This article examines the dynamics of collective behavior in Santiago, Chile every September 11, the date of the 1973 coup that brought General Augusto Pinochet to power. It uses a multiple-method strategy that includes participant observation, personal interviews, and content analysis of three major newspapers during the period 2003–8. The theoretical approach emphasizes time and space coordinates of specified social actors, sociocultural emergence, a limited range of dominant emotions, and dramaturgy to describe the complexity of ritualized commemorations. It shows that incidents occurring on this date are not primarily caused by the actions of social movement organizations. Moreover, the dichotomy of “day and night” used to understand the peaceful and violent commemorations is an oversimplification of a complex network of events, actors, and scenarios that has the effect of denying any legitimacy to actions that fall outside the state-approved practices.

La última conferencia económica de Ginebra, de tan magros resultados, y los “planes” de distintos países han puesto al orden del día el tema del desarrollo económico. Se habla y se escribe, mucho más que antes, en todos los tonos, de importantes objetivos a alcanzar: de creación de riquezas, de reactivación de las economías nacionales, de tecnificación de la agricultura, de modernización de las comunicaciones, de reabsorción de la mano de obra ociosa, en fin, de revitalizar la producción general, elevar el consumo y asegurar en los países, ahora llamados “subdesarrollados”, un más alto nivel de vida.

Tales objetivos pueden ser fácilmente enunciados pero no concretamente alcanzados. Si “la naturaleza no camina a saltos”, tampoco pueden alterarse por decreto las etapas del lógico desarrollo económico sin tener en cuenta las reales posibilidades materiales, técnicas, financieras y culturales de cada país.

The writer will attempt to draw attention to major like and unlike elements in the cultural patterns of Brazil and the United States, with an eye to mutual understanding. Obviously, this constitutes a task of considerable magnitude, and much reflection was required in order to decide which of the many possibilities should receive attention. Finally, it was decided to center on the following four aspects of the general subject: (1) the diversity of patterns of living in the United States, and the even greater diversity of ways of life in Brazil; (2) the higher degree of social differentiation in the United States, in comparison with contemporary Brazil; (3) the similarities and differences in patterns of living which result from the class structures found in the respective societies; and (4) the effects upon general social and cultural patterns of the institutions which have played the most important roles in producing the distinguishing characteristics of each of the societies: in the case of Brazil, the great patriarchial family or kinship unit, and in the case of the United States, the public school.

During the last national election in Peru, one of the candidates charged that the Indians probably lived better under the Inca rulers. Rather than being political hyperbole, this observation points up the stark reality which is the root cause of Peru's economic and social problems. With a relatively thin middle class, Peru's population of about 11.6 million is largely polarized into a small elite, whose wealth is conspicuous even by Latin American standards, and the larger proportion of the population living in the high sierra or in the slums surrounding each coastal city, which barely manages to exist under conditions of abject poverty. This skewed distribution of wealth and income, long apparent even to the most casual observer, has been confirmed by a recent study which indicates that the top 10 per cent of the spending units receive 60 per cent of the disposable income, and 8,760 spending units, representing only .25 per cent of the total, receive 35 per cent of the income.

En los últimos días de julio de 1963, el que escribe estas líneas, durante una breve visita al Perú, tuvo ocasión, una vez más, de presenciar un cabildo abierto. Por cierto que el entonces recién inaugurado, ahora ya depuesto, Presidente Belaúnde Terry, se suponía iba a asistir al acto. Pero una avería en el helicóptero que le conducía le impidió llegar más allá del Cuzco. La ocasión de aquella asamblea, verdaderamente popular, era el elegir al alcalde y regidores de la pequeña villa de Chinchero, situada en plena Sierra peruana. Reuniones semejantes se estaban celebrando aquel mismo día, último domingo de julio, en los demás pueblos, cabezas de partido. Dato interesante es que las discusiones se condujeron en la lengua quechua, única que comprendían los asistentes al acto, en su totalidad indígenas.

Una filosofía es una expresión autónoma del espíritu, resultado de la eterna inquietud del hombre —nunca del todo desilusionado por sus fracasos— por ponerse en claro sobre el sentido de su vida y del universo a que pertenece. Así considerada, la obra de cualquier filósofo puede sufrir el examen de su valor intrínseco, como esfuerzo hacia la verdad, en cuyo caso se ejercita sobre ella una valoraciónteórica. Pero la filosofía es a la vez una parte de la aventura del hombre en el tiempo, y va signada por las limitaciones temporales de aquél. Nunca se da en el vacío, sino amalgamada con todos los elementos propios de la vida del hombre en un instante de la historia. Cuando se examina una filosofía según su función en una época, una comunidad o una cultura, lo que se intenta no es ya una valoración teórica, sino una interpretación histórica.

Mexico's party deputy system, created in 1963, has just completed its first decade of existence; enough experience has now been accumulated to evaluate its impact on the Mexican political system. This essay will examine the system in its following aspects: origins, implementation, amendments, beneficiaries, and effects.

Since 1929 the government party (currently called PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional, but having existed under other names) has so completely dominated the electoral scene at the national level that only in the Chamber of Deputies has the opposition been able to take some electoral posts. Even in the Chamber, opposition groups have only been able to acquire a few seats by winning a majority of votes (Table l). PRI's success has been attributed to its superior organization, appeal, finances, and relationship with the government. The high point of majority-elected opposition in the Chamber came in 1952 when nine opposition deputies represented 5.5 percent of the Chamber. Between 1946 and 1964, no opposition party, of whatever ideological stripe, achieved more than six seats in the Chamber (3.7 percent).

The purpose of this paper is to draw together from primary sources the case history of formative policy years for the Central Bank of Honduras. This bank, like others formed throughout the underdeveloped world in the post-World War II era, was created in 1950 as a vehicle for stimulating economic growth. In retrospect over 186 months of operations this particular Central Bank has an unusually outstanding policy record—a record which argues forcefully for appropriate monetary policy as a stimulant to economic advance.

The first meeting of Central Bank directors was held on May 31, 1950, for the purpose of establishing the major monetary policies under which the Bank would commence operations July 1. At that meeting the directors established a schedule of maximum interest rates to be charged by the public commercial banks and a schedule of rates at which eligible commercial paper of 12 months maturity or less could be rediscounted with the Central Bank.

La obra más popular de Sarmiento es la que dedicó a Facundo y publicó con este nombre y el agregado de Civilización y barbarie en 1845. Este libro es, también, el que más ha sido leído, entre sus cincuenta y dos volúmenes de obras completas, y el que más comentarios, buenos y malos, ha suscitado. Sobre él han llovido los elogios y han caído los ataques. Lo mejor que se ha dicho es que constituye la obra maestra más extraordinaria de las letras americanas; lo peor, que todas sus páginas son una calumnia y un monumento de ignorancia. Entre los escritores modernos, Manuel Gálvez lo ha atacado con independencia y valentía, más movido por un raro odio que por una sabia comprensión.

Japan's Current Role as the world's most dominant economic power has had an impact on its relations with Latin America despite the absence, historically at least, of few long-term ties between the two regions. While there is some evidence that contacts may date as far back as 1609, relations between them only began to acquire a certain relevance as recently as the 1970s and 1980s, when the Japanese domestic model, acquired after World War II, began to seem assured.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to understand either the relations between these two actors, or their future trends, without examining the policies and conditions that have marked Japan's reinsertion into the world — from its situation as a defeated, war-devastated, resource-poor country to one that is not only extremely wealthy but with the potential to become a superpower (Time, 1988: 6-9).

The international debt crisis has received a great deal of attention at the macroeconomic and the political levels, but there have been few analyses of its impact upon individual sectors. Thus this article will consider the consequences of the Latin American debt crisis for manufacturing industry, particularly the adjustments that this sector has made in its response to the crisis.

The adjustment process which the manufacturing sector has undergone has produced implications which depend partly upon factors exogenous to the sector and partly upon the nature, and degree of competitiveness, of the manufacturing activity in each of the countries. In turn, the latter factors have been influenced by those very macroeconomic and exogenous variables. Some variables, such as the exchange rate, play major roles in determining the competitiveness of industry, as has frequently been emphasized in recent years. This is true of a number of variables at the industry and enterprise level as well.

Negotiating a treaty between two sovereign nations is no simple matter. Even when there is consensus that a new accord is long overdue, a solution acceptable to both governments and their most vocal constituencies is most elusive and often difficult to conclude within a reasonable period of time. This is especially true when there is strong popular opinion aroused on both sides. Discussions usually drag on, and while diplomats publicly agree that “progress is being made,” there are significant political and economic benefits unrealized by either or both countries involved in the negotiation proceedings (Lopez Guevara, 1976).

The present treaty negotiations between the Republic of Panama and the United States of America is a case in point. That Panamanian public opinion is aroused on the Canal issue is indicated by the 1964 Canal Zone border incidents in which twenty-one Panamanians and three Americans died and by subsequent demonstrations.

Central America has always seemed to me a particularly fruitful object of study, of economic and particularly monetary affairs, because of the existence of six countries of not too different size and economic structure. This situation provides an opportunity for assessing the workings of certain economic principles.

In economic terms, the countries of Central America are very small units. For such units, economics can provide a few analytical propositions that seem prima facie plausible. One is that such economies need not indefinitely specialize in exports of primary products, but if they diversity and industrialize their economies, it must be for export. Industrialization for the domestic market is unlikely to permit sufficient economies of scale. In this regard, the Central American countries have industrialized much less than the small republics in the Far East, and accordingly have not enjoyed as rapid a rate of economic growth.

Current experience in international relations reveals not only an increase in the number of international organizations but also a proportionately greater number of associated problems. One of these problems is the ascertainment of legal status and the assessment of the nature and significance of nonmembership.

As long as there are international organizations that embrace less than a universal membership, there will be nonmembers. The problems of nonmembers become particularly acute when one or more of the “great powers” (or states sponsored by them) are involved; the absence of the United States from the League of Nations and the absence of continental China and the divided nations of Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and others from the United Nations attest to this fact.

Within the past decade a perennial and intriguing problem concerning Canadian foreign relations has gained new prominence. Can the government of Canada as empowered under Heading VI (Section 91) of the British North America Act (1867) conclude contractual relations with foreign states when the terms of such contractual relations can be given legal implementation only by legislation of the provinces in areas reserved to them under heading VI (sections 92 and 93) ? Or more precisely, since certain classes of legislative subjects are specifically reserved to the provinces, can the individual province then engage in “foreign relations” vis-á-vis those reserved subjects?

With the signing of the Franco-Quebec Agreements of 15 September 1967, which provided for increased cultural, scientific, and technological cooperation between France and Quebec, and the developments leading up to and flowing from this Accord, the problem of the role and extent of provincial powers in regard to foreign relationships again came to the fore.