Sociological studies of the family, ethnographic studies of kinship and marriage, and legal accounts of family law have been neither clear nor comparable in explaining how members perceive and interpret arrangements such as “marriage” or “divorce.” These comparative studies invariably include case materials, and accounts which presuppose various linguistic and para-linguistic phenomena, meanings, and unexplicated usages. The precise character of comparable behavior remains obscure. Truncated categories translated from one language to another become verbal signals disengaged from the actual perception of social behavior and its interpretation in subsequent descriptions. The categories of different scholars are presented as equivalence classes in which the adequacy of the descriptions is never an issue because the author assumes that the reader “knows” what the author “means.” Although the categories employed describe general routine practice of members, there is little concern with the language, gestures, voice intonation, and body posturing accompanying the action scenes to which general categories refer.

Constitutions are an important feature of many authoritarian regimes. But what role do they in fact perform in processes of authoritarian regime stabilization and legitimation? Much of the contemporary literature focuses on authoritarian constitutionalism in transitions away from constitutional democracy. This article considers the opposite scenario: pre-emptive constitution-making as a mechanism of authoritarian constitutionalism to contain a potential transition toward constitutional democracy. This is illustrated through the case of Myanmar. Since the 1960s, Myanmar has experienced successive periods of direct military rule without a constitution, followed since 2011 by a new constitution. Adding to the comparative literature on constitutions in authoritarian regimes, this article explains how pre-emptive constitution-making limits a transition to liberal democracy and contributes to authoritarian-regime resilience. This article further identifies “military-state” constitutionalism as a variation of authoritarian constitutionalism in Myanmar. The case of Myanmar offers comparative insights into the ways constitutions are used to contain transitions to constitutional democracy and illustrates the varieties inherent in authoritarian constitutionalism.

The juvenile court in Italy was established many years after those in the United States and other European countries. Even after its creation problems of differentiation and staffing remained, and delays plus ineffective services continue to complicate day-to-day operations of the juvenile courts. I propose that the juvenile court in Italy has been a spurious development, reflecting contradictions between the culture of legal certainty and familism, and the adoption of a pattern of discretionary justice based on the positivism of Ferri. Operations of the juvenile court resemble rituals aimed to satisfy conflicting values. Signs are that its legitimacy has been weakened and that other forms of social control have emerged or reemerged.

Social psychologists have traditionally been concerned with problems of social conflict, power, influence, and persuasion. Yet, when one looks for systematic theory and evidence regarding the determinants of behavioral compliance to rules, norms, or influence attempts, few prescriptions can be garnered by the practical man of affairs for developing policy in matters of law and order. In a day when shouts of black power, student protests, and antiwar demonstrations reverberate through the legitimate institutions of the country and when violence commissions report the degree of disorder existing in the urban centers of America, lack of social scientific evidence upon which to base policy is a disquieting comment upon the relevance of social scientific research.

Recent years have seen a rapprochement between research on organizations and research on law. One goal of such research is a better understanding of how the structures of complex organizations and the normative and cognitive structures of law interact within different cultures. This article is part of that enterprise. We report results from surveys conducted in Moscow, Tokyo, and Washington in 1993 that asked respondents to judge acts of wrongdoing within corporate hierarchies and then asked them to propose sanctions for the wrongdoers. Most important, respondents' views of sanctioning reflect cultural differences in conceptions of the individual, the organization, and the rule of law. The discussion locates this research within the larger context of normative-cultural approaches to the study of organizations and indicates how this research tradition can be enriched by studying the attribution of responsibility.

There can be no doubt that parties to a lawsuit in ancient Hindu law had a right to be represented by other persons. The question arises whether or not the representatives referred to in the ancient texts correspond to the pleaders, advocates, vakils or attorneys of modern India. In other words, did ancient Hindu law have the kind of legal procedure in which the rights of the parties were safeguarded through the services of a class of experts, as is the case in present day India and in most other modern legal systems?

Looking at Hindu law as it became known to the West in the latter half of the 18th century, it did indeed seem as if the question was to be answered in the affirmative. Halhed's Code of Gentoo Laws (1777), translating the Vivadarnavasetu, did have a section (ch. III, § II) explicitly called “Of appointing a vakeel (or attorney).”

I draw on the archives from two Indonesian courts to analyze how judges have reached decisions in the face of conflicting legal norms. Judges in the town of Takèngën, in the highlands of Aceh province, hear claims based on Islam and on local social norms (adat). Between 1960 and the mid-1990s, they changed the way they resolved disputes over inheritance cases, from accepting village settlements as valid, to rejecting those settlements as either contrary to Islam or as coercive. I examine the justifications offered in the earlier and the later periods for these decisions. I find that in both periods judges employed creative legal devices to resolve or bridge differences between Islam and adat, and that they consistently referred to broader cultural values of agreement and fairness. I suggest that the change in their decisions was due to the combination of political centralization, increased legitimacy of the Islamic court, and judges' perceptions of a more individualized society.

This article examines the recent failure of formal constitutional amendments in the United States and Canada by closely analyzing the institutional environment in which constitutional modification takes place. I focus first on the instrumental objectives of constitutional reform to develop an institutional design model of constitutional modification and identify the structural factors that affect the level of controversy generated by proposed amendments. I then revisit the failed ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment to demonstrate more explicitly how these institutional factors affected the amendment's fate. Finally, I extend the analysis by undertaking a comparative case study of the recent politics of constitutional modification in Canada. In particular, I focus on the failure of comprehensive constitutional change between 1987 and 1992. I argue that the same institutional design model, which focuses on institutional rigidity, interpretive flexibility, and litigation potential, enhances our ability to understand both the U.S. and Canadian cases of amendment failure.

With each step forward, with each problem that we solve, we not only discover new and unsolved problems, but we also discover that where we believed we were standing on firm and safe ground, all things are, in truth, insecure and in a state of flux.

Karl Popper

(Popper, 1976: 87)

Police often ask people to consent to a search of their person or possessions. Many people agree to allow such searches because they interpret the officers' ostensible “requests” as indirect commands. Yet courts routinely interpret police utterances in this situation as requests. A similar issue arises in the context of custodial interrogation. People being interrogated are inclined to invoke their right to counsel in relatively indirect or tentative terms. Yet courts often conclude that the suspect did not really “request” the presence of counsel. We refer to this inconsistency as “selective literalism,” by which we mean that courts selectively consider pragmatic circumstances in interpreting the speech of suspects. Using analytical tools from linguistic theory, this article explores how courts employ selective literalism. It further examines some of the consequences of this inconsistent use of interpretive devices, both practically and jurisprudentially.

One definition of the “proletarianization of the professional” is that the professional loses “control over policy and value objectives” in his or her work (Derber 1982b: 17). Proletarianization is normally explained as resulting from workplace labor process control (ibid., p. 31). A compatible, but quite different, explanation relates proletarianization to changes in the social practices and ideological orientations of professional careers. In this research note, I present this different explanation and suggest avenues for empirical research.

Health care rights for transgender and/or nonbinary people have dramatically expanded in recent years, including in insurance coverage for the treatments and procedures they need. Yet, trans people themselves still identify health insurance problems as a top priority for research and policy change because of significant difficulties gaining and using coverage. Wrangling over coverage determinations happens through multiple types of interactions, bureaucratic, interpersonal, and medical. When these interactions become difficult, it is because key terms such as medical necessity are both powerful and indeterminate. This study examines how trans people and health care intermediaries navigate the health insurance process and contest the meaning of medical necessity in coverage determinations. These disputes constitute the ground-level reality for instantiating health care rights to gender affirming care. Relying on analysis of contract language and 32 interviews with people who sought gender-affirming care and allied professionals, we find that health insurance policy language, interpretation, and implementation often create disadvantages and barriers for trans people who attempt to access care. Our study highlights how the contested life of insurance policy terminology produces a reality for rights but also details the mechanisms through which insurance-mediated care is a socially contested and negotiated process

In his discussion of modern society, Habermas begins with Weber's thesis of a universal rationalization process within which the rationalization of law plays a central part. Thus his starting point is the classical thesis of the formal rationalization of law as advanced by Weber (1960; Schluchter, 1979). Habermas tries to show that Weber's theorizing is deficient because he underestimates the specific historical role of the materialization of law (1981, Vol. 1: 332). Additionally, such theorizing does not allow us an adequate grasp of some recent developments that proceduralize law (Teubner, 1983, 1984; Eder, 1986). From the perspective of Weber's theory of formal rationalization, the processes that materialize and proceduralize law appear to be aberrations from the normal path of modern legal development. Habermas suggests that, far from being deficient, these processes are necessary forms of law in the process of modernization. The appearance of deficiency proceeds from Weber's attempt to separate morality from law and to conceptualize a moral-free law, a corollary of Weber's plea for a value-free science. Habermas concludes that formal rationalization is an inadequate model of law operating in the modern welfare state. Thus a new model is in order.

Legal proportionality is one of the most important principles for adjudicating among conflicting values. However, rather little is known about the factors that play a role in the formation of proportionality judgments. This research presents the first empirical analysis in this regard, relying on a sample of 331 legal experts (lawyers and legal academics). The policy domain addressed by the experiment is the antiterrorist military practice of targeted killings, which has been the subject of a legal debate. Our experimental findings suggest that proportionality judgments are receptive to normatively relevant facts. We also find strong correlational evidence for the effect of ideological preferences on such judgments. These results are consistent for two proportionality doctrines. We suggest that proportionality judgment is anchored jointly in the experts’ policy preferences and the facts of the case. We outline the implications of the findings for the psychological and legal literature.

This review of work and trends in the sociology of law makes no claims to being exhaustive or comprehensive. If it succeeds in pinpointing and highlighting major work, important problems, and gaps in the field, in showing trends that have developed, and in suggesting ideas for future direction, we shall have accomplished our objectives.