Cross-examination is lauded within the common law tradition as the definitive forensic device for exposing testimonial infirmity. Victimological study of criminal trial proceedings has, however, revealed the extent to which cross-examination is used as a tool to humiliate, intimidate and confuse opposing witnesses. Particular difficulties confront children and those with learning disabilities as little reference is made during cross-examination to their special communicative needs. This paper reviews the tactics and techniques employed by cross-examiners to systematically destroy the credibility of those with limited language capability. The main aim of the paper is, however, to demonstrate the significant limitations of what may be termed an accommodation approach to the problems facing vulnerable witnesses, whereby ‘solutions’ are sought and crafted within the established trial framework. Such an approach ignores the very nature of adversary advacacy and the potent structural barriers to effective regulation of courtroom questioning within an adversarial system of trial.

The concept of the sovereignty of the nation state is at the very core of our understanding of public international law. Nevertheless, the concept is under constant pressure to adapt to the changing global situation. This is particularly true when sovereignty is examined in the light of environmental concerns. Is the traditional paradigm still relevant in an age when so many transboundary and global environmental issues confront the international legal order? This paper suggests that whilst sovereignty remains a central pillar of international law, it is one that increasingly must be responsive to the needs and concerns of an interdependent international community. It must not be treated as a static, immovable fact, but rather as a flexible tool through which states can more effectively act in an increasingly interdependent global society.

The first part of this paper asks if the Creditors' Bargain Model, long employed by insolvency scholars as the starting point for many an analysis, can explain or justify even the most distinctive and fundamental feature of insolvency law. After examining the defining features of the model's construction, the role of self-interest and consent in it, and its ex ante position, it is concluded that the Bargain model can neither explain nor legitimate the coercive collective liquidation regime. The second part of the paper develops an alternative model to analyse and justify insolvency law. The starting premise is that all (but only) those affected by issues peculiarly governed by insolvency law are to be given a choice in selecting the principles which would determine their rights and obligations. Once these parties have been identified, they are to be given equal weight in the selection process, since their legal status (whether they are employees, secured or unsecured creditors, etc), wealth, cognitive abilities, and bargaining strength are all morally irrelevant in framing rules of justice. This part of the paper introduces the notion of a constructive attribute, characteristics this society accepts its citizens should have in their role as legislators. So all parties affected by insolvency issues are regarded as free, equal, and reasonable. The model sketched out in this part of the article requires all principles to be selected from its choice position. Here, all the parties are deprived of any knowledge of personal attributes, and must reason rationally. It is shown that parties in the choice position would in fact choose the principles laying down the automatic stay on unsecured claims. The paper concludes with the demonstration that because of the construction of the choice position and the constructive attributes of the parties bargaining in it, the principles chosen are fair and just, and chosen in exercise of the parties' autonomy. As it happens, they are also efficient.

This paper argues that comparative law should become a core subject in all law degree programmes. By ‘core’ is meant a progression subject that will take the student through a three-year programme emphasising not what the law is but how one should think like a lawyer. Comparative law is ideal for this task because it emphasises two fundamental questions: what is ‘comparison’? And what is ‘law’? The paper demonstrates, first, how the rule model of legal knowledge is inadequate when it comes to comparing law and, second, how the techniques of comparison can reveal this inadequacy. These demonstrations are primarily founded upon a distinction, explained in the paper, between symbolic and non-symbolic knowledge.

This paper briefly reviews the US case law dealing with the issue of birth control fraud and speculates on the possibility of a similar action succeeding in the UK. It then focuses on newspaper reporting of one such case. A common media reading of this case, and one which can also be detected in some academic commentary of similar cases, is to contextualise it as part of an ongoing ‘battle of the sexes’, where historic poles of inequality have become reversed and women have gained unfair (legal) advantage in procreative matters. It is argued that such an understanding is flawed and misleading, serving to distract attention from the legal structuring of these kinds of disputes. The paper concludes that the operation of the law can here be better understood as seeking to support the nuclear family in a way which can impact negatively on both individual men and individual women. The birth control fraud cases invite us to rethink the way that parental obligations are imposed and to justify more rigorously the choices which we make in this regard.

The law of negligence favours redress for damage to property interests over redress for damage to mere economic interests. The question arises whether this preference can be justified. In endeavouring to answer it, the author surveys existing reasons given by courts and commentators for maintaining a distinction between property and economic interests. Each of these reasons, which collectively focus upon the ‘problematic’ nature of economic losses, is found to be either ad hoe in nature or without substantial explanatory power. However, it is submitted that the distinction is explicable on the basis that, whereas an individual's personality is partly constituted by the property that he or she owns, so that property can be seen as essential to the ways in which individuals constitute and define themselves, no such claim can be made with respect to mere abstract holdings of wealth. Although wealth permits the acquisition of property and participation in activities and experiences which might help to constitute and define the self in the future, the very fact that wealth has not been transposed into these things precludes it from being considered as important as actual holdings of property. The protection of property interests ought, therefore, to precede the protection of mere economic interests.