Major events concerning national minorities continue to occur on a daily basis. Long lingering issues surface throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, often after decades of official denial and repression.

After its establishment in 1918–1919, Czechoslovakia was a multinational state and some of its minorities protested against their being included into it. The nationality problem was related to the collapse of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1938 and the loss of some of its territories to Germany, Poland, and Hungary. It may be pointed out that the 1920 Constitution did not recognize a separate Slovak national identity and that the Czechs and Slovaks were termed “Czechoslovaks.” The post-Munich Second Republic recognized a separate Slovak nationality; however, the state came to its end in March 1939. In 1945, after its reestablishment as a national state of the Czechs and Slovaks, the country's government attempted to liquidate the national minorities' problem in a drastic manner by transfer (expulsion) of Germans and Hungarians.

It has already been pointed out by many scholars that the supranational Soviet state meets many sociological criteria of an empire. Thus, it is populated by many different ethnic groups; they did not join the state voluntarily, having all been conquered in the past or incorporated into the state by force; and they are still forcefully kept together, even though force is far from being the only factor. Last but not least, the Soviet empire, like any other, has one dominating nation: the Russians. Thus, many regularities in other empires may also be applicable to the Soviet Union.

In this paper we present an approach to national problems in Estonia today and report an empirical assessment of some of the major causes that have brought us to the complicated problematic situation today. We make use of materials from sociological public opinion research done in 1986 and 1988.

The uneven course of Hungary's domestic politics and its relations with its socialist neighbors, which have large Magyar populations, has deeply affected the evolution of its minorities' policies since 1948. Initially, the minorities question seemed to be an insignificant issue, since 1949 census figures showed that only 128,758 people out of a total population of 9,204 799 chose something other than Hungarian as their primary language.

Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934) was one of the most important Ukrainian public figures of modern times. In the realm of scholarship, he was the greatest of Ukrainian historians whose ten-volume History of Ukraine-Rus' charted the saga of the Ukrainian people from antiquity to modern times. He was a prolific writer and essayist whose personal bibliography lists over 2,000 titles. He was also the principal organizer of an unofficial Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Austrian Galicia—the Shevchenko Scientific Society—and towards the end of his life became the single most important cultural figure in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

National relations in the Second Republic contained a number of problems which throughout the entire interwar period did not find an appropriate solution. Among those was the question of the Orthodox Church in Poland. Although its believers comprised over 11 percent of the country's population, up to 1938 the Polish authorities did not legally regulate the organizational and material situation of the Orthodox Church in Poland, which was founded as a unit independent of the Russian Orthodox Church after the proclamation of an autocephalous status in 1922.

The history of Judaism in the Soviet Union is not a happy one. The Soviet Union, in a policy reminiscent of the premodern age, has persecuted the Jewish religion and not—with the exception of the 1948-53 period—Jews as persons. This does not mean that there was not discrimination. Anti-Jewish discrimination began about 1944 and presumably still continues in spite of Gorbachev's reported attempts to ease it. But we see no clear signs that the purges of the thirties were directed at Jewish party members as such. Recent research also does not credit the once common belief that the liquidation of the “Evsektsiia” (Jewish sections of the Communist party) in 1930 was an anti-Jewish act.

Mass deportations of native populations (Jews included) from territories annexed by the USSR in 1939–40 in amicable division of spoils with Nazi Germany and its allies had everywhere the same historical background and followed roughly the same procedure. Territories in question included the states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in their entirety, parts of Finland, nearly one-half of pre-1939 Poland, and the formerly Romanian regions of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

Common historical wisdom has it that the Peasant Revolt of 1907 and the elections of December 1937 reflected the profound anti-Semitism of the Romanian peasantry. And since the events of 1907 and 1937 have also been looked upon as decisive in determining the course of the history of the peasantry, if not of Romania as such, it seems only proper to assess the accuracy of these contentions.

The revolt of 1907 was indeed a social movement directed against the exploitation of the impoverished Moldavian and Wallachian peasantry by Romanian landlords and Jewish “arendaşi” (Leaseholders). After 1907, and throughout the interwar years, Romanian historiography and political propaganda stressed the anti-Semitic character of the uprising in an effort to exonerate the absentee, and other, Romanian landowners and to emphasize the exploitative nature of Jews and Jewish capitalism. The Jewish question was organically connected with the peasant question in a variety of ways, all condemnatory of Jewish and Judaizing capitalism.

As none of the major political parties of pro-World War I Romania—or, for that matter, few of interwar Romania as well—paid more than lip service to the economic and social plight of the peasants, it was convenient to regard the Jew as the root cause of all the evils affecting the peasantry. Before World War I, populists and, paradoxically, socialists enunciated political theories regarding “neoserfdom,” which, however different in origin, converged in demands for radical land reform. The reform came not because of such demands but because of the Bolshevik Revolution and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. Officially, it was unrelated to any political ideology, certainly separated from the Jewish question which, in theory, was resolved concurrently with the peasant question through the granting of citizenship and extension of political rights to the Jews of Romania. Following the countrywide agrarian reform in Greater Romania the peasant and the Jewish questions were in fact severed as Jews and Jewish capitalism had virtually no connections with the land.

The conventional distinction between Soviet and Western uses of the term democracy juxtaposes socioeconomic against political considerations— that is, for the former the stress is upon social equality and economic security, whereas for the latter it is upon civil liberty and political freedom. The tone and character of the Bolshevik approach to institutions which in the West are associated with liberal, parliamentary democracy can best be captured in the words of Lenin himself:

Until Gorbachev's glasnost', Soviet treatment of nationalities problems within the USSR ranged from carefully worded ethnographic studies to utterly dishonest articles in the political press. Much of this has changed, and we are now able to read some revealing works in the pages of avant-garde Soviet publications. Among the latter, Vikukaar (Tallin) and its Russian Raduga edition (which is not the exact twin of its Estonian counterpart), are remarkable by their frankness.

One of the blank areas of Latvian history is the period of German occupation 1941-45. Especially obscure are the crimes against humanity and war crimes committied during that period. It is so in the West among the emigrés, and the situation is no better in Soviet Latvia. It is a taboo topic all around—the Soviets have made it taboo by sitting on the evidence, the Latvians abroad have made it taboo for their own convoluted reasons.

Bilingualism is the ability of an individual to use two languages to an equal or near equal degree. A completely bilingual person can switch from one language to another instantaneously.

The Soviet absorption of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania during World War II caused hundreds of thousands of Baltic immigrants to come to the West, where they established strong, viable ethnic communities, often in league with groups that had left the region earlier. At first, Baltic publishing and publications centered almost exclusively on nationalistic themes that decried the loss of Baltic independence and attacked the Soviet Union for its role in this matter. In time, however, serious scholarship began to replace some of the passionate outpourings, and a strong, academic field of Baltic scholarship emerged in the West that dealt with all aspects of Baltic history, politics, culture, language, and other matters, regardless of its political or nationalistic implications. Over the past sixteen years, these efforts have produced a new body of Baltic publishing that has revived a strong interest in Baltic studies and has insured that regardless of the continued Soviet-domination of the region, the study of the culture and history of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will remain a set fixture in Western scholarship on Eastern Europe.

The Baltic Way

Over the millenia the destiny of the Baltic nations has been shaped by their location on the crossroads of Northern and Eastern Europe. The history of the Baltic nations is one of the cooperation between the west and the east but it is also a history that is marked by a power struggle between the east and the west. This power struggle condemend the Baltic nations to languis under the domination of foreigners who have always tried to deny or restrict the rights of the native populations to determine their own destinies. But even under the domination of the foreigners the Baltic peoples—the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanians—have managed to maintain their own cultural identity.