The Law & Society Review enters its second decade with a record of considerable accomplishment. From a fledgling journal, aspiring to create both a new inter-disciplinary focus and a community of scholars, it has grown quantitatively and qualitatively: in size, circulation, and number of manuscripts submitted; and in the wealth of empirical data it reports, the sophistication and comprehensiveness of the theories it presents, and the variety of disciplines it encompasses. By any of these criteria, the Review has attained a position of prominence within the ever expanding ranks of social scientific journals. This is the signal achievement of my predecessors; my primary goal will be to maintain that level of performance.

During the past decade there has been a resurgence of interest in the problem of law and social control. Indicative of this interest, a rekindling of an earlier tradition, is the founding of the Law and Society Association and its journal the Law & Society Review, the growth of course offerings both in law schools and social science departments, and the emergence of a rapidly growing body of literature. Research interests in this area, often captured by such terms as impact, compliance, legal effectiveness, and law and social change, have diverged from the traditional preoccupation with the development and meaning of formal legal doctrine and from the more recent behavioral concerns with judicial decisionmaking, to address the broader questions of the effects of law on society at large. While varying in breadth, depth, and precise focus, most of this research treats law as an independent variable and its consequences as the dependent variables, the events caused by the law. In the language of systems theory, the formal legal rules are the “policy outputs” while changes—of whatever scope—are the “policy outcomes.” Although these studies vary from one-shot case histories to projects involving multiple controls and multiple time series analyses, they all tend to conform to this general design.

Ten years ago, in the first issue of this review, Carl A. Auerbach criticized some early statements of an emerging “Berkeley perspective” in the sociology of law (Auerbach, 1966). Selznick, Skolnick, Carlin, and I were chided for proposing in various terms that a central concern of the sociology of law should be to study the social foundations of the ideal of legality (Selznick, 1961; 1968; Skolnick, 1965; Carlin and Nonet, 1968).

In 1968 Renato Treves and J.F. Glastra van Loon edited Norms and Actions, a book of essays by indigenous scholars describing “law and society” research in their countries. No account of work in Britain was included, probably because there was so little activity in the field at that time. Yet only eight years later remarkable changes seem to have occurred. Courses at undergraduate and postgraduate level have proliferated; the number of empirical research projects is expanding; new centers and institutes have been established, series of books and a specialist journal have been launched, and financial and institutional support is provided by the universities, research councils, and through governmental initiatives. Not too long ago Lon Fuller (1967:1) suggested that the growth of interest in studying the operation of the law in American society had “come to assume the proportions of something like an intellectual movement.” Some commentators are tempted to perceive recent British developments in like fashion. But whatever the truth of Fuller's analysis of the American setting, it is dangerous to apply it to the situation in Britain. It would be reassuring to think that British academics simply discovered (rather later than elsewhere) a novel field of inquiry and boldly set out to explore it, and that the clamor of current activity indicates a vigorous beginning has been made. This would allow us to predict a healthy future and the rapid enhancement of our understanding of the nature and operation of law. It is just as plausible, however, to regard the current developments as fortuitous and perhaps transitional—the product of a curious concatenation of institutional, political and social influences.

In the two years from June 20, 1971, to March 10, 1973, Japanese courts decided four pollution injury suits colloquially known in Japan as the “big four.” This litigation and the social and political movements that accompanied it are of great interest from several perspectives, including the doctrinal development of Japanese tort law. This article, however, will focus not on the legal or political impact of the litigation, but on the way in which cultural and social factors influenced its course. I attempt to illuminate thereby a side of the Japanese legal system that is ordinarily hidden from view, i.e., the interface of modern Japanese society and the formal legal system.

Courts are supposed in common law countries to operate by adversary adjudication. Until a few years ago I, for one, thought that they did. Apart from radio, TV, and the movies, which reinforce this symbol with all their might, my only exposure to courts was as a juror in a case of the alleged theft of one used automobile battery. We deliberated long and found the defendant (who was surely guilty of something!) to be not guilty. I took for granted that my experience was an example of typical practice. It never occurred to me to reflect upon the size of the taxpayers' bill if there were to be a trial of this sort for every crime of this magnitude. Nor did I suspect that I could be witnessing an exception rather than the rule, the exception being a jury trial, since my only contact with a court was in the capacity of juror.