The provisional proposals of the Law Commission for reform of the law relating to illegal transactions are examined in relation to proposals for reform of the same area of the law in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. The working in practice of the New Zealand Illegal Contracts Act 1970 is considered, and judicial development of the law in Canada and Australia is contrasted with the reluctance of the judiciary in England to embark upon systematic reform. The conclusion is reached that there is a proven need for a move away from rigidity and literalism towards a legitimated judicial discretion enabling the great variety of factors in illegality cases to be weighed. Furthermore, the artificial and arbitrary notion of ‘reliance’ upon illegality should be abrogated. Only statutory reform of the law along the lines provisionally proposed by the Law Commission is capable of bringing about these changes in England.

The law of goods remains in a relatively undeveloped state, retaining both a vocabulary and doctrines which derive from the late Year Book period. That vocabulary is expressed in terms of general and special property in goods. The ‘property’ in goods was always regarded as indivisible because there could be no estate in goods. That doctrine survives in the modern rule that ownership of goods is indivisible. The difficulty of reconciling the old language with modern usage is conventionally overcome by assuming that the old terms simply correspond with ownership and possession. It will be argued in this paper that no such correspondence exists because general and special property always represent an aspect of ownership. In order to demonstrate this assertion it is necessary to depart from orthodox doctrine and insist that ownership is severable. This will be illustrated by the way in which proprietary interests behave upon the creation of a pledge and a hiring of goods.

This article considers the justification for various doctrines pursuant to which rights in or over land may be acquired or lost informally. Three relevant factors are identified: the fault of the owner of the land or interest; potential unfairness to the other party; and policy reasons. Individual doctrines are examined to ascertain which factors are relevant to each. It is then argued that only policy reasons or a combination of fault and unfairness can adequately justify depriving someone of their rights in land and that some policy reasons relied on by the courts are no longer sufficient justification in the light of the Land Registration Act 1925. Consequently, it is argued that some of the doctrines discussed require reconsideration, if not abolition.

It has often been assumed that the notion of altruism indicative in the ordinary use of the term ‘charity’ penetrates the rationale for equity's enforcement of charitable trusts for the relief of the poor. This article questions whether in the area of poor relief equity acts out of a humanitarian regard for those whose relief is the purpose of the trust, or whether there is a more pragmatic rationale for action. Examination through case law of equity's reasoning is placed against a backdrop of socio-historical development, and of present day political concerns with resource allocation and professional accountability. This article concludes that whilst the potential for humanitarian relief in charitable trusts for the poor is clear, the operation of equity's jurisdiction in this area has a more prosaic disposition, placing poverty within the practical context of broader economic, social, commercial and industrial political policies.

In November 1997 the Environmental Audit Committee of the House of Commons (EAC) was established. The Committee is modelled in some ways on the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons (PAC) but, unlike the PAC, the EAC is not supported by an independent auditor. This article argues that, despite the limitations of audit made in accountancy literature, audit can be a useful mechanism by which to hold government to account for the impact of its policies and operations on the environment. However, as a model of accountability, the current system of environmental audit is inadequate. In making this argument, the article draws on two existing audit models. First, because the government has chosen to model the EAC on the PAC, the mechanisms in place for securing financial and value for money accountability in UK central government will be considered. Second, the article looks to the arrangements in Canada, where a more developed system of environmental audit exists.

Until recently environmental noise pollution has attracted relatively little attention from Parliament. However, currently, noise is rapidly moving up the political agenda both in the United Kingdom and in the European Union. This article focuses on neighbourhood noise and examines the efficacy of the substantive law as an instrument of environmental control. Potential difficulties in employing nuisance-based environmental standards for noise are also discussed. The article concludes with the author's suggestion that the law is in need of reform. However, there is no single solution to the problem. Regulation, whatever form it takes, will not, of itself provide the complete solution to noise pollution.

Defamation law offers a unique view of society and the changes it undergoes. When a claim of reputational injury is made, the case exposes the prejudices alive in the particular society at hand; and when the law deems a claim actionable, it recognises and, at some level, lends credence to the prejudices held. The case of Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn Mayer is a case in point. The claim by Princess Youssoupoff in 1934 that an imputation of rape or seduction is libelous reveals underlying currents in English society at the time as to class, nation and gender. The judicial recognition of the claim, and the legal and extra- legal reactions to the claim at the time and since, further raise for examination the relationship between law and morality: to be recognised as defamatory, must an allegation impute immorality to the plaintiff? Should the law of defamation recognise societal prejudices that are real, even if deemed by lawmakers and the judiciary invalid? Is it the function of the law to mirror the society in which it is produced or to carry it forward?