This paper examines the significance of the issue of causation where a death results from the supply of an illegal drug. The characterisation of the drug user’s conduct by means of a principle of voluntary intervention, as favoured in English and Welsh law, is questioned. The customary academic reliance upon the work of Hart and Honoré is doubted. The possibility of a new statutory offence of causing death by the supply of a controlled drug is considered.

The liability of public authorities in negligence continues to be a problematic area of the law. Some of the difficulties have been caused by the adoption by the courts of unnecessary and unworkable tests, in addition to the ordinary principles of the law of negligence. This is normally done to restrict liability, as with the policy–operational dichotomy, and the propositions that no liability can arise in respect of an act that ‘falls within the ambit of a statutory discretion’ or where the matter is non-justiciable. Sometimes the intention seems to be to extend liability, as with the suggestion that, generally, a duty of care may arise where there is an irrational failure to exercise a statutory power. Recent cases have helpfully continued the process of removing these special rules, leaving matters to be dealt with by the ordinary principles of negligence. Those principles enable proper account to be taken of the particular functions and responsibilities of public authorities. However, the cases remain difficult and the outcomes can still give rise to debate and disagreement. Insofar as there is a good case for extending the range of situations in which compensation is available in respect of the careless or unlawful acts of public authorities, it would be better to develop ex gratia schemes and the provision of remedies through ombudsmen than to extend the law of tort.

In his Dimbleby Lecture in December 2002, the Archbishop of Canterbury examined the effect of the emergence of the market state on the legitimacy of government activity in areas of morality. He suggested that, while this is becoming limited, the continuing need to provide a moral context for social life provided an opportunity for religious communities to play a crucial role. This paper suggests that the increasing significance of market concepts in healthcare law poses a similar challenge to the moral basis of medical practice, threatening to drive moral argument outside the scope of the discipline, with the consequent effect of undermining the values that drive good healthcare. Thus, the de-moralisation of medicine is also demoralising for those within the health professions. To counteract this tendency, a strong sense of a common moral community needs to be maintained amongst those engaged with the discipline of healthcare law. This paper also examines the role of law in this area. Traditionally, legal scholars have attacked the reluctance of legislators and the judiciary to wrestle from the grip of doctors the authority to determine ethical issues. The dominant view has been that this was a failure to recognise the fact that society has a stake in these matters and that legal non-intervention was an abdication of responsibility that undermines the rule of law. However, the integration of medical and moral decision making into a collaborative enterprise can also be seen as a more effective defence against the forces of demoralisation than the separation that the orthodox approach implies. If this is correct, then a key task for healthcare lawyers, as yet undeveloped, is to consider how to establish a legitimate common moral community, and what role the law might have to play in that process.

This paper examines the historical and theoretical basis of the privilege against self-incrimination and the case-law regarding the privilege before the UK and European courts in order to understand better the development of the privilege in relation to competition investigations in the UK and EU. The historical and theoretical basis of the privilege indicates that the privilege is a relatively modern legal creation and a number of theoretical bases are offered to justify its existence. The theoretical justifications assist in a better understanding of the extant case-law, but indicate that some of the distinctions drawn between categories of protected information have no clear basis. The paper goes on to examine the difference between self-incrimination and self-accusation, the extension of ‘human’ rights to corporate entities, and the existence of a privilege as a ‘functional necessity’. Finally the paper makes some suggestions about the type of information that might be sought legitimately in competition investigations and those requests that might be challenged.

The 2004 decision of the Court of Appeal in Manchester City Council v Romano and Samari highlighted the unexpected impact of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) upon the control of anti-social behaviour by social landlords where that conduct is caused by a mental disorder. This paper positions the legislation against the backdrop of advanced liberal housing policy, and its concern with the management of risk and the fostering of individual responsibility among tenants. In particular, it explores the possible criticism that, by preventing landlords in certain circumstances from taking action against the mentally disordered on grounds of their anti-social conduct, the DDA patronises those individuals by denying them the opportunity to take responsibility for their actions.

In December 2005, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force, thereby enabling same-sex couples to obtain formal legal recognition of their relationships. By modelling the provisions for dissolving such partnerships on divorce law, the government effectively transposed into the new regime both a fault-based ‘system’ and the accompanying sense that the law is vested with a role beyond that of simply ending relationships. In view of the recent, but ultimately failed, attempt to introduce no-fault divorce, this paper explores the role of law in this context. Drawing on a series of interviews with key individuals involved in the reform process, it explores how no-fault divorce was hijacked in a vain effort to provide simultaneous means of saving and ending marriage. In particular, the veto wielded by an influential group of idealistic conservatives during the latter stages of the reform process is identified. Given the inability or unwillingness of reformers to confront such conservatism with either a thoroughgoing defence of diversity, or the reality of the limited capacity of states to legislate for morality, the paper calls for a re-evaluation of the law’s role. It questions whether the Civil Partnership Act 2004 represents a missed opportunity to conduct such a re-evaluation and thus to point the way for future divorce reform.