This paper concentrates on the ethical tension created by lawyer billing. In particular, it examines the tension between a lawyer's commercial imperative to make a profit and their ethical obligation to promote their clients interest over their own. Conventionally, this conflict is resolved through the lawyer providing disinterested advice on (their own) costs and the client granting informed consent to billing arrangements on that basis. This paper uses empirical data to suggest that notions of disinterested advice and informed consent are deeply flawed when it comes to lawyers' fees. Clients passively consume exploitative practices. As a result, this paper argues that, where possible, regulators should supplant informed consent with an approach requiring simple charging: reducing professional discretion over charging practices and strengthening the market-based regulation of price. This requires a significant simplification of lawyers' fees wherever possible.

Two recent fatal accident inquiries (FAIs) in Scotland have potentially far-reaching ramifications for educational provision across the whole of the UK. The deaths of two teenage children during the course of outdoor adventure activities led the sheriff in one of those inquiries to recommend a review of the regulatory framework which governs those activities. This call for an across-the-board review means the outdoor education sector – which includes organisations which provide outdoor education for schools groups as well as those offering more adventurous experiences for children outside term time – is now likely to face a degree of scrutiny greater than any it has experienced since the 1993 Lyme Bay disaster.

This paper draws upon research interviews with those who work in outdoor education in some of the more remote areas of Scotland. The data from those interviews indicate that some of the issues that ought to be considered in any such review will not be immediately apparent from reading either the fatal accident inquiries' determinations or the literature which is available either on the Heath and Safety Executive's website or otherwise in the public domain. In particular, it appears that some issues which have only reached a wider audience by virtue of these FAIs have actually been the source of longstanding concerns among the stakeholders, dating back to the mid-1990s when the regulatory framework that came into being in the wake of Lyme Bay was still under discussion. This paper therefore uses the interviewees' responses to help develop a greater understanding of the issues that exist in this particular sector and to illustrate the legal and logistical challenges that it faces.

This paper explores the issue of donation of organs from deceased donors for transplantation into a specified recipient. It argues that proper account should be taken of the principles underlying the Human Tissue Act 2004, which grant the donor a form of proprietary control. Three hypothetical scenarios are then used to draw out the implications of these principles for existing regulatory policy and the common law response to excised human organs. The paper concludes that the law should be understood as recognising ownership in organs removed from living and deceased persons and as offering opposition to the prohibition of directed donation that can only be coherently removed by reform of the 2004 Act.

The paper analyses the scheme whereby provincial chief constables, encouraged by the Home Office, could call in the help of Scotland Yard's experienced detectives to investigate serious cases, especially murder, that were considered to be beyond the capacity of the local force to solve on its own. While the scheme was on balance successful in that more than 50% of such call-outs between 1919 and 1928 resulted in convictions, it is suggested that its significance extended beyond the mere profit and loss accounting approach. For the arrangements cast a mirror on many of the conflicts and some of the developments in policing during this period. Thus they illuminated the tension between respect for local, even if inexperienced, police autonomy, on the one hand, and efficiency and expertise on the other; or, more broadly, between constitutional localism and central governmental direction of policing in England and Wales. But with the press campaigning for more efficient use of the scheme, its arrangements actually attested to the favourable prospects, in the late 1920s and 1930s, for inter-force cooperation in the form of national crime prevention schemes (such as that designed to intercept cross-country ‘motor bandits’). It was thus one of the unacknowledged elements in the forcing house for organisational change experienced by British policing before the war.

This paper examines how the courts can appropriately oversee the way in which local authorities formulate and implement their housing allocations policies. It locates this discussion within the wider topic of the courts' long-standing reluctance to become involved in adjudicating cases involving the allocation of resources more generally, as well as the potential for the courts to facilitate citizen participation in decision making, an aspiration that permeated the previous government's agenda and is apparently also a key influence for the current coalition government. It seeks to identify how the courts can protect both procedural and substantive fairness, in a manner that respects the courts' constitutional position and institutional competence.

The aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end-of-life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. The argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. A clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions is provided which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This paves the way for a clarification, in conclusion, of important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures, on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other.