Considering whether law students receive a legal education that is meaningful and relevant to them raises interesting questions about what education is, what it's for, how we teach, how we learn and, essentially, how we know what we know. This article examines ideology and the law lecturer and student, and how these intersect, interact and conflict to inform the teaching, learning and understanding of law. These are not inconsequential questions considering the range of diversity among students now studying law. These issues are explored by examining the purposes of legal education in light of the overall objectives of higher education. The article then looks at the impact of ideology on our understanding of the world in general and of law in particular, and how ideology influences how we learn and what we learn. The manner in which ideology influences a particular interpretation of information, and especially legal information, is explored, as are the consequences to those outside that ideological and interpretive commonality. Thus, it is argued that some groups of students are excluded from a legal education that is meaningful and relevant to them. Lastly, the article considers ways in which law may be understood and taught otherwise to reflect both our students' reality and the social context in which law operates.

The current law of resulting and constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel is acknowledged to provide uncertain and often unsatisfactory remedies to disputes concerning the allocation of property rights in the family home. This article reviews these inadequacies, particularly as they affect the growing numbers of cohabitants, and puts forward radical proposals for reform. It is argued that the special nature of the family home - where the parties' relationship is based on ‘trust and collaboration’ rather than commercial principles - requires reform which takes account of the broader contributions of both parties to the home and to the family in allocating property rights. The law should strive to treat all family homes in a consistent way, provide greater certainty of outcome, and yet do justice between the parties. A system of modified community property is therefore proposed. Broadly, this will provide a sliding scale of allocation of property rights over time for non-owner partners and a presumption of enhancement of the interest of the primary carer of children of the relationship. However, contracting out should be permitted; and a discretion to adjust the presumptive rights retained by the court where ‘manifest injustice’ is demonstrated.

There is a real need to clarify the scope of the doctrine of joint tortfeasance, in view of the constant attempts by plaintifs to widen liability in the search, for the deepest pockets. Part of this clarification involves a reaction to the growing use of ‘accessory liability’ terminology in the civil IUMI generally. There Lire those who argue that whatever the limits of joint tortfeasance liability, the law implicitly accepts liability for ‘facilitators’ us secondary parties to all civil wrongs. The aim of this paper is to clarify the doctrine of joint tortfeasance, to distinguish the liability of those who cause or conspire from those who merely facilitate, and to deny the existence of a wide concept of secondary civil liability.

Corporate governance is ‘hot’ in the United Kingdom and legal academics have written widely on the subject. Still, the topic has been virtually ignored as an academic discipline for law students. This article argues that corporate governance is a subject which should be included in the law curriculum and describes how a course dealing with the topic might be structured.

Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317, 6 ESP 129 has long been perceived as a ‘problem case’ in the law of contract. It provides a famous example of conflicting reports: one reporter appears to base the judgment on the doctrine of consideration, the other on public policy. The view that the case turned on the application of the doctrine of consideration had been generally accepted, but was challenged in Williams v Roffey Bros. & Nicholls [1991] I QB1. This article looks again at the texts of the two reports of Stilk v Myrick, and discusses these against the background of law reporting in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It also looks at the case in its historical context, as one of many cases in the law reports concerning aspects of the employment and remuneration of merchant seamen. The writer suggests that judges and commentators have tended - whether looking at the reports of the case as texts, or considering the facts of the case in their historical context - to take an over-simplified view of the case.

Sexual harassment litigation may be thwarted by judges failing to address the acts in question from the perspective of the victim, thus legitimising behaviour acceptable to men but unacceptable to women. This paper shows how this problem may be overcome by adopting a ‘reasonable woman’ standard to decide if: (i) objectively, the acts in question constitute harassment; and (ii) subjectively, whether the victim suffered injury. Using US case law the paper shows how the reasonable woman standard, which has been accepted in some courts, can allow women's perspectives to be heard. The paper suggests that a reasonable woman standard should be adopted in UK tort law, specifically in litigation under the Sex Discrimination Act, but also for litigation under trespass torts and under the Protection from Harassment Act. Doctrinally, the proposed standard fits within the fabric of tort la; and does not challenge the principle of corrective justice. From a feminist perspective, the reasonable woman standard can successfully redirect tort law to address gender-specific harms.