Jurisdiction clauses commonly feature in high-value international contracts. Recently, these clauses are also increasingly utilised in international trust instruments. At common law, a contentious issue vis-à-vis exclusive jurisdiction clauses in trust deeds has been whether they should be upheld in the same way as their contractual equivalents. In obiter remarks in Crociani v Crociani, in 2014, the Privy Council stated that these clauses should be afforded less weight in trusts than in contracts. However, as this paper seeks to demonstrate, the reasoning underpinning the treatment of exclusive jurisdiction clauses in trust deeds in this manner is questionable. The paper's key contention is that exclusive jurisdiction clauses in trust deeds should be enforced in the same way as those in contracts. Accordingly, an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a trust instrument should be upheld, unless the claimant can establish a strong cause why the matter should be litigated elsewhere.

This paper explores the promise of pluralism in the realm of contract law. I begin by identifying and rejecting conceptual strategies adopted by monistic and dualistic approaches. Turning towards pluralism, I evaluate three versions in contemporary literature: pluralism across contracting spheres and types, pluralism through consensus and convergence, and pluralism through localised values-balancing and practical reasoning. I suggest embracing some pluralism about contract pluralism, by using these models to construct a framework of ‘meta-pluralism’, where at the macro-level, we are concerned with plural spheres of contracting activity; at the meso-level, a variety of trans-substantive interpretive concepts that receive some measure of juristic consensus; and at the micro-level, practical reasoning through particularistic analysis of case-specific considerations. I illustrate the meta-pluralistic framework through a case study on the varieties of specific performance, and explain how the proposed pluralistic framework enriches our understanding of the nature of contract.

This paper examines the extent to which law and regulation protects students renting from private individuals or private companies, as opposed to universities, in both of the main types of student accommodation, the private rented sector (PRS) and purpose-built student accommodation (PBSA). It first examines the different problems faced by students in both tenure types, notably issues of repair and the failure of PBSA providers to complete accommodation in time for the beginning of term. Secondly, it considers consumerisation of private renting and the extent to which a consumer protection law approach can assist tenants generally, and students specifically. Thirdly, the paper explains how power relationships between students and landlords and issues with access to legal advice restrict access to justice for student as tenants. It is argued that whilst consumer contract law and consumer protection law have something to offer student tenants (particularly in PBSA) a generic consumer approach to the rights of tenants is insufficient because the nature of the landlord and tenant relationship inhibits access to legal redress. It is concluded that in addition to improved consumer protections, a proactive approach by both local authorities and universities could significantly improve the experiences of students.

This paper takes as its context the decision of the Solicitors Regulation Authority in England and Wales to abandon before the event regulation of lower court trial advocacy. Although solicitors will continue to acquire rights of audience on qualification, they will no longer be required to undertake training or assessment in witness examination, by contrast with other, competing, legal professions. Their opportunities to acquire competence outside the classroom will remain limited. The paper first explores this context and its implications for the three key factors of rights to perform, competence and regulatory accountability. The current regulatory system is then displayed as a Hohfeldian network of rights and duties held in tension between stakeholders intended to inhibit the incompetent exercise of rights to conduct trial advocacy. The SRA's proposal weakens this tension field and threatens the competitive position of solicitors. The paper therefore finally offers a radical alternative reconceptualisation of rights of audience in terms of Waldron's ‘responsibility rights’ as a solution, albeit one with significant implications for the individual advocate. This model, applicable globally, is closer to notions of societal good and professionalism than to those of the competitive market, whilst inhibiting incompetent performance and remediating the SRA's approach.

The illegality defence is an important element of private law, but its operation has been unpredictable. In Patel v Mirza, the Supreme Court opted for a flexible approach, which does not increase predictability. This approach was recently confirmed in Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust and Stoffel & Co v Grondona. I propose a principle to guide the application of the illegality defence in tort: namely, the claim fails for illegality if the claimant's harm is the ordinary result of the claimant's wrongdoing. It is argued that the guiding principle: (i) substantially explains the case law; (ii) is normatively defensible; and (iii) makes the defence much more predictable.

The European Court of Human Rights (the Court) has been invoking the vulnerability criterion to overcome the drawbacks of cases concerning Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the prohibition of discrimination. This new criterion, allowing the Court to favour the applicants, highlights the applicants’ group affiliation. However, whether this criterion is effective in protecting vulnerable applicants against discrimination is doubtful. To examine this, I divide the Court's approach to Article 14 before and after the application of the vulnerability criterion. I argue that vulnerability criterion was used to fix the drawbacks of Article 14, but eventually backfired. The concept of vulnerability has been ambiguous, inconsistently used by the Court, and paternalistic. I suggest the Court focus on individual autonomy rather than grouping the applicants to improve their legal reasoning of Article 14.

Arguments for reform of the dynamic of medical negligence litigation in Ireland frequently centre on temporal and financial concerns. However, as the field of law and psychology has continued to grow, a body of international literature has emerged which recognises that litigation can have a destructive emotional impact on its participants, particularly in the context of medical negligence disputes.

This paper contributes to the discourse on law-caused harms through a critical exploration of the emotional burdens of medical negligence litigation from the perspective of both the plaintiff and medical practitioner, with reference to the findings of an empirical study (interviews with barristers, patient support groups, and medical professional bodies) and the literature. Whilst the temporal and financial efficiency of medical negligence litigation is important, if litigation can cause emotional harm, this should be considered a serious, undesirable effect of the traditional adversarial process, and may have broader implications for reform in this area.

Paternalistic forms of regulation for the retail investment market have been gradual and restrained, even though significant gaps exist between investors’ needs and market-based provision. As ordinary citizens reckon with a variety of savings needs and become financial citizens responsible for their own financial welfare provision, financial health is not merely an issue of individual fortunes but a social need. Adverse financial welfare consequences can at scale become a social issue, as is reflected in the social demands and critique entailing from the collapse of London and Capital Finance in the UK. The need for more regulatory paternalism goes beyond preventing mis-selling, and the outworking of welfare beyond point-of-sale remains relatively unconsidered. Post-sale welfare is, however, increasingly recognised for consumer credit and is slower to catch on in relation to savings needs and investments. This paper advocates that the regulator should not remain ambivalent about the need for more paternalistic interventions. Paternalistic protection is not only about shifting more burdens to the industry but also about the provision of public goods where there are standardised baseline needs for retail investors. This paper unpacks the roles of both the public and private sectors in addressing retail investors’ financial welfare needs.

During 2020, weddings were profoundly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. During periods of lockdown few weddings could take place, and even afterwards restrictions on how they could be celebrated remained. To investigate the impact of such restrictions, we carried out a survey of those whose plans to marry in England and Wales had been affected by Covid-19. The 1,449 responses we received illustrated that the ease and speed with which couples had been able to marry, and sometimes whether they had been able to marry at all, had depended not merely on the national restrictions in place but on their chosen route into marriage. This highlights the complexity and antiquity of marriage law and reinforces the need for reform. The restrictions on weddings taking place also revealed the extent to which couples valued getting married as opposed to having a wedding. Understanding both the social and the legal dimension of weddings is important in informing recommendations as to how the law should be changed in the future, not merely to deal with similar crises but also to ensure that the general law is fit for purpose in the twenty-first century.

In a context where the criminal courts have been drastically affected by coronavirus, this paper seeks to demonstrate that the presumption of innocence risks becoming a further casualty of Covid-19. It will argue that prolonged pre-trial detention of unconvicted defendants has been sanctioned by the senior judiciary under the Custody Time Limit (CTL) Regulations. Following a series of important CTL decisions, a universal position of the senior judiciary, one supportive of government, is emerging: despite the case backlog resulting in defendants facing trial delays of unknown length, the exceptional circumstances of the pandemic which the executive faces, amounts to ‘good cause’ to extend CTLs. It will be argued that the correct approach for courts to follow is that that they must hear evidence that justifies why no court rooms are available before using that to mandate extensions. It will be further contended that these far-reaching decisions came from the senior judiciary's perceived need to mop up the problem posed by widespread refusals to extend CTLs, raising questions as to their ability to act independently of political pressure.