The 1999 Annual Meeting of the ASIL exhibited a rare diversity of panels and speakers. The paradigm of an ‘inclusive’ professional community, shared by this Meeting, is well in line with a more general understanding of international law as an inclusive, unified discipline. This Editorial begins investigating this image of unity and its consequences for the ways ‘difference’ is encountered in professional debate.

In March 1997, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1101 (1997) which authorised a multinational protection force – known as Operation Alba – to enter Albania “to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organisations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance.” Created with the consent of the government of Albania, the intervention occurred as a direct but also as a near-immediate response to the political, financial and humanitarian crisis that had been precipitated by the collapse of so-called pyramid schemes in Albania. The purpose of this article is to examine the background of the adoption of Resolution 1101 (1997) and then to investigate the impact and importance of the consent for the operation given by the beleaguered government of President Sali Berisha. The article will then analyse the legal significance, meaning and interpretation of Security Council in Resolution 1101 (1997), as amended in Resolution 1114 of June 1997, in its endeavour to provide an account of the organisation, achievements, shortcomings and lessons of Operation Alba.

Playing the devil's advocate, it is argued that ultimately there are no international legal limits to the UN Security Council's enforcement powers. The argument is based on a brief analysis of various UN Charter provisions and the rejection of the ius cogens concept and other possible arguments for international legal limits. The conclusion reached is that the UN Security Council has unfettered powers when dealing with maintenance of international peace and security issues.

Is it true of the Security Council, that: […] because the End of this Institution is the Peace and Defence of […] all; and whosoever has the Right to the End, has the Right to the Means, it belongeth of Right [to him] to be Judge both of the Meanes [sic] of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done […]Martti Koskenniemi, quoting from Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan

Abdullah Öcalan's arrival in Turkey in February 1999 followed a prolonged search in Europe for asylum following his expulsion from Syria in late 1998. His coming within Turkish jurisdiction raises questions about the international processes to bring alleged transnational fugitive offenders before the courts. This article looks at the extradition regime within Europe and the alternative methods of rendition that were eventually employed to remove him from Kenya. Extradition law developed during the nineteenth century and is based on ideas of revolution, the principle of nationality and liberal democracy which pervaded that period. The late twentieth century has a different ethos that offers fewer protection to the political revolutionary, but has incorporated international human rights standards. Extradition law straddles the enforcement of criminal law, non-interference in the domestic affairs of another State and international human rights law. The article concludes by examining the demands of international human rights law for the trial in Turkey.

The Dayton Accords of 1995 for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided for arbitration over the boundary line in the Brčko area of Bosnia. Arbitration took place between the Muslim and Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. The Award of 14 February 1997 did not draw a boundary line but established an international interim supervisory regime. On 15 March 1998 the Arbitral Tribunal handed down a Supplemental Award which extended the interim regime pending further action by the Tribunal. The Final Award of 5 March 1999 establishes a permanent self-governing Brčko District government that is independent of the two entities. The Tribunal reserves the authority to revise its decision in case of a failure of either party to cooperate in the implementation of the new regime.

Libya filed two separate applications on 3 March 1992. In the applications, Libya contended that it had not been possible to settle this dispute by negotiations and that the parties unable to agree on the organization of an arbitration to hear the matter. It accordingly submitted the disputes to the Court on the basis of Article 14(1) of the Montreal Convention. Libya refers in the applications to the charging of two Libyan nationals, by the Lord Advocate of Scotland, and by a Grand Jury of the United States, respectively, with having caused a bomb to be placed aboard a Pan-am flight, which bomb subsequently exploded, causing the aeroplane to crash. Libya contends that the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively, by rejecting the Libyan efforts to resolve the matter within the framework of international law, including the Montreal Convention, are pressuring it into surrendering the two Libyan nationals for trial. In this connection, Libya refers to Article 1 of the Montreal Convention, according to which the charge constitutes an offence, and to the several other articles of that Convention which are relevant to Libya's alleged right to jurisdiction over the matter and the prosecution thereof. Libya alleges that these obligations are breached by the United Kingdom and the United States respectively.

The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court has been both hailed and criticized on various grounds. However, one area, namely the Court's treatment of the distinction between the law regulating the use of force and the humanitarian law of armed conflict, has received relatively little attention. This author is convinced and concerned that the Court's treatment of this issue misconstrued the relationship between these two branches of the law, and in doing so potentially weakened any restraining influence the law of armed conflict might have on the potential use of nuclear weapons.

On Monday 24 May 1999, Judge David Hunt confirmed an indictment against, and issued initial arrest warrants for Slobodan Milošević, the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Milan Milutinović, the President of Serbia; Nikola šainović, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Dragoljub Ojdanić, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army; and Vlajko Stojiljković, Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia.

By decision of the Judges at the Twentieth plenary session of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) two new rules were adopted, Rule 77 bis and Rule 84 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules). In addition, 13 rules were amended.

Instead of conducting trials in absentia, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has an innovative procedure against an accused not in custody. Officially, this ‘Rule 61 procedure’ is only a proceeding for reconfirming an indictment, which does not determine an accused's guilt or innocence. In substance, however, it has functioned as a trial-like procedure to some extent. As a judicial finding on legal issues, the decisions under the procedure have influenced subsequent trials. This article traces the evolution of the procedure and explores its unique character. In particular, by examining essential problems thereof, this article clarifies some points to be considered in establishing a similar mechanism for the International Criminal Court.

This article discusses certain key aspects arising from the negotiations leading up to the adoption of a Statute for an International Criminal Court (ICC), to have its seat in The Hague. These aspects include individual criminal responsibility regardless of status as Head of State or constitutional organ and the transformation of international criminal law into domestic law. Also discussed are the two appendices to be added to the Statute pertaining to substantive criminal law and rules of criminal evidence and procedure to be used by the Court. The author argues that the appendix on the law of criminal procedure will be of particular importance to the Netherlands as the host state. The obligations regarding legal assistance of the host state will be dependent on this.

International law is a projection of the imagination and professional identity of the practitioners in the field. Take a diligent, somewhat idealistic Delegate X who participates in a major event in international law: the negotiations on the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), starting with the Ad Hoc Committee in 1995, continuing in the Preparatory Committee and culminating at the Diplomatic Conference in Rome in 1998. What takes place when the ambitious ‘world public opinion’ expectations for international law are supposed to be made everyday life by the delegates? How does X, a single committed person, play his or her role as a tiny part of the global reform machinery? What is the anatomy of the engagement: professionalism and a comfortable exit from the intolerable world of human suffering and injustice? What kind of mechanisms govern the vertiginous scenes of genocide, champagne and flirt? Do the everyday worlds of violence and of welfare touch each other only slightly, in the name of international law, just in order to disappear again in their own, irresistible orbits?