Since its introduction, Black's (1976) theory of law has generated controversy (e.g., Eder, 1977; Stinchcombe, 1977), but few empirical evaluations. The most recent test (Gottfredson and Hindelang, 1979a) identified a number of empirical inadequacies and posited an alternative model to correct them. This paper assesses both Black's and Gottfredson-Hindelang's models of law, choosing as the arena of evaluation criminal law and its behavior. Analysis of data from a sample of criminal defendants identifies empirical inadequacies in both theories and raises questions about their validity, predictive power, and generality. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the substance and underlying assumptions of both theories of law.

American dynastic business families as descent groups constitute a category of social organization with which anthropologists have been traditionally familiar, but in the unlikely setting of a complex, bureaucratized society. This paper examines aspects of such groups and argues that law has been a critical organizational resource in their development. Law does not merely impinge at times on family concerns, but becomes an integral dimension of extended family relations in the arrangements for perpetuating collective wealth as business capital, and in distributing individual entitlements to that wealth among descendants. A general model of family/business formations is presented, supported by a comparative discussion of two dynastic families of Galveston, Texas.

This paper reports on an attempt by an interdisciplinary team to observe and record on tape lawyer-client interaction in the metropolitan Boston area in 1975-77. Current pressure for greater accountability to the public on the part of the legal profession makes the empirical, observational study of lawyer-client relations a timely, important topic. Despite the investment of much time and energy in creating conditions suitable for such a study, the project team failed to gain access to private lawyer-client encounters. The goal of the paper is to try to account for this failure, to analyze the nature of the obstacles encountered, and to stimulate speculation on how these obstacles might be overcome in the future. It is suggested that the doctrine of attorney-client privilege is the major obstacle which researchers must overcome. The idea of paying attorneys for their cooperation is also considered.

This study attempted to construct and test a discretionary justice model of disciplinary response to inmate rule breaking in a medium-security prison for adult male felons (N = 182). We found, first, that while black and white inmates were equally likely to engage in rule-breaking activity, blacks were more likely to be officially reported for rule infractions. Second, a prior record of official disciplinary action, itself shown to be a product of discriminatory response, influenced subsequent sanctioning decisions, thus amplifying the racial bias. Third, analyses of separate models for black and white inmates revealed the importance of prior record to be differentially imputed on the basis of race. The study concludes with a discussion of the nature and impact of stereotypic expectations and labeling processes in the reaction of guards to inmate behavior.

This study of bail reform in a large urban court employs an interrupted time-series research design spanning a six-year period, and examines case data for over 38,000 defendants. Two reforms—creation of a pretrial release agency and adoption of deposit bail—are evaluated to determine whether they had statistically significant impacts on the likelihood of pretrial release, the probability of financial losses for defendants, and the avoidance of bondsmen in the pretrial process. Weighted regression analysis was used to compensate for the possibility of autocorrelation in the time-series data. The reforms proved a mixed success. Explanations for these findings emphasize the role of previous policy patterns and procedural rules in restraining the scope of bail reform and the political forces encouraging the use of bail for preventive detention.

This research tests the simulated impact of Supreme Court decisions which allow for smaller than twelve-member juries. It identifies variation in judicial output that results from competing operating structures of jury decision making. The research employed a quasi-experimental design to address important problems of simulation, such as structural and functional verisimilitude. The sample consisted of 110 juries composed of nearly 1000 jurors. The findings indicate that a jury's size affects its behavior. Larger juries hang more often than smaller ones do. The degree to which this avoids the committing of a Type I or Type II judicial error remains to be seen; nevertheless, the Court was wrong in assuming that there are no differences in the behavior of twelve- and six-member juries.