Changes in government litigation during the past fifty years are treated as an indicator of changes in policymaking priorities of various national administrations during that period. Policies of direct government intervention (enforcement) are distinguished from policies of indirect intervention (regulation). They are measured here by U.S. plaintiff and U.S. defendant litigation trends in federal district and appeals courts from 1937 to 1986. Trends in administrative appeals from regulatory agencies, boards, and commissions to the appeals courts are used to estimate the intensity of regulatory activity. There is some evidence of systematic variation in government litigation and administrative appeals due to an “administration” effect, but there are also secular tendencies suggesting a more general “government” effect cutting across various administrations. The implications of the analysis for the theory of the state are discussed.

This article investigates why cause lawyering organizations choose policy work and how policy agendas are set. Interviews and documents from eight legal organizations in the LGBTQ movement reveal that policy work expands the scope of conflict, giving organizations not only more opportunities to act, but potentially providing greater autonomy to lawyers by allowing them to build their own opportunities. Furthermore, policy agendas are not simply tied to litigation and resources. Organizations balance perceptions of opportunity and need with resource availability. These perceptions are often informed by collaborations with state and local organizations, facilitating communication between groups, organizers, and activists at different vantage points. Thus, the nature of a legal organization's multidimensional strategy, which expands opportunities to reach their goals, may be shaping what those goals are. These findings contribute to our understanding of cause lawyering tactics and agendas.