The second survey of legal education was published in July 1975 and was based largely on information gathered during the academic session 1973/74. At that time, the decision was taken to present the material in tabular form in order that the report could provide a framework for the future publication, at suitable intervals, of supplements containing appropriate up-dated tables. In pursuance of this objective, supplements were published in 1978 and 1981 with statistics drawn largely from sessions 1976/77 and 1980/81 respectively.

Developments since 1981 now justify the undertaking of a more thorough review with the object of producing a third survey report.

The tort of passing off developed as an offspring of deceit, with the twist that it allows trade rivals, rather than deceived customers, to sue. The classic case is a trader ‘passing off his goods as the goods of somebody else: the defendant is liable for misrepresenting, innocently or otherwise, that his goods are the goods of somebody else. The plaintiff is the trader whose trade is thereby diverted or whose reputation is thereby harmed.

The classic case thus involves a misrepresentation as to the source of the goods. However, case law has shown that this is not the only relevant misrepresentation on which the tort can be founded

The impending arrival of the Single European Market and the consequent drive towards European legal integration raise in stark form the future role of the national law school. Should we continue to have national law schools at all, in the sense of law schools with a predominantly national focus? Or should we move towards a system in which the typical law school, though located in a particular country within Europe, encompasses a structure, a body of staff and students and a curriculum which are a national and which focus on European laws and institutions rather than on those of the particular home State? I-f law schools are to retain their essentially national character, how should the growing influence of European law in general and Community law in particular affect their role, organisation and activities?

The objectives of the Criminal Law Revision Committee when drafting the radical reforms proposed by the 1966 Theft Bill were described by a contemporary commentator2 as being: ‘. . . to do away with the more embarrassing and restrictive technicalities of the existing law . . .’

In the same place it was observed that the Committee faced a choice between creating a specific definition of the various theft offences and their elements, or one whose generality would allow it to evolve to meet the challenges presented by ever more complex and sophisticated dishonest dealing.

Money is central to the constitution, whether the focus be effective power, legitimate authority, or both. To map the distribution of power within government it is best to begin by examining the control of money, because little of the business of government can be done without incurring expenditure of some sort. Control of money gives control of policy, either directly - because, in many fields, ‘expenditure is policy; policy is expenditure’ -or indirectly, on the principle that he who pays the piper calls the tune.

The rule in O’Reilly u Mackman is well known. As a result of Lord Diplock’s speech in that case, the scope of the application for judicial review procedure under s 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and RSC Ord 53, has been dominated by attempts to distinguish between public and private law. According to Lord Diplock, public law cases must normally be pursued under the special Ord 53 procedure whereas private law cases even though involving substantive principles of judicial review must be pursued in ordinary courts. There are also hybrid cases - chimeras which combine features both of public and private law. In such cases the challenger is apparently free to proceed either under Ord 53 or by way or ordinary action or defence. These hybrids are not easy to reconcile with the purposes and policies behind the O’Reilly rule.

In 1979, Allen Smith suggested that there was to be a ‘coming renaissance’ in Law and Literature as a teaching discipline. In fact, Law and Literature had already arrived. In 1973, James Boyd White had publishedhis The Legal Imagination, and had geared it primarily to the teaching and study of law. Of the many intriguing characteristics of the Law and Literature movement, one of the most exciting and most valuable, is the fact that, unlike many other theoretical approaches to the problems of law, the ambition of Law and Literature is firstly educative, and only then, secondly, social and political. Moreover this secondary ambition, has tended, in two senses, to be appended to the educational ambition. In one sense, it is additional in that the political manifesto is supposed to emerge from the educational force of literature. In a second sense, it is additional because politics was certainly not such a ranking ambition in the earliest days of the Law and Literature movement, and it is no concidence that the politicization of Law and Literature has come about as its star has risen, whilst that of Critical Legal Studies has declined

John owns a workshop which he wants to redevelop. Securing the necessary financing and obtaining planning permission will take a few months and in the meantime he is happy to let Mike use the workshop for E30 a week. They draw up a simple form of agreement whereby John lets the property to Mark at the agreed rent ‘until John is in a position to proceed with the redevelopment’. John and Mark are content with the arrangement: Mark has the security of knowing he can occupy the premises for several months; John is getting some income from the property.

Strange events are occurring in the world of the jury. At a time when English confidence in the institution is on the ebb, a phenomenon evidenced both in the titles of recent jury studies - The Jury Under Attack and Taking Liberties- and in a steady stream of skeptical commentaries, it is reported that in Japan the Bar Federation is set to call for the restoration of jury trial, first introduced by a law of 1926 but suspended after an experimental period in 1942. Spain has a new Constitution that imposes a duty on the legislature to institute jury trial, an undertaking currently under examination by the Spanish Ministry of Justice. And in South Africa, recent calls for a more representative justice system have prompted the editor of the South African Law Journal, Professor Ellison Kahn, to devote a tetralogy of articles to consideration of the reintroduction of jury trial within that jurisdiction.

Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 is a measure of protective legislation that concerns purely commercial relationships and it is apparent that the degree of protection, and the need to redress inequality, is less than, say, with the housing market. The Act represents an unusual and complex measure of political and economic engineering. By an interference with the parties' freedom of contract, the policy of the Act is to provide security of tenure and to promote equality ofbargaining strength between commercial landlord and tenant. The aim was to prevent a tenant at the end of the contractual term facing business closure or being compelled to accept a new lease at an exorbitant rent. Although a derogation from the common law rights of the landlord, the Act was intended to make only limited inroads on the free market. In contrast to such areas as employment law and residential lettings, the transition from contract to status was to occur with a minimal disruption of market forces.

‘In my view, the criminal law of evidence should be developed along common-sense lines readily comprehensible to the men and women who comprise the jury and bear the responsibility for the major decisions in criminal cases. I believe that most laymen, if told that the criminal law of evidence forbade them even to consider such evidence as we are debating in this appeal, would reply, “Then the law is an ass.”…The hearsay rule was created by our judicial predecessors, and if we find that it no longer serves to do justice in certain conditions then the judges of today should accept the responsibility of reviewing and adapting the rules of evidence to serve present society.’

The Society first issued its Statement of Minimum Holdings for Law Libraries in England and Wales in 1958. Revised versions appeared in 1970 and 1975. A supplementary list covering the law of the European Communities and of the then seven continental Member States appeared in 1974. The most recent revision, including the law of the Community but no longer of continental countries, appeared in 1986.

The present revision was authorised by the Council of the Society in 1992, in order to have a list which is up-to-date and also, being stored on disk, can be continuously revised. The list (whose purposes remain those stated in the introduction to the 1970 version by Professor Sir John Smith) must be regarded as provisional.

In 1983, a report by the organisation JUSTICE into the state of prisons considered that the ability of convicted prisoners to communicate with those outside prison, by letters or visits was, as prison regulations then stood, ‘severely restricted’. Recent years have, however, witnessed a relaxation in the controls imposed on prisoners’ legal and non-legal correspondence, including the abolition of the prior and simultaneous ventilation rules and many restrictions affecting those convicted of less serious offences. Despite this fact, a number of restrictions remain, and the practices of prison authorities in opening, examining, reading and stopping legal mail continue to occupy domestic and international courts.

Are there now any circumstances in which a teenage may effectively withhold her consent to medical treatment? By effectively, I mean not only that she can refuse to consent to treatment but also that this refusal is respected and the treatment prevented.

Consent to medical advice and treatment, the givingofwhich means that a doctor does or does not commit a battery (criminal or civil) on her patient, necessarily involves both the giving of consent and the withholding of consent. Without one the other has no meaning.

The problems associated with pre-incorporation contracts are due to the essentially artificial nature of a company’s existence and personality. The existence of a company, unlike that of a natural person, is not something which can be readily ascertained but is a matter of legal formality. There is a good case for treating pre-incorporation contracts as sui generis, but until 1973 their legal effect was governed by common law principles of contract and agency which drew little distinction between companies and natural persons. The result was unsatisfactory and widely criticised, one commentator remarking that ‘it is rare to hear such a widespread and common opposition against any aspect of English company law’. Section 9(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 (now to be found in s 36C of the Companies Act 1985) made a partial reform of this law, but did not deal with the inability of a newly formed company to ratify or adopt a pre-incorporation contract made on its behalfeven though this was a major deficiency of the common law.

A trustee or fiduciary may mix trust money with his own, purchase property, and make a profit upon its sale when the property subsequently increases in value. Frequently, however, the trustee will use the misapplied money in order to raise further funds by way of a loan with which he then purchases the property. In the first case, equity’s conventional approach is to apportion the increase in value rateably between the funds from the trust and the trustee’s own contribution so that the trust obtains that proportion of the profit derived which the misapplied funds bear to the purchase price. This result flows from the decision of Hudson J in the Supreme Court of victoria in Scott v Scott from which no cross-appeal was taken to the High Court of Australia.

In recent years the meaning of the word ‘interview’ has become central to the regulatory framework of PACE. In part, this flows directly and inevitably from the terms of the act itself. If a verbal exchange between suspect and police is an interview, certain procedural consequences follow: it must normally be contemporaneously noted verbatim or taped; if the suspect is a juvenile or mentally disordered, it must usually take place in the presence of an ‘appropriate adult’. Furthermore, as a result of the recent revision of Code C on ‘Questioning’, persons arrested for an offence may not normally be interviewed about it except in a police station.

In both England and Wales and New Zealand adoption law is under review. A series of discussion papers followed by a Report to Ministers has been published in this country, while New Zealand has published an interim proposal for amendment ofexisting legislation prior to a later full review The time is right therefore, to consider and compare the basis upon which adoption law reform is proceeding. The opportunity to question the nature of adoption as a legal construct and examine the particular patterns offamily morality that it promotes is timely. Equally, it is timely to re-assess the philosophical underpinning of the Adoption Act 1976 in light of the particular ideology imported into family law in England and Wales by the Children Act 1989. The Act stresses the durability of parenthood and establishes the concept of parental responsibility which survives both divorce and a child care order. While containing points of confluence with adoption law, the new ideology nonetheless clashes with the existing concept of adoption in certain fundamental ways.

‘Men are in the habit of taking an erroneous view of what they may be permitted to do in the shape of picketing.’

Throughout its history, the law on picketing has been a matter ofdispute between those who see any interference with an employer’s ability to carry on his business as wrongful, and those who see picketing as an essential and lawful part of that collective strength which is a prerequisite of effective bargaining. Sometimes the issue is seen as one of industrial relations, sometimes as one of civil liabilities and sometimes as one ofeconomic theory, but in the event the resolution of the debate has been mostly political. Over the past 170 years many attempts have been made to set the balance but a permanent answer cannot be achieved, since the economic and political considerations of each era will lead to a re-assessment of the appropriate balance.