This paper describes two studies conducted in the People's Republic of China aimed at improving understanding of knowledge sharing among managers. Study 1 found evidence for the role of two individual factors: greed which reduced knowledge sharing, and self-efficacy which increased it. In addition, co-worker collegiality has an indirect influence on knowledge sharing by lowering greed and raising self-efficacy. Study 2 replicated the key findings of Study 1 and also identified the influence of organizational support on knowledge sharing. Organizational support led to higher utilization of information and communication technologies, resulting in more knowledge sharing, especially for explicit as opposed to implicit knowledge.

This study investigates the relationship between level of trust and cooperative behaviours in a social dilemma. We argue that this relationship should depend on the basis of trust (cognition- versus affect-based) and on beliefs about the equality of resource endowments. Results supported our prediction that increasing affect-based trust increases cooperation, but increasing cognition-based trust to a certain level can reduce cooperation because of free-riding tendency. Moreover, these effects of trust are stronger for individuals who believed that other group members had more resources than they did. Thus, our study demonstrates that higher levels of trust do not necessarily encourage cooperation. Implications of these findings are discussed.

This study presents a 12-year (1989-2001) longitudinal comparison of managerial values systems in China, Hong Kong, and the U.S. Using hierarchical cluster analysis, we test the validity of the three competing perspectives - convergence, divergence, and crossvergence - on values system evolution in these three societies. We use the sociocultural influence and business ideology influence typology as the foundation for developing our hypotheses. Additionally, we assess the contribution of the specific values within the values system to the overall system values findings. Our data most strongly support the multicultural crossvergence perspective. During a time period of stability in the U.S. and substantial change in both Hong Kong and China, the values of Hong Kong and China became more similar, while the values of these two Greater China societies became more different from those of the U.S.

This study examines the factors that affect the choice of location for foreign direct investment (FDI) in China. We identify three groups of factors that may affect the location choice by foreign firms: agglomeration economies, infrastructure, and institutional changes resulting from the economic reform. The study utilizes the most recent data from China's industrial census for the empirical testing. The findings show that agglomeration economies, in particular the clustering of foreign firms and domestic firms, exert the strongest effect on FDI location. Higher FDI concentration tends to attract more foreign firms. The clustering of domestic firms exerts a negative effect on FDI locations. Better infrastructure (electricity, telecommunications, and road) and greater institutional change (open policies, privatization, and legal development) also show positive effects on FDI location. The size of the local economy does not seem to affect the choice of location of FDI.

This article develops a theoretical model of opportunism in inter-organizational exchanges in emerging markets. I decompose opportunism into ‘strong form’ (contractual norm violation) and ‘weak form’ (relational norm violation), and suggest that strong form tends to be more observable, measurable and remediable than weak form and its adverse effect on cooperation tends to be stronger but less enduring than weak form. I address how external uncertainty, a multidimensional concept that includes market volatility, legal unprotectability, information unverifiability and regulatory variability, along with internal uncertainty that reflects dyadic tensions such as goal disparity, resource misfit, cultural dissimilarity and bargaining asymmetry, together affect exchange members' opportunism. This is followed by further discussions on conditions under which firms will opt for strong form or weak form opportunism in the face of such external and internal uncertainties. I suggest that suppressing forces against opportunism necessitates not only economic ordering, such as contractual mechanisms and structural mechanisms, but also social ordering, such as relational mechanisms and justice mechanisms. I expect that economic ordering is more effective in resisting strong form opportunism while social ordering is more forceful in curtailing weak form opportunism.