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Competencia política y gasto particularista de los gobiernos subnacionales en México y Argentina

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2022

María Alejandra Armesto
María Alejandra Armesto*
Affiliation:
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Unidad Cuajimalpa
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Resumen

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Las hipótesis sobre la relación entre competencia política y gasto particularista predicen consecuencias opuestas. Una sugiere que la competencia política —el gobierno sin mayoría<— constriñe al ejecutivo y reduce el particularismo, la perspectiva opuesta predice un mayor particularismo como resultado del intercambio de apoyo legislativo por beneficios. Ambas descansan sobre un supuesto que no siempre se cumple: la presencia de actores con poder de veto en el congreso. Este artículo argumenta que este supuesto es crucial para ambas hipótesis y muestra que allí donde aquel no se cumple estas últimas no se sostienen. Explora los efectos del gobierno con y sin mayoría en contextos de debilidad institucional del congreso a través de un análisis del gasto en bienes públicos locales de los gobiernos subnacionales en México y Argentina y muestra que el gobierno sin mayoría no conduce a ninguno de los resultados anticipados por los modelos existentes.

Abstract

Abstract

The existing hypotheses about the relationship between political competition and particularistic spending predict opposite consequences. One view suggests that political competition—divided government—constrains the executive and reduces particularism; the opposite perspective predicts greater particularism as a result of side payments in exchange for legislative support. Both hypotheses rest on the assumption, which is not always true, that partisan veto players are present in the legislature. This article argues that this assumption is crucial for both hypotheses and shows that where this condition is not met the predictions do not hold. The article explores the effects of government with and without a majority on particularistic spending where legislatures are institutionally weak. To do so, it analyzes spending on local public goods by subnational governments in Mexico and Argentina and shows that government without a majority does not lead to any of the results anticipated by existing models.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Research Review , Volume 50 , Issue 1 , 2015 , pp. 160 - 183
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by the Latin American Studies Association

Footnotes

Parte de la presente investigación fue financiada por una beca Seed Money Grant y una beca Dissertation Year Fellowship del Kellogg Institute for International Studies de la Universidad de Notre Dame, Estados Unidos. Jorge Asso, Alejandra Pereda, Benjamín Pérez y Diego Tolosa contribuyeron en la elaboración de la base de datos. Agradezco especialmente el apoyo de Frances Hagopian, Scott Mainwaring, Michael Coppedge y Benjamin Radcliff en distintas etapas de este proyecto. Asimismo, agradezco a Allyson Benton, María Escobar-Lemmon, Francisco Sánchez y a los dictaminadores anónimos de Latin American Research Review las valiosas sugerencias. Cualquier error u omisión es mi exclusiva responsabilidad.

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