The criminal justice system of England and Wales has been subject to a series of essentially ad hoc reforms that depart to a significant degree from its adversarial heritage and represent a threat to fair trial rights under Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Far from moving closer to the European ‘inquisitorial’ model, as has been suggested by some commentators, criminal procedure is becoming increasingly dominated by managerialist concerns. Intolerance to litigant control is motivated by the desire to increase efficiency and reduce cost, although the replacement of party autonomy in terms of control over the conduct of the case by state power over process corresponds to some degree to the descriptions, in the work of Mirjan Damaška, of the system favoured by ‘activist’ states. However, the financial crisis facing the new government means that the situation is unlikely to be alleviated should the extent of government activity be reduced.

Throughout the world, the corporate group structure has long proved troublesome to the creditors, and particularly the tort creditors, of undercapitalised subsidiary companies. In the wake of Australia's James Hardie asbestos compensation inquiry, Senior Counsel assisting the Jackson Special Commission, Mr John Sheahan QC, called for the Commission to ‘recommend reform of the Corporations Act so as to restrict the application of the limited liability principle as regards liability for damages for personal injury or death caused by a company that is part of a corporate group...’. Following this call, in May 2008 the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee released a report on long-tail liabilities, making various recommendations for reform. Separately, legislation was passed making pooling available for insolvent group companies in Australia. This paper examines the long-tail liability suggestions and the 2007 pooling amendments. It will be argued that neither of these is adequate for the proper protection of tort creditors of insolvent subsidiaries. It then considers international alternatives which might satisfy Mr Sheahan's appeal for reform.

Alan Watson's theory of legal transplants was pioneering and innovative. It moved comparative law beyond ideas of legal families and legal systems by providing both a tool and a metaphor for examining hybrid, or mixed, legal systems. However, socio-legal comparativists in particular criticised his approach because of its failure adequately to acknowledge the importance of legal culture in transplant theory. As a hybrid legal system Japan provides an operative laboratory of comparative law. This paper examines jury trial to evaluate Watson's theory. It concludes by offering a new threefold categorisation of legal transplants.

The ‘elusive’ concept of ‘impairment’ was introduced into the General Medical Council's Fitness to Practise Procedures in 2002. Its function was ostensibly to bring all forms of fitness to practise allegations against doctors under a unifying concept and thereby reduce procedural complexity. This paper strives to illuminate the application of ‘impairment’ of fitness to practise with reference to a year of fitness to practise decision making by the General Medical Council (GMC). It concludes that impairment has brought with it a redemptive style of resolving matters of professional discipline which brings significant benefits to doctors, the patient population and society as a whole, but which can also encourage a contrived exchange of remorse, insight and remediation with further implications for professional integrity and truth.

In law and discourse, it has typically been assumed that the religious freedom of state-funded religious schools must trump any competing right to non-discrimination on grounds of belief. For example, the Irish Constitution has been interpreted as requiring the broad exemption of denominational schools from the statutory prohibition on religious discrimination in school admissions. This stance is mirrored in the UK Equality Act 2010. Thus, religious discrimination in the public education context has been rationalised with reference to a ‘liberty-equality dichotomy’, which prioritises the integrity of faith schools' ‘ethos’, as an imperative of religious freedom. We argue that this familiar conceptual dichotomy generates a novel set of absurdities in this peculiar context. We suggest that the construction of religious freedom and non-discrimination as separate and antagonistic values rests on a conceptually flawed definition of religious freedom itself, which overlooks the necessary dependence of religious freedom on non-discrimination. Furthermore, it overstates the necessity, to religious freedom, of religious schools' ‘right to discriminate’. We argue for an alternative ordering of the values of religious freedom and non-discrimination – which we locate within the neo-republican theory of freedom as non-domination.

In 2009 the legislature, judges and Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) each turned their attention to issues around assisted suicide. The legislature decided not to change the law. The judges decided the existing law was insufficiently clear and required the Director to clarify it. The Director flirted with reforming the law, but then drew back from such a legislative role. His published prosecution policy has been considered as a contribution to the regulation of death and dying, and as such has been found wanting. However, considered in the context of the proper roles of Parliament, courts and prosecutors, and seen as an exercise in constitutional restraint, the Director's approach should be appraised rather differently. From this perspective, the decision of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords in R (Purdy) v DPP raises significant concerns for the legitimacy of decision making in the contested moral issues that arise in healthcare ethics. In our democracy, courts should be wary of usurping legislative authority in areas where the Parliamentary position is clear. They should be reluctant to take sides in the protracted war over access to a ‘good death’.