The organizations research community is a multidisciplinary, multinational and multilingual association of scholars with all the paraphernalia of international exchange. Nevertheless, it is a community that is organized in a geographically fragmented way, with linguistic, national, cultural and regional boundaries separating relatively autonomous scholarly communities. Although this fragmentation limits the integration of organization studies, it serves an adaptive role in making the resistance of deviant ideas to the homogenizing tendencies of dominant scholarly groups easier. The effective use of such differentiation, however, requires linkages among the fragmented parts of the field. We consider some ways of thinking about how research boundaries can be both sustained and violated, with particular attention to the emergence of Chinese scholarship in the study of organizations.

This paper examines how the rise of a market economy in urban China redefines the rules governing economic activities and affects on earnings inequality. We identify three causal mechanisms linked to institutional change that are transforming the firm's employment practices: the higher marginal productivity of a private enterprise economy relative to state-owned enterprises, competition by firms for skilled and semi-skilled labor following emergence of labor markets and the end of state monopoly on labor allocation, and increased emphasis on merit-based reward systems in firms. Analyses of survey data from urban China show how these three causal mechanisms stemming from the transition to a market economy contribute to new patterns of earnings differentiation that increase income returns to human capital and private-sector entrepreneurship.

This paper examines the status of boundaries in organizational theory. Tacitly if not explicitly, most researchers view organizations as bounded, tightly coupled and more or less rational systems. Yet organizations may also be open, loosely coupled, hierarchically nested systems whose boundaries are indefinite. In the case of China, incomplete separation of firms from the state, incomplete integration of firms and partial listing of assets have left most Chinese firms with indefinite boundaries. While many Chinese firms are disadvantaged by indefinite boundaries, some have managed their boundaries advantageously. The Chinese group corporation described here has resisted interference from its state owners, one of whom tried but failed to turn it into a captive supplier. It has secured full operational and financial control of subsidiaries despite their independent legal status, fractional local government ownership, and local government representation on their boards. And it has successfully funded and executed an aggressive acquisition strategy and now dominates its industry globally. There are lessons specific to the Chinese context. The most important is that boundaries should be assumed indefinite unless shown otherwise. And there are lessons about firms in emerging economies. Indefinite boundaries are characteristic of such firms; indefinite boundaries pose either threats or opportunities depending on the strategic response; lastly managing indefinite boundaries will be a key strategic priority and a precondition of finding and exploiting market opportunities.

This paper investigates the effect of decision-makers' culture on their implicit choice of how to make decisions. In a content analysis of major decisions described in American and Chinese twentieth-century novels, we test a series of hypotheses based on prior theoretical and empirical investigations of cross-cultural variation in human motivation and decision processes. The data show a striking degree of cultural similarity in the relationships between decision content, situational characteristics and the decision mode(s) employed, but also support several hypotheses about cultural differences. As predicted, Chinese decision-makers more frequently used role-based logic (a form of recognition-based decision-making) to arrive at decisions, by virtue of their greater awareness of and need for relational obligations. The hypothesis (based on conjectures about Chinese thinking style and personality differences) that Chinese decision-makers would show more rule-and case-based decision-making (two other variants of recognition-based decision-making) than decision-makers in American novels was also supported. After controlling for other predictor variables, there also was support for the hypothesis (based on comparative analyses of Chinese and Western philosophy) that analytic modes which base decisions on the calculation of best consequences would be used less frequendy by Chinese decision-makers. There was no evidence of greater prevention focus in Chinese decisions. These and other observed cultural similarities and differences in the dynamics of decision mode selection have implications for the study and practice of decision-making in managerial settings.

An organizational view of corruption is a frontier and challenging issue in the realm of management and organization research. This article elucidates four interrelated yet sequential issues that collectively constitute organizational explanations of corruption: (i) corruption and organizational environment; (ii) corruption and organizational behaviour; (iii) corruption and organizational consequences; and (iv) corruption and organizational architecture. Specifically, it (1) offers taxonomic metaphors that identify different corrupt organizations on the basis of corruption scale and hierarchical involvement; (2) defines task environments (oligopoly intensity, regulatory control and structural uncertainly) and institutional environments (opaqueness, injustice and complexity) that stimulate illicit acts; (3) confers a typology of corrupt behaviors that align with these task and institutional environments and correspond to different metaphors (system malfeasance, procedural malfeasance, categorical malfeasance and structural malfeasance); (4) develops the logic that corruption impedes organizational development through quadri-damages (evolutionary hazard, strategic impediment, competitive disadvantage and organizational deficiency; and (5) illuminates a corruption-resisting architecture comprising corporate culture, organizational structure and compliance system.