In the transition from military rule to democracy, the government of Augusto Pinochet bequeathed to Chile a unique electoral law by which all legislative seats are contested in two-member districts. A key implication of this rule is that in order to secure legislative majorities, coalitions have to put their strongest candidates in the most precarious electoral list positions. This generates a divergence of interests between coalitions and politicians. Chile's largest coalition, the Concertación, has resolved the dilemma by providing appointed posts to unsuccessful congressional candidates who accept personal political risk on the coalition's behalf. This study argues that this insurance system has provided the critical glue to hold the coalition together since Chile's transition to democracy in 1990. Recent changes in the electoral environment could threaten the Concertación's control over the appointed posts that have sustained this informal institution. This could jeopardize the Concertación's cohesion during the process of negotiating coalition candidate lists for the 2005 legislative elections.

This article maintains that the recent wave of pension privatization has been spurred largely by rising pension expenditures and chronic capital shortages. Many policymakers in Latin America and around the world believed that privatizing their public pension systems would boost their domestic savings rate and resolve the systems' financial problems, thereby reducing their dependence on unstable foreign capital and freeing resources for other, more productive uses. There is no clear evidence that pension privatization will bring these economic benefits, however. To understand why policymakers held these beliefs, we must examine how ideas about pension privatization have formed. Two particularly important factors are the Chilean model and the World Bank's growing influence on pension policy. A probit analysis of the determinants of pension privatization provides support for these arguments.

Chile's 1980 Constitution embodied the political aspirations of the nation's military regime. Before democratization, the constitution underwent a process of reform that did away with some of its most blatantly authoritarian provisions but preserved a set of institutions that would characterize and constrain the regained Chilean democracy. This article presents an account of that process. It juxtaposes two theoretical perspectives: one that sees the results as determined primarily by the power relationship of the participants, and one that stresses contextual factors, such as institutional traditions. This study argues that while the Chilean case largely confirms the importance of the existing constitution for the outcome, the final outcome depended nonetheless on the participants' assessment of the relations of power, and therefore might have been open to different results.

Mexico and Ireland, traditionally countries of emigration, experienced pronounced multinationalization of their economies during the 1990s. In Ireland net emigration declined, but in Mexico it remained quite high, suggesting that Ireland advanced in the mobility transition while Mexico did not. Several reasons are offered to explain this, reflecting Mexico's relationships with the United States, multinational corporations, and local income and social conditions in Mexican regions. In Ireland and its relationship with the United Kingdom, by contrast, these factors generally took the reverse direction. This article uses the comparison to examine the relationship between declining emigration and multinational investment and the question of whether Mexico may be expected eventually to reverse its present trends.

Mexico's former opposition parties had specific social bases that would not, on their own, have catapulted either opposition party into power. In the 1990s, specific regional bases of support developed for the parties, reflecting their efforts to develop their organizations more locally. Nationally, this led to the emergence of two parallel two-party systems, PAN-PRI competition in the north and center-west and PRD-PRI competition in the south. In parallel, a proregime-antiregime cleavage came to dominate the Mexican party system, which, combined with local-level opposition efforts to oust the PRI, created new incentives for the opposition parties to abandon past emphases on ideological differences and to act like catch-all parties instead. The regime cleavage fostered the dealignment of the Mexican electorate, a process that promoted the development of catch-all parties. Movement within the parties to behave like catch-all parties has not come without internal tensions, but electoral dynamics prove powerful inducements to catch-all behavior.

This research examines the data from private polls conducted during Vicente Fox's presidential campaign through the lenses of the “modernization” of campaigning, the creation of image in the modern Mexican presidency, and the survey tools used by the campaign to achieve a historic presidential victory in 2000. Fox's campaign team used polling to determine the potential of the Mexican public to be persuaded by an opposition candidate, to provide a continuous update on how the campaign strategy was working, to assist in solidifying Fox's image and message of change (rather than promoting his policy agenda), and to target demographic groups that were perceived to be important electoral partners. These findings suggest that public opinion polling is a useful tool in Mexico to combat longstanding corporatist structures used to favor the PRI. Presidential campaigns in Mexico are beginning to resemble modern campaigns in other mature democracies in their use of private polling data; future Mexican campaigns will become more image- and personality-based.