Based on a findings of a simulation study in which 160 members of the public observed a mini rape trial re-enactment and were then asked to deliberate in jury groups towards a unanimous verdict, this paper explores the extent to which participants were able, and willing, to understand and apply judicial directions, and the legal tests or criteria contained therein. More specifically, it reflects on whether the additional provision of written directions in the jury room influenced the tone or direction of jurors' discussions, and illustrates the limited recourse made by participants to their contents, as well as their tendency to misinterpret or misapply them when they were relied upon. Having done so, this paper moves on to explore the reasons behind this limited impact, suggesting that fundamental tensions may exist between legal and lay imaginaries, such that jurors are reluctant to jettison their more natural inclinations to reach individual and collective verdicts on the basis of narrative constructions grounded in ‘common sense’ and ‘personal experience’.

This paper considers the influence of the Supreme Court decision in Jones v Kernott on subsequent cases. It focuses on situations with which Jones was not directly concerned, namely where there is only one legal owner of a home and a non-legal-owning cohabitant seeks to establish that he has an equitable interest in it under a common intention constructive trust. The paper argues that while judges have mostly accepted that Jones is relevant to such sole-owner cases, they have had few opportunities (and taken fewer) to move beyond the restrictive approach of Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset and allow novel outcomes in the light of Jones as yet. It is contended that this state of affairs could ultimately produce a conservative approach that is undesirable for cohabitants who make indirect or non-financial contributions to shared lives, and remain without comprehensive statutory property and financial provision on relationship breakdown.

In the wake of the financial crisis, there has been much discussion about whether boards (particularly of banks) are sufficiently accountable. However, while a significant literature has grown up in relation to the study of accountability in various disciplines, particularly public administration and politics, in the field of corporate governance there has been little consideration of what accountability means or entails. This is problematic: without a clearer idea of the elusive concept of accountability, debates about board accountability may be at cross-purposes. It will be difficult to assess whether particular corporate governance mechanisms promote board accountability, and if not, why not. The lack of clarity can also mask accountability deficits. This paper addresses this gap, setting out why accountability is important and offering an account of what accountability means in the corporate governance context, focusing on board accountability, in order to provide a framework for future research.

The doctrine of insurable interest grew out of eighteenth-century anxieties over fraudulent seafarers and habitual gamblers. It was created by the courts, entrenched by statute and remains in place to this day despite the fact that it serves no practical or legal purpose. It was hoped by many that, when the English Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission established their joint review of insurance contract law in 2006, the doctrine would be consigned to the proverbial dustbin of history. Eight years later, these hopes have been dashed. The doctrine is here to stay. This paper asks ‘Why’ and finds the answer to be elusive.

It is often said that distributive justice has no place in private law. However, distributive justice considerations feature strongly in cases involving the remedies imposed over bribes gained in breach of fiduciary duty. This paper argues that courts should exercise structured discretion, guided by principles of distributive justice, in ascertaining the appropriate remedy. The distributive factors of desert, needs and equality should inform the determination of what remedy is apposite to provide justice in the circumstances.

In this paper, stimulated by the publication some years ago in France of a small book on medical reasoning, legal and medical reasoning are compared. The question that is asked is whether the differences between the two types of reasoning will permit one to have a better understanding of some of the methodological and epistemological issues associated with legal reasoning. It will be argued that although medical and legal reasoners do share things in common, legal reasoning, perhaps unlike medical reasoning, is actually concerned less with the explanation or even comprehension of texts or the facts of a dispute (explicatio causæ) and more with what will be termed the ‘manipulation’ of facts (accommodatio factorum). Lawyers purify and (or) construct ‘virtual’ factual situations out of perceived ‘actual’ factual situations in order to make them conform or not conform in an isomorphic way with factual situations implied by a legal text or precedent. Medical reasoning is equally complex but facts are read in a different way.

The legal framework concerning liability of communication intermediaries for defamation is under-conceptualised. The paper thus develops a holistic doctrinal approach to liability of speech intermediaries, such as Internet service providers (ISPs), booksellers and newspaper vendors, for defamation. It views intermediary liability for defamatory speech against the backdrop of communication theory and freedom of expression doctrine. If properly conceptualised, as suggested in this paper, the law of defamation can accommodate the cyberspace-specific legislation in Arts 12–15 of the e-commerce Directive and s 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, as well as the innocent dissemination defence in s 1 of the Defamation Act 1996, now to be read together with s 10 of the Defamation Act 2013. The paper establishes six tenets of intermediary liability for defamatory content. In particular, it argues that ‘publication’ is to be conceptualised as a merely factual requirement for defamation, whereas the defence of ‘innocent publication’, also known as ‘innocent dissemination’, is a fault-based concept. Communication intermediaries are thus to be considered ‘publishers’, even if they have a merely automatic role in the publication process, but they may avail themselves of the defence of ‘innocent publication’. This defence has to be applied in compliance with the human rights of the parties involved.