China and the United States are the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, making them pivotal players in global climate negotiations. Within the coming decade, however, India is set to become the most important counterpart to the United States, as it overtakes China as the country with the most at stake depending on the type of global burden-sharing agreements reached, thus becoming a member of the ‘Climate G2’. We create a hypothetical global carbon market based on modelling emissions reduction commitments across countries and regions relative to their marginal abatement costs. We then analyse net financial flows across a wide range of burden-sharing agreements, from pure ‘grandfathering’ based on current emissions to equal-per-capita allocation. Among the four largest players – the United States, the EU-27, China, and India – it is China that would currently be the largest net seller of emissions allowances in all but the grandfathered scenario. The United States would be the largest net buyer. However, India is poised to take China’s position by around 2030. That leaves the United States and India as the two major countries with most to gain and lose, depending on the type of climate deal reached.

Carbon pricing has been the most prominent climate change mitigation policy for the EU since the launch of its emissions trading system (ETS) in 2005. Since then, the context of international climate policy as well as of the socio-political and economical context of decarbonisation has changed considerably. The 2015 Paris Agreement engages virtually every country unlike its predecessor, while non-carbon pricing policies have led to rapid cost reductions in renewables, even if other sectors (particularly in energy-intensive industry) have not seen similar developments. This paper examines how the role of carbon pricing in the EU climate policy mix has evolved from its beginnings as a means to help achieve modest targets under the Kyoto Protocol, to a policy instrument increasingly augmented by a wider policy mix aimed at reaching no net emissions of greenhouse gases by mid-century.

There is evidence that the risk of stranded assets in the oil and gas sector is underpriced in financial markets. Publicly traded Western oil and gas companies are starting to write down assets, opening up the possibility that more rationalisation of value is likely to come. To the extent that large oil companies diversify portfolios to include cleaner energy and carbon sequestration technologies, it could reduce the risk of a sudden cascading change in the stock valuation of these firms and related bond and credit markets. Instead, the vast majority of oil and gas assets that will be stranded are in the control of sovereign states whose national budgets are highly dependent on oil and gas revenues. Thus, the problem of stranded asset risk for the oil and gas sector may be most relevant in markets for sovereign credit as well as risks that go beyond financial losses.

This study uses an econometric approach to investigate the role of IPR protection on renewable energy adoption using panel data of 102 countries at five-year intervals over the period 1990–2005. The Ginarte-Park index is used as a measure of the strength of intellectual property protection while the adoption of renewable energy is measured by the share of renewable energy in total final energy use. The results reveal that the level of intellectual property rights protection and reform of the intellectual property rights regime do not have significant impact on renewable energy adoption, suggesting that IPR protection is not a cause for concern in the global quest for clean energy transition. On the contrary, we find that trade openness has a stronger influence in the transition to clean energy. Based on the findings of the study, we conclude that IPR protection does not influence renewable energy adoption except in high R&D countries; rather policy makers should concentrate efforts on economic factors, such as trade openness, that drive the adoption of renewable energy technologies.

We estimate trend UK labour productivity growth using a Hodrick-Prescott filter method. We use the results to compare downturns where the economy fell below its pre-existing trend. We find that the current productivity slowdown has resulted in productivity being 19.7 per cent below the pre-2008 trend path in 2018. This is nearly double the previous worst productivity shortfall ten years after the start of a downturn. On this criterion the slowdown is unprecedented in the past 250 years. We conjecture that this reflects a combination of adverse circumstances, namely, a financial crisis, a weakening impact of ICT and impending Brexit.