholar

7. The Golder Case, 57ILR (1975) 201, 213–4; US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case, ICJ Rep. (1980) 3.

8. ICJ Rep. (1996).

9. 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS p. 277.

10. Supra n. 8, para. 34.

11. [1976] YUN 1052.

12. Supra n. 8, para. 34.

13. Supra n. 8, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreca, para. 120.

14. Supra n. 1.

15. Supra n. 1, at n. 40.

16. Supra n. 8, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreca, para. 120.

17. Supra n. 8, para. 34.

18. ICJ Rep. (1951) 15, 23.

19. Supra n. 8, para. 31.

20. Supra n. 8, para. 34.

21. 1924 PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 2.

22. Idem, at p. 35 (emphasis added).

23. Lauterpacht, Hersch, The Development of International Law by the International Court (1958) p. 244. This interpretation of the statement in the Mavrommatis case was not accepted by Judge Armand-Ugon in the Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Preliminary Objections) ICJ Rep. (1964) 162. In his dissenting judgment, Judge Armand-Ugon interpreted the jurisdiction to decide ‘all disputes referred to it’ as the jurisdiction to decide disputes arising after the entry into force of the treaty.Google Scholar

24. Supra n. 2, at 23.