In the transition from military rule to democracy, the government of Augusto Pinochet bequeathed to Chile a unique electoral law by which all legislative seats are contested in two-member districts. A key implication of this rule is that in order to secure legislative majorities, coalitions have to put their strongest candidates in the most precarious electoral list positions. This generates a divergence of interests between coalitions and politicians. Chile's largest coalition, the Concertación, has resolved the dilemma by providing appointed posts to unsuccessful congressional candidates who accept personal political risk on the coalition's behalf. This study argues that this insurance system has provided the critical glue to hold the coalition together since Chile's transition to democracy in 1990. Recent changes in the electoral environment could threaten the Concertación's control over the appointed posts that have sustained this informal institution. This could jeopardize the Concertación's cohesion during the process of negotiating coalition candidate lists for the 2005 legislative elections.

This article examines, through a two-level game model, the case of the first investment dispute under NAFTA between a private U.S. firm and the Mexican government. It argues that the clue to understanding why the Mexican president could not cooperate with the U.S. president lies in Mexico's domestic “ratification” process. The analysis yields two theoretical propositions. First, federalism represents an important variable in explaining foreign economic policy. Second, two-level game logic should not be applied only to formal international negotiation situations; instead, by specifying the dependent variable as cooperation or noncooperation, these models connecting domestic and international politics can be productively applied to study foreign economic policy.

The century embracing the wars and turmoils that politically separated America from Europe coincides roughly with that great change in the economic life of the western world known as the “Industrial Revolution.” Admitting that this so-called “Revolution” did not occur simultaneously everywhere, or affect all parts in a like manner, it is nonetheless clear that it had a profound effect not only on the material well-being of the American peoples, but on their social and political institutions as well, probably an effect even more important than the political revolutions and wars that accompanied it. The period thus demands careful attention and lends itself well to regional comparative study.

Perón and the Peronista party and movement have been interesting from at least two crucially important perspectives: first, Perón's ability to keep Argentina hostage for three decades in his roles as twice-elected “lider,” as exiled “caudillo,” and president once more (I say “hostage” in the sense that he remained the pivotal political force in all the crucial coalition bargains struck among the major power contenders since 1943); second, his ability to forge an intellectual and political clientele that spanned several generations and encompassed various, but unique, ideological views. Perón had the leadership capability not only of touching many people but also of striking a common political resonance among vastly differing sets of values.

Faced with rapid changes in the global system, most Caribbean countries may seem to be doing everything right. The English-speaking Caribbean countries, in particular, have been exemplary in their practice of democracy and political stability. Others, such as Suriname and Haiti, are nurturing new democratic regimes. Economically, the region has followed the neoliberal reform rule book and implemented policies mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. They have trimmed fiscal deficits, privatized state-owned commercial enterprises that were losing money, and liberalized their trading regimes. These measures have been implemented either by reform-minded governments or governments which have seen no alternative. Only Cuba continues to labor under a discredited, ideological model that does not encourage democracy, while its economy mirrors some version of “á la carte capitalism” in the face of an accelerated US embargo.

Venezuela has experienced significant economic development during recent decades, although rapid population growth has partially offset economic gains. During the five-year period 1969-1973, the gross national product increased at an annual rate of 5.0 percent, which, coupled with population growth, yielded real per capita increases of 2.6 percent annually. Relatively smooth transition in the nationalization of the Venezuelan oil industry in 1976 presents a favorable assessment for the economy during the next decade. Yet while there has been notable progress in conventional economic indicators, there have been less rapid improvements in education, nutrition, and health. This paper examines past trends in Venezuelan population growth within the context of general social and economic development. Because of the importance of fertility in affecting population growth, particular attention is paid to fertility trends.

The question of state insolvency has been a recurring problem in modern history. Defaults have plagued investors and damaged many nations' credit on international money markets. Other nations have suffered due to investor anxieties resulting from defaults by their neighbors. Politicians, diplomats, financiers, and investors have differed greatly in their proposed solutions to the problems of national fiscal failure. The experience of Mexico in its postrevolutionary era is a classic example of the myriad problems faced by those who assist in the financial rehabilitation of the distressed nation, as well as by those who seek to protect investors.

The first half-century after Mexico won its independence was characterized by almost constant domestic strife, frequently humiliating international relations, and a tendency toward fiscal irresponsibility. It was not until Porfirio Díaz seized the presidency from Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada in 1876 that Mexico experienced a degree of domestic tranquility which earned it the tolerance begrudgingly granted by powerful states to their weaker but stable brethren.

This article analyzes the relationship between ideas, interests, and institutions in the 1996 reform of the civil service in Uruguay. Beneath the appearance of a process led by technocratic principles, the reform's agenda and content were shaped by legitimating principles, strongly institutionalized interests, and the political legacy of earlier failed reform attempts. Reformers sought a strategy of a reform “without losers,” which, instead of gathering support for adoption and implementation, sought to minimize opposition. This deliberately low-profile strategy left people unaware of the reform's achievements and thereby reinforced a political culture that has made resistance to change both a political virtue and an inescapable condition.

In 1989 The Inter-American System will celebrate its centennial anniversary, tracing its lineage to the International Union of the American Republics formed at Secretary of State Blaine's Washington convocation in 1889. Over the years the mantle was passed, first, to the Pan American Union, and then to the system's present incumbent, the Organization of American States (OAS). It has been a century of unprecedented achievement and unremitting frustration, of great triumphs and repeated failures. Given the present state of the system, however, the major question is whether the system can endure, much less match the rhetoric and aspirations of its members, in its second century.

International cooperation is a political decision in search of a framework. The Organization of American States is the attempt to express and enhance that cooperation among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. It is, and can be, no better than the underlying relationships among the nations.