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Comparative law as a core subject

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Geoffrey Samuel
Geoffrey Samuel*
Affiliation:
Kent Law School
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Abstract

This paper argues that comparative law should become a core subject in all law degree programmes. By ‘core’ is meant a progression subject that will take the student through a three-year programme emphasising not what the law is but how one should think like a lawyer. Comparative law is ideal for this task because it emphasises two fundamental questions: what is ‘comparison’? And what is ‘law’? The paper demonstrates, first, how the rule model of legal knowledge is inadequate when it comes to comparing law and, second, how the techniques of comparison can reveal this inadequacy. These demonstrations are primarily founded upon a distinction, explained in the paper, between symbolic and non-symbolic knowledge.

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 21 , Issue 3 , September 2001 , pp. 444 - 459
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 2001

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References

1. This is an updated and much revised text of an inaugural lecture delivered on 4 June 1999 at the University of Kent. The author would like to thank the anonymous referees whose observations and criticisms of the original lecture itself were instrumental in the production of this revised version. Many thanks, also, to Bernard Rudden, Kevin Gray, John Bell and Pierre Legrand for their support over the years.

2. For a more detailed, but still introductory, survey with references see G Samuel and S Millns ‘L'enseignement du droit en Angleterre’ (1998) XXII-76 Revue de la Recherche Juridique 1527.

3. That this question remains a major problem for legal education, is not in doubt: see Toddington, S ‘The Emperor's New Skills: The Academy, The profession and the Idea of legal Education’, in Birks, P (ed) What Are Law Schools For? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p 69.Google Scholar

4. For a criticism of the comparative-law-as-method thesis see P Legrand ‘Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory’ (1995) 58 MLR 262.

5. See D Farber ‘The Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in Comparative Perspective’ (1996) 81 Cornell LR 513.

6. See eg Youngs, R English, French and German Comparative Law (London: Cavendish Press, 1998).Google Scholar

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14. On which see Stein, n 11 above, pp 184–208.

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16. The present author himself is guilty, perhaps, of encouraging the use of the ‘law of obligations’ in the context of English law: see Samuel, G Sourcebook on Obligations and Legal Remedies (London: Cavendish, 2nd edn, 2000)Google Scholar; Samuel, G Law of Obligations and Legal Remedies (London: Cavendish, 2nd edn, 2001)Google Scholar. By way of defence, these works exhibit a scepticism both about the importation of the notion of a law of obligations and about the attempts at producing a highly rationalised law of restitution based on the Roman principle of unjust enrichment.

17. For a gloomy assessment see P Birks ‘The Academic and the Practitioner’ (1998) 18 LS 397.

18. Legrand, P Le droit comparé (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999)Google Scholar.

19. A Joint Statement on Qualifying Law Degrees issued by the Law Society and the General Council of the Bar (sixth draft) (1999).

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21. O Kahn-Freund ‘Comparative Law as an Academic Subject’ (1966) 82 LQR 40, 41.

22. Note Geoffrey Wilson's perceptive observations: G Wilson ‘English Legal Scholarship’ (1987) 50 MLR 818, 832–833. The author would like to record his debt to this stimulating and insightful essay.

23. B Markesinis ‘Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience’ (1990) 53 MLR 1, 21.

24. See eg Watson, A Legal transplants (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1974) pp 1–2 Google Scholar. However, Professor Watson goes on to offer his own suggestions as to the meaning of Comparative Law.

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27. Markesinis, n 23 above.

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29. R Sacco in P Legrand ‘Questions à Rodolfo Sacco’ (1995) Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé 943, 952–953.

30. On this whole question of legal epistemology the author must register his debt to Professor Atias’ work. See in particular Atias, C Epistémologie juridique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985)Google Scholar and épistéhologie du droit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994).

31. See eg P Legrand ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”’ (1997) 4 Maastricht J European & Comparative Law 111.

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37. Peter Levin, Letter, Times Higher Education Supplement, 3 November 2000, p 17.

38. For an introduction to the sheer richness of this legal tradition see: Walter, J Jones Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940)Google Scholar; Kelley, DR The Human Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal tradition (Cambridge Mass: Harvard, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wieacker, F A History of Private Law in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, trans Weir, T)Google Scholar.

39. Legrand, n 28 above, p 48, quoting T Weir ‘Friendships in the Law’ (1991-92) 6/7 Tulane Civil Law Forum at 61.

40. P Legrand ‘How to Compare Now’ (1996) 16 LS 232, 241.

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44. Ibid, pp 161, 162.

45. Ibid, p 159.

46. Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor (1978) 3 All ER 146 (CA); (1980) AC 827 (HL).

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48. (1978) 3 All ER at 152 per Lord Denning MR.

49. Ibid at 155.

50. Ibid at 157.

51. In fact, Lord Denning MR himself makes this point in a different case: Lamb v Camden London Borough Council (1981) QB 625 at 638.

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53. ‘Securicor undertook to provide a service of periodical visits for a very modest charge… It did not agree to provide equipment. It would have no knowledge of the value of Photo Productions’ factory; that and the efficacy of their fire precautions, would be known to Photo Productions. In these circumstances nobody could consider it unreasonable that as between these two equal parties the risk assumed by Securicor should be a modest one, and that Photo Productions should carry the substantial risk of damage or destruction…’: per Lord Wilberforce (1980) AC at 846. And see also Lord Salmon: i think that any businessman entering into this contract could have had no doubt as to the real meaning of this clause and would have made his insurance arrangements accordingly’: at 852.

54. As indeed Lord Denning MR has normally been the first to recognise: see in particular Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd (1973) 1 QB 792.

55. See eg Lord Denning MR in Morris v Ford Motor Co (1973) 1 QB 792, 798.

56. See further Samuel, G Law of Obligations and Legal Remedies (London: Cavendish, 2nd edn, 2001) pp 165–174.Google Scholar

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58. D.9.2.31.

59. G.2.14.

60. D.5.1.76.

61. One can talk of a constructivist epistemology: V Petev ‘Virtualité et construction de la réalité sociale et juridique’ (1999) 43 Archives de philosophie du droit 27. And see more generally Le Moigne, J-L Les épistémologies constructivistes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995)Google Scholar.

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64. ‘In substance the appellant was on the respondents’ premises in performance of a statutory duty incumbent on her as a citizen, but it is, I think, obvious that this circumstance did not alter the nature of the duty which the respondents owed to her as a person who with their consent was present on their premises on business.' Per Lord Uthwatt at 184.

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68. L Rayar ‘Translating Legal Texts: A Methodology’, Euroforum Conference, The Netherlands, April 1993, p 5.

69. Legrand, n 31 above, at 121.

70. See further G Samuel ‘Comparative Law and Jurisprudence’ (1998) 47 ICLQ 817.

71. Cf Barreau, H L’épistémologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990) pp 53–54.Google Scholar

72. Durgnat, R Films and Feelings (London: Faber & Faber, 1967) p 211.Google Scholar