The ghost of Trianon continues to haunt Central Europe. The consequences of the unmaking of the Habsburg Kingdom of Hungary still confront diplomats, even more so now in the aftermath of communism and the demise of Soviet hegemony. The plight of Hungarian minorities in Hungary's neighboring states is a constant concern to diplomats as satisfactory accommodation of ethnic minorities fails throughout post-communist Eastern Europe. Specifically, a fear of destabilization on account of a crisis related to the several Hungarian minorities scattered in half a dozen adjacent states is never far from the surface.

The fate of Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe has been one of the most neglected subjects in the Western scholarly world. For the past fifty years the subject—at least prior to the late 1980s—was taboo in the successor states (except Yugoslavia), while in Hungary itself relatively few scholars dared to publish anything about this issue till the early 1980s. In the West, it was just not faddish, since most East European and Russian Area studies centers at American, French and English universities tended to think of the territorial status quo as “politically correct.” The Hungarian minorities, on the other hand, were a frustrating reminder that indeed the Entente after World War I, and the Allies after World War II, made major mistakes and significantly contributed to the pain and anguish of the peoples living in this region of the “shatter zone.”

Western experts claim that the end of the Warsaw Pact and the artificial stability it provided, together with what are routinely called “traditional ethnic animosities,” are the causes of continual and inevitable clashes between states in East Central Europe. This area, a triangle formed by the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas, covers the Western border area of the former Soviet Union, and all of Poland, ex-Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, ex-Czechoslovakia and the eastern territories of Germany. This issue of Nationalities Papers is dedicated to the Hungarian ethnic minorities of East Central Europe, in part to examine the validity of the “traditional ethnic animosity” thesis. Spread among seven states, roughly three and a half to four million souls, they constitute the largest diaspora in Europe, and, in relative terms, are more numerous in states around Hungary than the ethnic Russians outside of the Russian Federation on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The collapse of the three great multi-national and multi-ethnic empires—the Czarist Russian, the Ottoman Turkish and the Austro-Hungarian—was an immediate consequence of World War I and the ensuing revolutions. Of these three, only the empire of the Habsburgs was really considered to be an integral part of nineteenth-century European developments. Although historians and contemporaries may have questioned its modernity and viability, few would have challenged its credentials as part of Europe. Yet its demise was rooted—as for the other empires—in the unresolved nationality questions which still bedevil the region in our own time.

At the beginning of his political career, Count Kuno Klebelsberg, the remarkable future Hungarian Minister of Culture and Education of the 1920s, prepared a statement on emigration from Hungary for Prime Minister Kálmán Széll in 1902. “[W]e must correct a great and general mistake, that might unfortunately lead to disappointment,” Klebelsberg warned the PM. “Unwilling to make a distinction among people from the point of view of nationality, we call everybody residing in Hungary a Hungarian. This is how it became fashionable to speak of 'the emigration of Hungarians' when emigration was discussed, giving the general public, unaccustomed to making distinctions, the mistaken belief that we are talking about the emigration of Hungarians who speak the native tongue. This is why the return of the emigrants and corresponding official arrangements are demanded. The case is different, however. The two largest contingents contributing to the [“Hungarian”] emigration are Slovaks and Ruthenes.”

A direct consequence of World War I was the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the establishment of new states in its place. This has had far-reaching consequences for both regional and world politics. The existing balance of power as well as social, economic and political problems within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including the nationality conflicts, led to this result. In spite of the unavoidable collapse, the successors, the new states, were not the result of a natural evolution, but were the creations of the major powers—France, Great Britain, the United States and Italy—who through the creation of their new post-war order ignored the long-term interests of the region and the actual ethnic composition of the land.

The Sovietization of East Central Europe between 1945 and 1948 led to a complete reformulation of the “nationalities question” on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory and the practical experience of the USSR. The changed political and ideological context provided the expanded camp of peoples' democracies with new guidelines for the treatment of their minorities. From this time onward, the ethnic/national minorities of these states were guaranteed an existence which was “national in form,” but “socialist in content.”

In the wake of the 1989 revolutions in East Central Europe, two parallel developments took place in rapid succession. On the one hand, strong national sentiments accompanied by a desire to set up independent nation states emerged in the countries neighboring Hungary. At the same time, the ethnic Magyar minorities, long excluded from participation in the political life of those countries, gained the ability to establish their political movements, to enter candidates in local and national elections, and to elect their own deputies in the national parliaments and local governments. On the other hand, the fate of the Magyar minorities and the guaranteeing of their rights became one of the central elements of Hungary's foreign policy in bilateral relations with its neighbors. Budapest also embarked on a major effort to make the minority problem an international issue and to achieve some form of international legal codification for minority rights. These simultaneous and, in part, contradictory developments and goals placed several dilemmas before Hungarian policy-makers that, three years later, have yet to be resolved.

The southern counties along the Danube, Sava, Tisa (Tisza) and Tamis (Temes) rivers, including Srem (Szerém, Sirmium) had been the richest, most developed and purely Hungarian inhabited part of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Middle Ages. The Ottoman conquest brought about a dramatic population shift between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Hungarians were either massacred or forced to flee the area. The demographic vacuum was filled by Serbian immigration. The Serbs acquired a privileged status as frontier guards of the Habsburg realm, with full territorial, religious and cultural autonomy up to the middle of the eighteenth century.

In December 1918, Hungary ceded 21,000 square kilometers to what was soon to become the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian Monarchy. According to 1910 census data, of the total 577,000 ethnic Hungarian population on the ceded territory, one-fifth came under the jurisdiction of Croatia, approximately one-twentieth came under the jurisdiction of Slovenia, and the rest became citizens of Serbia in the region that was to become the autonomous province of Vojvodina. According to 1991 census data, the Hungarian-speaking minority decreased by 200,000 (over one-third), and its proportion of the population also changed: currently, only 6 percent live in independent Croatia and 2 percent in independent Slovenia. The population of Hungarians in Croatia decreased by four-fifths, and that of Slovenia decreased by two-thirds. Already between 1980 and 1990, the decrease in the Hungarian minority population exceeded 10 percent in both republics. Despite the differences in the condition of the Hungarian community in Croatia and Slovenia, their total assimilation can be averted only if serious measures are taken. An analysis of the political, economic, demographic, cultural and other factors contributing to the population decline since the post-world war peace treaties is beyond the scope of this article. I would merely like to point out the general demographic trends and indicate that, according to estimates, the Hungarian population is 1.5 times larger (22,400 in Croatia and 8,500 in Slovenia) than the figure revealed by census data.

The fate of the Hungarian minority in Romania is closely linked to the political situation in that country, its economic development, and its geopolitical location. This was the case before 1989 and remains so today. On the other hand, the Hungarians of Romania are an important factor affecting the internal and the external political relations of the country. This was dramatically confirmed by the revolution of 1989 which had been triggered by ethnic unrest. This study will focus on major political and economic developments from December 1989 until December 1993, analyzing them in terms of their impact on the Hungarian minority.

The situation of Hungarians in Slovakia since 1989 has developed in the context of the political and economic transitions of the region: from post-totalitarian states towards pluralist democracies, and from centrally-planned economies toward market systems. In addition, the end of Czechoslovakia as a united entity on December 31 1992, has directly affected the Hungarian nationality. These political, economic and social changes have had a direct impact on their situation in Slovakia.

As in other countries of the Danubian Basin, the Hungarians of historic Subcarpathian Rus' (Hungarian—Kárpátalja), present-day Transcarpathia, did not become a national minority until 1919. Before then they were simply Hungarians—and part of the dominant state nationality—living in the northeastern corner of the Hungarian Kingdom. With the border changes that occurred in 1919-1920, the Hungarians of Transcarpathia/Subcarpathian Rus' found themselves within the borders of the new state of Czechoslovakia. Since then borders and countries have changed several times, so that Transcarpathia's Hungarians have found themselves in Czechoslovakia (1919-1938), again in Hungary (1938-1944), in the Soviet Union (1945-1991), and in an independent Ukraine (1991-present). Regardless of what state may have ruled Subcarpathian Rus'/Transcarpathia, it has remained a distinct administrative entity—at times, with a degree of autonomy—throughout most of the twentieth century.

The preceding studies in this volume have provided an overview of the history and current situation of Hungarians living as minorities in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, and the regions of the former Yugoslavia. The purpose of this conclusion is not to analyze past experience and current hardships but rather to illuminate the future prospects of Hungarian communities located outside Hungary's current state borders by looking at various autonomy proposals. Since the collapse of state socialist regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, persons belonging to Hungarian national communities in the region have expressed a political will to preserve their identity and to determine and govern their own affairs. It is, therefore, instructive to take a closer look at the various proposals for autonomy advocated by the representatives of these Hungarian communities because they offer a peaceful and democratic solution, not only to the current problems of the countries they inhabit, but also to the growing destabilization of the region due to ethnic strife.

I certainly find the present times most engaging: I have had the chance to live through events that will not be neglected by historians—the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the subsequent end of the Cold War, the failed Moscow coup and the breathtaking aftermath of undoing “mankind's golden dream” in its very cradle, the Soviet Union. There is so much hope in the air for East Europeans to return to development which was thwarted by decades of imposed socialist dictatorship. The sweet taste of freedom and self-assertion helps people to overcome the economic hardships ravaging the area. From the Baltic to the Balkans, from the Tatra to the Caucasus and beyond, nations, nationalities, and minorities show signs of vitality and righteous affirmation of their own complex existence on territories fragmented by conventional boundaries established with or without their own consent or approval.

The following tables have been compiled on the basis of published census data. In many instances this has necessitated explanatory footnotes for the following reasons:

1. The oldest census results used in the tables are taken from the 1910 Austrian and Hungarian census based on “language” and “religion” categories. The later census results are usually based on declared “nationality.” A significant consequence of this difference is that in the Austrian and Hungarian census Jews can be found either among the German- or the Hungarian-speaking population, while in subsequent census results they are always designated a separate “nationality.” For this reason, additional information is provided in some of the footnotes regarding the Jews.