We develop a macroeconomic model in which the government does not guarantee to repay debt. We ask whether movements in the price of government bonds can be rationalized by lenders' unwillingness to fully roll over debt when the outstanding level of debt exceeds the government's repayment capacity. Investors do not support a Ponzi game in this case, but ration credit supply, thus forcing default at an endogenously determined fractional repayment rate. Interest rates on government bonds reflect expectations of this event. Numerical results show that default premia can emerge at moderately high debt-to-GDP ratios where even small changes in fundamentals lead to steeply rising interest rates. The behavior of risk premia broadly accords with recent observations for several European countries that experienced a worsening of fundamental fiscal conditions.

In this paper, unemployment, growth, and income inequality are interdependent and endogenously determined in a unified model of a trade union. Analytically, we show that the effective labor force exhibits an intensive margin response, in the sense that in response to higher unionization the number of employed workers decreases, but each individual employed worker provides more working hours. This intensive margin response leads to the possibility of the coexistence of high unemployment and high growth. Moreover, unionization gives rise to an ambiguous effect on income inequality, whereas it has an unambiguously positive effect on the labor income share and growth rate. Our numerical study shows that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital plays an important role in governing the steady-state consequences and affecting the impact of (de-) unionization. These results provide not only a plausible explanation of the empirical evidence, but also a reconciliation for the disparity in the empirical findings.

In this paper we investigate the relationship between leverage and the level of economic activity in the United States, using quarterly data over the period 1951–2012. We address the question for five different measures of leverage—household leverage, nonfinancial firm leverage, commercial bank leverage, broker–dealer leverage, and shadow bank leverage—making a distinction between traditional banks and shadow banks, the latter being a consequence of financial innovation and deregulation in the financial services industry over the past 30 years. We investigate whether the relationship between leverage and the level of economic activity is nonlinear and asymmetric using slope-based tests as well as tests of the null hypothesis of symmetric impulse responses. Our results inform policymakers about the important distinction between traditional banks and the market-based financial intermediaries that have been at the center of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. They also inform about the macroeconomic effects of the deleveraging process that began in 2008, as well as about the need for countercyclical macroprudential policies to reduce the procyclicality of the financial system.

This note studies the implications of the price reset hazard function for the monetary transmission mechanism of sticky price models. I first document some general analytical results that highlight the central role of the price (accumulative) distribution in linking the hazard function and the impulse response function. I find that nominal rigidity underlying increasing hazard functions is more successful than real rigidity in replicating realistic macro persistence. In addition, numerical simulations show that the interaction between the increasing hazard function and the real rigidity provides a powerful propagation mechanism for monetary shocks.