Despite the limited exception introduced by statute in 1974, the principle that truth is and ought to be a complete defence to all actions in defamation is typically regarded as self-evident in modern English law. The fact that England stands here against not only the whole of the civilian tradition but also a number of common-law jurisdictions suggests, however, that it is not. This paper, after surveying the history of the principle in English law and the debates that it has spurred in the past, argues that English law is right on this question, but needs to understand more cogently why. This, in turn, requires an examination of the interests protected by the cause of action. It is only if we accept that it is, and is solely, reputation founded in character that the defence of veritas will be secured.

Employment rights may be crafted as ‘bright-line’ rules or open-textured standards. Employment rights which are framed at a higher level of generality, such as standards, have not been examined in the same level of detail as rules in labour law scholarship. Standards can be divided into standards of conduct and standards of review. Standards of conduct represent commands to decision makers, such as employers, which enable them to scrutinise their decision making internally; whereas standards of review are addressed to adjudicators whose function it is to scrutinise the conduct of decision makers externally. In the majority of cases, the intensity of scrutiny which is attached to both of these standards will be the same, resulting in conflation. However, there is a general assumption that in adjudicating disputes involving employment rights, the judiciary is overly deferential to the managerial prerogative and this assumption can be corroborated – but also challenged – by an analysis which focuses on standards of review quite separately from standards of conduct. Such an examination reveals situations in which the level of scrutiny exerted externally by the adjudicator pursuant to the standard of review may be less, but also more, acute than that attached to the internal standard of conduct. This paper goes on to evaluate what the degree of intensity of scrutiny attached to standards of conduct and review reveals about employment rights more generally and erects a framework against which the argument about varying intensities of scrutiny can be given greater clarity.

In England and Wales, the question of access to information about deceased persons is determined under two separate statutes: the Access to Health Records Act 1990 and the Freedom of Information Act 2000. This paper examines the normative and legal issues raised by access to information about the dead and evaluates the statutory framework. It draws on philosophical and legal sources which support the claim that the dead are owed a moral and legal duty of confidence. However, it also shows that this is not an absolute duty and it identifies the public and private justifications which favour the provision of access to information about the dead. It argues that the current statutory framework is excessively restrictive and that it fails to provide an appropriate context within which interests favouring access may be considered. Accordingly, it argues that the law needs to be reformed and that a specific legislative framework dealing with access to information about the dead should be introduced. The paper concludes by setting out some preliminary suggestions regarding the possible form of such a legislative framework.

This paper addresses a cluster of issues. What is state entrapment? Why is it objectionable? Is it wrong to prosecute the entrapped? What should the court do when the case is brought before it? These questions are intertwined. To know what is wrong with state entrapment, we must be clear about what it is; our understanding of what constitutes state entrapment, with its negative connotation, is shaped by what we think is distinctively wrong with it; and, we cannot know how the court should deal with state entrapment unless we identify the precise problem to which a judicial response may be required. The right response is a permanent stay of proceedings. A stay should be granted because the executive does not come to court with clean hands. It lacks the standing to blame the entrapped for what he or she did, and the state lacks the standing to condemn the person for the same.

The English criminal law has not moved with the times – nor with the increasing emphasis on human rights. Legislation still extant goes back nearly 700 years and is barely intelligible. This paper analyses antiquated criminal and criminal procedure legislation and asserts it should be repealed, being superceded by more modern enactments. It also argues for the consolidation of all criminal (and criminal procedure) legislation for the period 1313–1960 into one Act of around 300 sections. This task would not be complex.

Following the House of Lords' decision in Purdy, the Director of Public Prosecutions issued an interim policy for prosecutors setting out the factors to be considered when deciding whether a prosecution in an assisted suicide case is in the public interest. This paper considers the interim policy, the subsequent public consultation and the resulting final policy. Key aspects of the policy are examined, including the condition of the victim, the decision to commit suicide and the role of organised or professional assistance. The inclusion of assisted suicides which take place within England and Wales makes the informal legal change realised by the policy more significant than was originally anticipated.

The paper assesses the extension of the public sector equality duty to cover religion and belief. The duty on public authorities is to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation on grounds of religion and belief; and advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between people of different religions (and none). The paper considers a number of concerns about how this duty may be applied in the context of religion and belief, and, in particular, that it could give rise to resentment between communities rather than fostering good relations. It is suggested that the potential difficulties of such a duty, when applied to religion and belief, may be lessened if it is based overtly on a concept of equality which aims to address disadvantage, rather than on a concept based on dignity or recognition.