Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2024
This paper explores the judgmental process involved in the determination of liability in accident cases. The law of negligence, unlike other branches of the civil law and the criminal law, lacks a body of substantive rules by which a jury may determine the legality of conduct. The acts of one person which may result in property loss or physical injury to another are extremely varied. This variety makes it all but impossible to specify, in advance, what kind of behavior constitutes adequate caution or due care in given situations. Hence, the law has devised a general procedure by which to reach a judgment on this matter for any particular case. It directs the members of the jury to consider what precautions a person should take while engaged in some potentially hazardous endeavor in order to minimize the risk of possible harm to others, and offers a model of behavior “... the supposed conduct, under similar circumstances, of a hypothetical person, the reasonable man of ordinary prudence who represents a community ideal of reasonable behavior.”
Author's Note: This investigation was supported by a grant from the Social Science Research Council. Phyllis Ullman Kostich, Susan Mieden, and Thomas M. Fuchs assisted in the collection of the data. Diane Allevato assisted in the analysis.
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6. A composite of the sixteen complete versions of the narrative constituting the experimental stimulus may be obtained from the author.
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