18 Comment attributed to Heidegger's one-time student, the phenomenologist Hans-Georg Gadamer – see Lang, Berel Heidegger's Silence (Cornell University Press, 1996) p 86.Google Scholar

19 A criticism Ben-Dor himself acknowledges (p 33). Cf, eg, JN Findlay's observation ‘at the level at which Heidegger's existential person lives... there can be no values in any organised, systematically discussable sense, only the tortured preferences of the individual, into whose loneliness, styled “authenticity”, the whole organised world of value and being has been absorbed’ – Axiological Ethics (Macmillan, 1970), p 3.

20 Wood, D Thinking After Heidegger (Polity Press, 2002) p 7.Google Scholar

21 In this later Heidegger, Philip Buckley, rightly in my view, argues that ‘the “ethical life” is one that appears in the very disappearance of the calculating, objectified “subject” who is the focus of traditional moral theory... [Heidegger] sees in traditional ethics and its view of the “moral agent” precisely a type of subjectivity that must be “overcome” in order to arrive at an “original' ethics”’: Philip Buckley, R ‘Martin Heidegger: the “end” of ethics’ in Drummond, J and Embree, L (eds) Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy (Kluwer, 2002) pp 214–215.Google Scholar

22 See Levinas, E En Découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger [1949] (Vrin, 2002).Google Scholar

23 Douzinas, C Justice, judgment and the ethics of alterity’ in Economides, K (ed) Ethical Challenges to Legal Education and Conduct (Hart, 1998) p 31.Google Scholar

24 Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence [A Lingis (transl)] (Martinus Nijhoff, 1981) p 3.

25 Heidegger The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, cited in Ben-Dor, p 371.