By introducing legal tests centring upon concepts of freedom, capacity and reasonableness, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 reflects a deliberate legislative attempt both to provide a clearer structure for jury deliberation on sexual consent and to hold defendants to a higher level of accountability in relation to their belief in its existence. While these developments are well intentioned, it is argued that they may ultimately prove to be of limited effect. More specifically, it is suggested that there is an inherent complexity in the concepts of freedom, capacity and reasonableness, at least in the largely undefined form in which they have been introduced, such that the Act may, in practice, simply result in the proliferation of a new set of malleable legal tests and unpredictable legal outcomes.

Drawing on a series of mock jury deliberations undertaken by the authors in which participants were asked, having observed a short rape trial reconstruction, to apply the tests set out in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in order to reach a verdict, this paper examines the ways in which the concepts of freedom, capacity and reasonableness were interpreted. Bearing in mind the inevitable constraints of the mock jury methodology (in particular its verisimilitude to real juries), this paper suggests that there may, nonetheless, be some valuable lessons to be gleaned from these deliberations about the future application of the law in actual rape cases.

In this paper, which is the text of a lecture given at the official launch of the Law School at the University of Bradford on 11 May 2006, the history of law reform in England is traced, the role of the Law Commission is analysed and future prospects are considered.

This paper, which is the revised text of the first Stephen Livingstone Memorial Lecture delivered in February 2006, surveys the human rights jurisprudence of the House of Lords over the past 10 years. It considers not just how the Law Lords have responded to the Human Rights Act 1998 but also how they have developed the law on equality, asylum and immigration. In assessing whether human rights are ‘safe’ in the hands of the Law Lords, it looks, first, at how willing the Law Lords have been to engage with human rights arguments, concluding that they have relished such discourse. The piece then examines how rigorously the Lords have protected rights guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. The conclusion reached is that the Law Lords have been doing a good job on that front. What is preventing them from adopting an even more rights-based approach to their work in general is the UK’s stubborn adherence to the ‘dualist’ theory of international law. The author agrees with Lord Steyn that the time has come to reconsider that position.

This paper examines concerns raised by employers about consensual sexual relationships occurring at work. It begins by examining the link between sexual relationships and sexual harassment as a justification for regulating relationships, particularly hierarchical ones, and suggests that the willingness of employers, particularly in the USA, to prohibit or regulate relationships might be motivated by reasons other than a concern for women’s equality at work. Secondly, it argues that although recent changes to the law on sexual harassment in the UK might encourage employers to consider prohibiting or regulating sexual relationships here, there are countervailing legal principles to be considered, such as anti-discrimination law and privacy rights. Finally, it argues that there is a real problem of harassment when relationships end and that sex discrimination law should be directed to ensuring that unacceptable behaviour is not tolerated, rather than prohibiting consensual relationships.

This paper challenges the traditional assumption that punitive damages are unavailable for breach of contract. It is shown that Addis v Gramophone provides weak authority for this assumption. The paper considers whether there is a logically coherent argument for retaining punitive damages in tort, while denying them for breach of contract, and it is shown that there is not. The main arguments advanced against punitive damages in civil proceedings are examined and shown to be unpersuasive. Finally, the efficient breach theory is considered and rejected on the ground that it significantly underestimates the costs associated with breach. In conclusion, the paper recommends that punitive damages should be exceptionally awarded to deter outrageous breaches of contract in cases where compensatory damages are inadequate and gain-based damages are unavailable.

This paper assesses the current state of English criminal law in relation to the use of physical force by parents as a means of disciplining their children. It does so in the light of the Children Act 2004, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, Art 3, pressure from bodies such as the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and the law in other parts of Europe. It acknowledges that parents should have a large degree of autonomy in relation to parenting. However, the defence of ‘discipline’ or ‘reasonable chastisement’ is outdated, vague and potentially dangerous to children. It is argued that the response of the British Government to criticism of our law has been far from satisfactory. The reform which was incorporated into the Children Act 2004 as a result of pressure upon the government aims to avoid criminalising ‘ordinary families’ for minor smacks. However, the statement of principle is so diluted that parents might understandably be confused and enforcement may be difficult. Moreover, the pressure for reform has continued unabated. The paper concludes that what is needed is an outright ban, combined with an educational campaign, which can lead the way in changing the cultural tradition of physical punishment.

Promoting alienability has been a policy of the law for many years. The rule against inalienability is one aspect of that policy. This paper seeks to demonstrate that that rule throws doubt on the validity of useful provisions such as the asset-lock provisions of the new breed of community-interest companies; that, historically, it has not been applied where logically it should have been; that the related rules restricting the imposition of conditions on transfers can readily, and better, be based upon secure doctrine rather than uncertain policy; and that, overall, its repeal, if thought necessary with concurrent reforms, would be welcome.