Among its many provisions, the Criminal Justice Act 1991 contained, in its original s 29(1), a prohibition on the use of previous convictions in the determination of sentences for current offences. This particular provision was the subject of much criticism before and after its coming into effect, so much so that within a year of its implementation it was replaced by a new section which, arguably, could have precisely the opposite effect. What follows is an attempt to chart the short life and sudden death of the original s 29( 1). The importance of such a prohibition to a 'deserts-based' sentencing framework will be discussed and some possible explanations for its removal will be suggested. Some of the implications of the change will also be examined, both in terms of its impact on the coherence of the sentencing framework that remains, and its possible impact on future sentencing trends.

Protection of confidential information has two main juridical bases, contract and equity. Where the defendant is or was the employee or agent of the plaintiff he may be subject to an express or implied contractual duty not to use the latter’s confidential information without his consent Other defendants who receive such information knowing or believing it to be confidential, either from the plaintiff himself or a thiid party, may be subject to an equitable duty of like kind

The purpose of this article is to examine the range and scope of compensatory remedies for breach of the equitable duty of confidence. The term ‘damages’ is sometimes used generically to describe these remedies which are several and different from one another in certain respects? albeit difficult to pinpoint exactly.

Intended conduct is not the only means by which people, for good or ill, make their presence felt in the world. Nonetheless, much judicial and academic learning exists on the meaning of intention in law. In spite of so much learning, however, our understanding of how intention affects the wrongfulness of conduct remains impoverished. The impression given by case law and commentary is that the important issues raised by the role of intention in the criminal law can largely be exhausted by exploration of the distinction between direct and oblique intention: between desired goals and side-effects foreseen as certain in acting. Nothing could be further from the truth. In particular, there is far more richness and complexity in the concept of direct intention itself than has been hitherto realised. In this article, I will focus on two more or less neglected species of direct intention: the intention to try to do wrong, and the intention to expose another to the risk of wrongdoing. An understanding of the moral significance of these kmds of intention enhances our understanding of the nature and scope of criminal attempts and possible offences of endangerment in English law.

The overwhelming majority of employees who are members of occupational pension schemes belong to what are called ‘defined benefit’ schemes. These schemes provide for their members to receive a benefit defined by reference to a member’s salary at the date of their retirement or, if they change jobs, the salary paid just prior to their leaving. This article examines the rights of the members of defined benefit schemes. In particular, it considers claims by scheme members that the pension funds which secure their pensions represent their deferred pay, and that these funds are, in some meaningful sense, their property. The article argues that whilst the law of trusts may appear at first sight to lend support to the members’ claims, developments within the law of trusts, coupled with the underlying contradiction in the meaning of ownership in trust law, has made it difficult for the courts to recognise the members’ claims.

Contract is playing an increasingly important part in the restructuring of the public sector in Britain in the 1990s. The direct providing role of the state is being reduced through the ‘contracting out’ of ancillary and core services in the NHS, central and local government, whilst the policy aim of increasing the efficiency of public sector management involves contract in the operation of internal markets, the creation of specialist agencies with clearly defined functions and responsibilities, the devolution of financial responsibility to budget-holding business units operating in internal trading relationships, and the exposure of internal workforces to private sector competition through compulsory competitive tendering (CCT). However, the widespread adoption of a common ‘language of contract’ to describe processes occurring in these different contexts disguises a variety of meanings and functions.

The problem of how to hold a company criminally accountable for the harm produced in the course of its business activity continues to vex the English judiciary. The attempt to apply conventional criminal law to companies has not been a resounding success. This was perhaps predictable, as the relevant rules and doctrines had been developed in cases involving human defendants. Their transposition to an inanimate organizational entity such as a company was never going to be easy. Not only did the judges fail to rise to the challenge, however, they managed to construe the relevant law in a regressive manner that has all but insulated large companies from criminal liability.

Before Odysseus navigates the rocks on which live Scylla and Charybdis he is lulled by the Sirens, promising advance disclosure of earthly adventures. Forewarned by Circe, he enjoins his crew first to contain him; later (on pain of death) to release him from the mast to which he is bound. Held to his originally expressed wishes, they refuse, and bind him more tightly. In this way, Odysseus creates what may have been one of the first advance directives. Its enforcement illustrates one of the concerns which have latterly been expressed about making binding health care choices, possibly many years before they might take effect

‘People do not always mean what they say; they do not always say what they want; and they do not always want what they say they want. That much is, if not exactly clear, at least uncontroversial. What is controversial is, recognizing this, how to proceed.’