This paper, which is based on a paper given at a seminar held at the University of Glasgow in November 2005, discusses the sovereignty of Parliament in the light of the decision of the House of Lords in Attorney General v Jackson, which considered the question of whether the Parliament Act 1949 and the Hunting Act 2004 were valid Acts of Parliament. The paper begins by explaining the background to the litigation, before going on to summarise the decision. Next, it briefly analyses the preliminary issues of standing and jurisdiction involved in the case, before going on to consider how the political background and political practice affected the decision of the House of Lords on the key questions in the case. The major part of the paper is devoted to a discussion and analysis in the light of constitutional theory of the extensive dicta in the case on the principle of the sovereignty of Parliament, which contrasts positivist and Dworkinian perspectives, and considers the question of whether the orthodox view of sovereignty is likely to be displaced in the foreseeable future by the view that Parliament’s legislative power is subject to legal constraints. The paper concludes that such a change in the rule of recognition is unlikely to come about merely because the judges change their view of the content of fundamental doctrines; changes of this nature require the assent of the other institutions of government.

The distinction between primary and secondary victims confirmed by Page v Smith has caused major problems in English psychiatric damage law. The House of Lords has suggested that the search for principle has been called off, and that the only sensible strategy is to say ‘thus far and no farther’. This paper suggests that one way forward is to recognise that it is not only persons who are physically proximate to an ‘accident’ who should be put in a special category: any case in which there is some sort of pre-existing relationship between claimant and defendant should be regarded as different from the standard secondary victim scenario. The relationship concept, first recognised in the USA and now adopted by the Court of Appeal, can be found in embryo form in the early cases.

The work of carers is too often unvalued and unrecognised. This paper seeks to demonstrate some of the ways in which law and traditional medical ethics overlook the interests of carers and the importance of their work. It argues that this is, in part, due to the individualistic ethic that has come to dominate legal and ethical discourse about medicine. It recommends an approach based on an ethic of care that seeks to promote and protect just relationships of care, rather than an individualised model of rights.

The story of the woman judge as one of exclusion and isolation plagued with allegations of bias is well documented. Interestingly, despite significant differences in time and place, a common theme unites these tales: the woman judge is a dangerous outsider, a threat to the aesthetic norm. The judicial climate, at least in most of the common law world, is somewhat chilly: reactions to her presence on the bench vary from the largely indifferent to the downright hostile. Why is this? After all, most people, perhaps acknowledging the political and democratic gains underlying calls for a more representative judiciary, would wish to encourage – or at least not discourage – judicial diversity.

Taking the stories of the woman judge as its starting point, this paper contends that underlying these tales is an image of the judge that is as much intuitive as it is reasoned; that our understanding of the judge and judging is as much derived from the imagination as from what is conventionally considered as rational thought. Thus, the paper deploys the narrative strategies of fairy tales in an attempt to disrupt the imaginative hold of familiar yet particular images that infuse and distort current discourses on adjudication. It suggests that despite the Department for Constitutional Affairs’ ongoing quest to increase diversity within the judiciary, current initiatives do not confront fully these instinctive images. As a result, their narrative of inclusiveness and difference fails. In response, the paper appeals to the imagination as a route toward engendering new conceptions on the judge and judging, the possibility of truly diverse judiciaries and, perhaps, a fairy tale ending to the woman judge’s story.

In 2005, the Law Commissions published a report reviewing unfair contracts legislation in the UK. Where the contract of employment was concerned, the Commissions were of the view that, in short, the status quo should remain. This paper seeks to appraise that position and considers whether an opportunity to bring forward beneficial reforms has been missed. The paper takes cognisance of the legislative scheme in New South Wales, which contains extensive powers where unfair contracts are concerned. It is suggested that, in the UK, the two key issues which need to be addressed are contracting-out and terms which may be substantively unfair.

In this paper, I explore the sanctity of life doctrine and consider the scope of s 4(5) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, a provision designed to give statutory effect to the sanctity principle. Rather than question the intellectual validity of the doctrine, I examine the legal and practical problems created by this limited section. I argue that it necessarily creates dilemmas for medical practitioners, which could only be avoided by a wholesale adoption of the principle. I conclude, therefore, that the provision fails to ensure a coherent moral and intellectual shape to the law.

One of the most controversial aspects of the assessment of damages for breach of contract is the extent to which there can be recovery for ‘intangible’ losses such as disappointment and inconvenience. In Watts v Morrow, Bingham LJ assumed that public policy generally proscribed contractual liability for such losses, unless the object of the contract was to provide pleasure and/or peace of mind, or the breach caused foreseeable physical inconvenience to the victim. Unfortunately, Watts, and its associated case-law, offered scant guidance on the underlying rationale for either the general rule or its two exceptions. Consequently, more recent judicial pronouncements on this issue, particularly from the House of Lords, are to be welcomed insofar as they demonstrate a greater preparedness to eschew the use of arbitrary policy constraints in favour of focusing upon a claimant’s expected benefits as contained within the contract. In so doing, disappointment and inconvenience appear to be subject to the same rules of recovery. This paper will seek to justify and encourage this trend, arguing that a logical application of the principles contained within Hadley v Baxendale and Robinson v Harman dispenses with any need to use ‘policy’ as a means of limiting the recovery of damages for disappointment and inconvenience, more properly takes account of a claimant’s known preferences, and ensures that all forms of inconvenience and disappointment are subject to the same rules; in short, that damages properly reflect the full range of the claimant’s expectation deficit.