This paper argues that the principle in Woolwich Building Society v IRC (No 2) (1993) that the citizen has a prima facie right to the repayment of money voluntarily paid in response to an unlawful demand by a public authority, should not be regarded aspart of the private law of restitution creating aprivate law right but as a free standing public law principle enforceable in the Administrative Court, broadly analogous to a legitimate expectation. The flexible process and the discretionary nature of the judicial review jurisdiction is more appropriate to the issues that arise than is the private law of restitution with its emphasis on bipolar disputes. Underlying the argument is the claim that the rule of law should not give automatic protection to a person who voluntarily makes a payment to a public authority while believing that payment to be unlawful. More generally, the paper suggests that the enterprise of seeking to subsume restitutionary principles within a single conceptual framework may be misconceived.

In this article we argue that the House of Lords recently erred severely by failing to apply the Human Rights Act 1998 retrospectively, and that the appropriate remedy is to deploy the 1966 ‘Practice Statement’. We describe how the House has made a number of basic mistakes in interpreting the literal meaning of the Act. These errors are partly explained by the court's reliance upon a general presumption that law should not be applied retrospectively. We argue that human rights legislation is a necessary exception to this rule. We maintain this for philosophical reasons, but also contend that s 3(1) of the Human Rights Act reverses the presumption against retrospectivity and requires a new presumption that human rights should be given effect whenever it is possible to do so. This is a vital issue because s 3(1) is one of the most important provisions in the UK constitution.

The modern argument that the law of obligations should be recast in restitutionary terms appears to have achieved its victory over contract in A-G v Blake. Although ritual obeisance to compensatory damages is made, Blake recognises a general restitutionary remedy for breach of contract the logic of which must be to undermine completely the expectation interest. The general effect of restitutionary rather than expectation-based remedies will be to furnish a greater deterrent against breach, a result welcomed by advocates of the ‘performance interest’. All this would be well were all breaches ‘wrongs’ which should be deterred. This, however, is not so. Breach has a positive, indeed essential, role in the operation of the law of contract as the legal institution regulating economic exchange and pursuit of its general prevention is inconsistent with the operation of a market economy. The victory of restitution therefore is illusory: it is impossible that the position established in Blake can be sustained.

Chancel liability is an ancient property right, enforced by a Parochial Church Council, attaching to certain former rectorial lands. It requires a landowner to bear the cost of repair of the parish church chancel. The right poses particular problems for a purchaser, not least because it is hard to discover and is not limited to the value of the land. A recent decision of the Court of Appeal has found that a Parochial Church Council falls within section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as a public authority, and that chancel liability infringes article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights. This paper will dispute the rationale used by the Court of Appeal, and in so doing will argue that whilst chancel liability is outmoded, widely regarded as incongruous and does not bear scrutiny in its modern context, it should nevertheless be removed on a principled basis, avoiding unwanted repercussions elsewhere in the law.

One of the most important issues arising from the Human Rights Act 1998 is the degree of its applicability, if any, to relations between private individuals. While the wording of the Act itself provides no clear guidance on the matter, and a wide-ranging spectrum of potential outcomes has been identified, there is an emerging academic consensus that the Act will have some horizontal effect – but limited to enabling development of the existing common law, and not extending to provision of new actions and remedies. This paper seeks to challenge that consensus. Fidelity to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights requires that the effect of the Act go beyond mere incremental development. There is clear authority that the legal systems of signatory states must provide remedies for infringement of individual rights by other individuals. Nothing in the Human Rights Act 1998 obstructs this interpretation. Further, the paper seeks to identify certain fatal errors in the arguments of the ‘developmental consensus’ .

This paper critically evaluates clause 106 of the Adoption and Children Bill that permits for unmarried fathers to acquire parental responsibility on joint registration of the child's birth. I will argue that there are two factors influencing the proposed expansion of the ways in which fathers may acquire parental responsibility. First, current law recognises the automatic parental responsibility of mothers but only of married fathers, and so is said to contain an imbalance in favour of mothers. Secondly, there is a perceived need to recognise the father's commitment to the child, which is allegedly demonstrated through the act of registration. This paper examines these two themes by reviewing recent case law relating to section 4 applications. It will show that the current law does at least place an emphasis on fathers showing some merit to the court and will argue that the reform in itself will do little to enhance and promote the relationships between children and fathers. However, as a result considerable incursion will be made into the control that women, as primary carers, have in relation to their children.