The mainly social nature of humanity's existence has necessitated an apparatus of ideas for evaluating, amongst other things, the acceptability of personal interactions. The idea of consent is an important part of this apparatus. We find it a valuable ingredient in our thinking about such activities as physical, sexual, or psychic invasion, and the transfer or use of property. We commonly say that if someone performs one of these activities without the consent of another person whom we identify as having rights in the matter, they do a wrong; and, albeit perhaps a little less commonly, that if the other person does consent, they do not do a wrong. And we go on to articulate at least some of this thinking in the form of rules of the criminal law.

Conciliation has formed an integral part of the New Zealand Family Court’s management of family disputes since 1980. The Family Court is a tiered structure, designed to encourage the parties to resolve their own disputes by providing opportunities for conciliation within a statutory process. The first two tiers, counselling and judicial mediation, are procedures intended to empower the parties, enable self-determination, and encourage a conciliatory rather than combative attitude towards both each other and the dispute. Consequently, the parties are compulsorily channelled through the conciliation tiers of the court even if the ultimate goal of one of them is a court room battle. The hope is that the third tier, adjudication by a Family Court judge in the Family Court, will be avoided.

The leading recent authority on beneficial interests in shared homes is Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset, where the House of Lords clarified what had become rather a confused area of law. By no means all the problems were resolved, however, and the House proceeded on the basis of a now commonly-held but nevertheless fundamental misapprehension, that common intention is relevant to the creation of a trust. It is our contention that once it is clear precisely whose intention is relevant, and why, many of the conceptual difficulties in this area disappear.

For the purposes of the discussion, we consider the two situations, where legal title to a home is vested in A alone, and where it is vested in A and B jointly. In each case, the question is whether B can claim a beneficial interest, and if so, what is its nature and extent.

In the last twenty-five years consent has emerged as central to ethical and legal thinking on medical treatment. The meaning of consent and its importance and applicability in the medical context has been tested by scholars and judges in most western jurisdictions. This essay seeks to re-examine the role of consent in medical law in England having regard to a recent series of cases concerning the refusal of treatment. By linking the law, as it has emerged from these decisions, with that developed in the 1980s concerning the doctrine of informed consent it should be possible to draw some conclusions regarding the role of law and the courts in medicine. Throughout we shall be contrasting the supposedly traditional and outdated paternalism of the medical profession with the liberal, pro-autonomy strategies of (mainly) academic commentators.

In recent cases English, Australian, and New Zealand courts have been called on to deal with apparently similar fact situations of a woman entering into a mortgage, guarantee or joint loan contract with respect to a husband’s, partner’s or child's business debts, placing her home at risk. Yet the results and reasoning in the cases appear to be markedly different. The question is whether the apparent differences can be resolved to yield a coherent policy approach. It will be argued, drawing on an economic-feminist perspective that the cases can be resolved in terms of the courts’ preparedness to acknowledge only limited categories of behaviour and circumstances, when measured against the paradigm of the ‘rational economic man’, as displacing the assumption that contracting increases welfare.

In 1995, the highest courts in two Commonwealth jurisdictions - Canada and Australia - squarely faced the issue of the liability of builders of defective and, in the case of the Canadian Supreme Court, dangerous premises in tort.’ The determination in both cases that the builders were liable to the remote purchasers for the cost of repair, based on a duty of care owed to them, can be contrasted to the current state of tort law in this country dealing with defective and dangerous premises. In fact, the articulation of the reasons why a duty of care was imposed in these cases - as reflecting considerations both of principle and policy - provides a more compelling analysis than has been seen to date in the British law of negligence.