Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7czq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T07:08:23.179Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

ENDOGENOUS ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, NORTH–SOUTH TRADE, AND GROWTH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2014

Andreas Schäfer  and
Maik T. Schneider
Andreas Schäfer*
Affiliation:
University of Leipzig
Maik T. Schneider
Affiliation:
CER-ETH Center of Economic Research, ETH Zurich
*
Address correspondence to: Andreas Schäfer, Institute of Theoretical Economics/Macroeconomics, University of Leipzig, Grimmaische Strasse 12, 04109 Leipzig, Germany; e-mail: [email protected].
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Now that most countries have harmonized intellectual property right (IPR) legislation as a consequence of signing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the dispute about the optimal level of IPR protection has shifted toward IPR enforcement. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North–South assumptions to study (a) the regions' incentives to enforce IPRs in a decentralized game, (b) the desired IPR enforcement of the two regions in negotiation rounds on global harmonization, and (c) the constrained efficient enforcement level. We show how the different solutions relate to each other and how the results depend on the research productivity in the North and the regions' relative market sizes. Although growth rates increase substantially when IPR enforcement is harmonized at the North's desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare.

Keywords

Endogenous GrowthIntellectual Property RightsTradeDynamic Game
Type
Articles
Information
Macroeconomic Dynamics , Volume 19 , Issue 5 , July 2015 , pp. 1074 - 1115
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Acemoglu, Daron (2009) Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Amir, Rabah (2000) Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillover. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 1013–1032.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Borota, Teodora (2012) Innovation and imitation and a model of north–south trade. Journal of International Economics 87, 365–376.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Branstetter, Lee, Fisman, Raymond, and Foley, C. Fritz (2006) Do stronger intellectual property rights increase international technology transfer? Empirical evidence from U. S. firm-level panel data. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, 321–349.Google Scholar
Bretschger, Lucas and Steger, Thomas (2013) Globalization, the volatility of intermediate goods prices, and economic growth. Macroeconomic Dynamics 17, 402–430.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, Yongmin and Puttitanun, Thitima (2005) Intellectual property rights and innovation in developing countries. Journal of Development Economics 78, 474–493.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chin, Judith C. and Grossman, Gene M. (1990) Intellectual property rights and north–south trade. In Jones, Ronald W. and Krueger, Anne O. (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Baldwin, pp. 90–107. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Cychosz, Allison (2003) The effectiveness of international enforcement of intellectual property rights. John Marshall Law Review 37, 985–1016.Google Scholar
Deardorff, Allen V. (1992) Welfare effects of global patent protection. Economica 59, 35–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dinopoulos, Elias and Segerstrom, Paul (2007) North–South Trade and Economic Growth. Working paper, Stockholm School of Economics. Available at http://www.hhs.se/personal/Segerstrom.Google Scholar
Dinopoulus, Elias and Segerstrom, Paul (2010) Intellectual property rights, multinational firms and economic growth. Journal of Development Economics 92, 13–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Diwan, Ishac and Rodrik, Dani (1991) Patents, appropriate technology, and north–south trade. Journal of International Economics 30, 27–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Drazen, Michael (2000) Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eicher, Theo and Garcia-Penalosa, Cecilia (2008) Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth. European Economic Review 52, 237–258.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
EU Commission (2008) The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Fact Sheet. EU Commission, Brussels.Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/140836.htm.Google Scholar
EU Commission (2009) IPR Enforcement Report. SEC(2009) 1360, EU Commission, Brussels.Google Scholar
EU Commission (2012) The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Questions and Answers. EU Commission, Brussels. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/acta/questions-and-answers/.Google Scholar
European Parliament (2004) Directive 2004/48/EC on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. European Parliament. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0048:EN:NOT.Google Scholar
Fernandes, Ana and Kumar, Krishna B. (2007) Inappropriate technology. What is in it for the rich? Macroeconomic Dynamics 11, 487–518.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gersbach, Hans (2004) Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections. Public Choice 121, 157–177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ginarte, Juan C. and Park, Walter G. (1997) Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national study. Research Policy 26, 283–301.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grinols, Earl and Lin, Hwan C. (2006) Global patent protection: Channels of north and south welfare gain. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 30, 205–227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, Gene M. and Lai, Edwin C. (2004) International protection of intellectual property. American Economic Review 94, 1635–1653.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, Brownian, Griliches, Zvi, and Hausman, Jerry A. (1988) Patents and R&D: Is there a lag? International Economic Review 27, 265–283.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Helpman, Elhanan (1993) Innovation, imitation, and intellectual property rights. Econometrica 61, 1247–1280.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Iwaisako, Tatsuro, Tanaka, Hitoshi, and Futagami, Koichi (2011) A welfare analysis of global patent protection in a model with endogenous innovation and foreign direct investment. European Economic Review 55, 1137–1151.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jones, Charles I. (1995) R&D-based models of economic growth. Journal of Political Economy 1003, 759–784.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kiedaisch, Christian (2009) Patent Policy and Income Distribution. SSRN working paper. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600069 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1600069.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klette, Tor J. and Kortum, Samuel (2004) Innovating firms and aggregate innovation. Journal of Political Economy 112, 986–1018.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kortum, Samuel (1993) Equilibrium R&D and the patent–R&D ratio: U.S. evidence. AEA Papers and Proceedings 83, 450–475.Google Scholar
Kwan, Yum K. and Lai, Edwin C. (2003) Intellectual property rights protection and endogenous economic growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27, 853–873.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lai, Edwin C. (1998) International intellectual property rights protection and the rate of product innovation. Journal of Development Economics 55, 133–153.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lai, Edwin C. and Qiu, Larry D. (2003) The north's intellectual property rights standard for the south? Journal of International Economics 59, 183–209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maskus, Keith E. (1990) Normative concerns in the international protection of intellectual property rights. World Economy 13, 387–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maskus, Keith E. (2000) Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.Google Scholar
Maskus, Keith E. (2012) Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economics of Intellectual Property in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.Google Scholar
McCalman, Phillip (2001) Reaping what you sow: An empirical analysis of international patent harmonization. Journal of International Economics 55, 161–186.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCalman, Phillip (2002) National patents, innovation and international agreements. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development 11, 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moro, Alession (2012) Biased technical change, intermediate goods, and total factor productivity. Macroeconomic Dynamics 16, 184–203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Müller, Markus (2007) Motivation of politicians and long-term policies. Public Choice 132, 273–289.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nordhaus, William D. (1969) Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
OECD (2009) Magnitude of Counterfeiting and Piracy of Tangible Products: An Update. OECD Project on Counterfeiting and Piracy. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/27/44088872.pdf.Google Scholar
Office of U.S. Trade Representative (2010) Special 301 Report. Office of U.S. Trade Representative.Google Scholar
Oudiz, Gilles and Sachs, Jeffrey (1985) International policy coordination in dynamic macroeconomic models. In Buiter, Willem H. and Marston, Richard C. (eds.), International Economic Policy Coordination, pp. 274–230. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Pakes, Ariel and Griliches, Zvi (1984) Patents and R&D at the firm level: A first look. In Griliches, Zvi (ed.), R&D, Patents, and Productivity, pp. 55–72. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Parello, Carmelo (2008) A north–south model of intellectual property rights protection and skill accumulation. Journal of Development Economics 85, 253–281.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido (2000) Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Reuters (2010) Countries Reach Tentative Anti-counterfeiting Pact. Reuters article 2010/10/02. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/02/us-trade-counterfeiting-idUSTRE6910AO20101002.Google Scholar
Rodriguez-Lopez, Jesus and Torres, Jose L. (2012) Technological sources of productivity growth in Germany, Japan, and the United States. Macroeconomic Dynamics 16, 133–150.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Romer, Paul M. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy 98, 71–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sakakibara, Mariko and Branstetter, Lee (2001) Do stronger patents induce more innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese patent law reforms. RAND Journal of Economics 32, 77–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schäfer, Andreas and Schneider, Maik T. (2013) Endogenous Enforcement of Intellectual Property, North–South Trade, and Growth. SSRN working paper 1907231.Google Scholar
Schmookler, Jacob (1966) Invention and Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scotchmer, Suzanne (2004a) Innovation and Incentives. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Scotchmer, Suzanne (2004b) The political economy of intellectual property treaties. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20, 415–437.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weitzman, Martin L. (1998) Recombinant growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 331–360.CrossRefGoogle Scholar