Leslie Scarman was one of the most influential common law judges of the twentieth century. As a judge, he was relatively conventional and sometimes unadventurous. His technique can be contrasted with that of his contemporary, Lord Denning. However, his role in establishing the Law Commission of England and Wales afforded a model that has been copied throughout the world. His early support for a law of human rights encouraged the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998. This paper explains the essential unity of Scarman’s legal philosophy and the importance of his contribution at a time when basic assumptions about governance in Westminster democracies are being re-examined and sometimes found wanting.

This paper considers the utility of the concept of conscience or unconscionable conduct as a contemporary rationale for intervention in two principles applied where a person seeks to renege on an informal agreement relating to land: the principle in Rochefoucauld v Boustead; and transfers ‘subject to’ rights in favour of a claimant. By analysing the concept in light of our current understanding of the nature of judicial discretion and the use of general principles, it responds to arguments that unconscionability is too general a concept on which to base intervention. In doing so, it considers the nature of the discretion that is actually in issue when the court intervenes through conscience in these principles. However, the paper questions the use of constructive trusts as a response to unconscionability. It argues that there is a need, in limited circumstances, to separate the finding of unconscionability from the imposition of a constructive trust. In these limited circumstances, once unconscionability is found, the courts should have a discretion as to the remedy, modelled on that developed in the context of proprietary estoppel. The message underlying this paper is that many of the concerns expressed about unconscionability that have led to suggestions of alternative rationales for intervention can in fact be addressed whilst retaining an unconscionability analysis. Unconscionability remains a preferable rationale for intervention as it provides a common thread that links apparently separate principles and can assist our understanding of their scope.

A recent consultation by the European Commission on a draft code of conduct for the voluntary and community sector to combat illegal political activities highlights the regulation of the sector. This paper considers the European Commission’s code in light of the current regulation for charities and the wider voluntary and community sector, questioning whether sector-specific regulation of political activities is achievable and how such regulation could be best achieved.

This paper considers the effectiveness of the enforcement provisions of consumer product safety law by examining the new legislation in this area (the General Product Safety Regulations 2005), and the broader context in which it operates. The paper suggests that to understand the likely effectiveness of the Regulations, it is necessary to examine what the author refers to as the internal and external dimensions of enforcement. The paper is divided into three parts: part one sets out the enforcement provisions of the Regulations; part two examines the internal elements of enforcement; part three examines the external elements of enforcement. The internal elements are those provisions found in the statute that direct enforcement authorities in the action they can take. The external elements are those pressures outside the statute that inevitably impinge upon the ability of the enforcement authority to make a decision. It will be argued that while recent developments make some important strides forward in protecting consumers from dangerous products, there is a risk that the law will not be enforced satisfactorily.

The approach adopted by epidemiologists when attributing a causal mechanism to an observed statistical association is contrasted with the common law of causation in personal injury cases. By recognising the need to distinguish between probabilistic measures of (1) the strength of an association and (2) the fact-finder’s ‘degree of belief’ in the claimant’s causal hypothesis, the verdicts in a number of epidemiology-based cases, mostly in British courts, are shown to be questionable. The argument is then made for a wider application of proportionate liability, extending beyond defective drug cases (where epidemiological evidence is most often found) to medical negligence, occupational injury and tobacco-related litigation. An increased coherence in the common law of personal injury can be achieved without compromising the fundamental aims of tort and, it is argued, by reaffirming the importance of just one ‘policy’ precedent on liability for increasing risk.

Where a defendant wrongfully detains the claimant’s goods the standard remedy in conversion permits the defendant to pay the value of the goods to the claimant instead of returning the goods. This amounts to legally sanctioned compulsory purchase. It will be argued that such a remedy is both muddled and unfair. It is muddled because it confuses a proprietary claim with a claim in tort. The action exists in a state of arrested development, never having advanced in step with the action of ejectment, which long ago ensured that wrongfully detained land could be recovered. It is unfair because it sanctions the purchase of the claimant’s goods against their will without any overriding public interest justification. The remedy in conversion needs to be unravelled to produce two distinct actions. One would be a true proprietary action that guarantees the recovery of wrongfully detained goods; the other would be a claim in tort providing personal remedies for wrongful interferences with title to goods. This can be achieved by reviving detinue but confining its ambit to the recovery of goods, leaving conversion to act as a tort.

Where it is accepted in proceedings for theft that ownership of the goods allegedly stolen had been abandoned at the time they were taken, criminal courts must make determinations about the possibility of any other prior title to those goods. If a conviction for theft of abandoned goods is to be safe, the court must find a proprietary right or interest in some person other than the relinquishing owner or the defendant. This paper reviews the criminal and civil law authorities on the problem of lost or abandoned goods, and argues for a uniform approach to resolving such questions of title using the ordinary common law rules of possession.