The modern business environment requires managers to make effective decisions in a dynamic and uncertain world. How can such dynamic decision making (DDM) improve? The current study investigated the effects of brief training aimed at improving DDM skills in a virtual DDM task. The training addressed the DDM process, stressed the importance of self-reflection in DDM, and provided 3 self-reflective questions to guide participants during the task. Additionally, we explored whether participants low or high in self-reflection would perform better in the task and whether participants low or high in self-reflection would benefit more from the training. The study also explored possible strategic differences between participants related to training and self-reflection. Participants were 68 graduate business students. They individually managed a computer-simulated chocolate production company called CHOCO FINE and answered surveys to assess self-reflection and demographics. Training in DDM led to better performance, including the ability to solve initial problems more successfully and to make appropriate adjustments to market changes. Participants’ self-reflection scores also predicted performance in this virtual business company. High self-reflection was also related to more consistency in planning and decision making. Participants low in self-reflection benefitted the most from training. Organizations could use DDM training to establish and promote a culture that values self-reflective decision making.

The paper critically reexamines the well-known “Julie and Mark” vignette, a stylized account of two college-age siblings opting to engage in protected sex while vacationing abroad (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Since its inception, the story has been viewed as a rhetorically powerful validation of Hume’s “sentimentalist” dictum that moral judgments are not rationally deduced but arise directly from feelings of pleasure or displeasure (e.g., disgust). People’s typical reactions to the vignette are alleged to support this view by demonstrating that individuals are prone to become morally dumbfounded (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000), i.e., they tend to “stubbornly” maintain their disapproval of the act without supporting reasons. In what follows, we critically reassess the traditional account, predicated on the notion that, among other things, most subjects simply fail to be convinced that the siblings’ actions are truly harm-free, thus having excellent reasons to disapprove of these acts. In line with this critique, 3 studies found that subjects 1) tended not to believe that the siblings’ actions were in fact harmless; 2) notwithstanding that, and in spite of holding a number of “counterargument-immune” reasons, subjects could be effectively maneuvered into exhibiting all the trademark signs of a morally dumbfounded state (which they subsequently recanted), and 3) with subjects’ beliefs about harm and standards of normative evaluation properly factored in, a more rigorous assessment procedure yielded a dumbfounding estimate of about 0. Based on these and related results, we contend that subjects’ reactions are wholly in line with the rationalist model of moral judgment and that their use in support of claims of moral arationalism should be reevaluated.

Prior research finds that liberals and conservatives process information differently. Predispositions toward intuitive versus reflective thinking may help explain this individual level variation. There have been few direct tests of this hypothesis and the results from the handful of studies that do exist are contradictory. Here we report the results of a series of studies using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to investigate inclinations to be reflective and political orientation. We find a relationship between thinking style and political orientation and that these effects are particularly concentrated on social attitudes. We also find it harder to manipulate intuitive and reflective thinking than a number of prominent studies suggest. Priming manipulations used to induce reflection and intuition in published articles repeatedly fail in our studies. We conclude that conservatives—more specifically, social conservatives—tend to be dispositionally less reflective, social liberals tend to be dispositionally more reflective, and that the relationship between reflection and intuition and political attitudes may be more resistant to easy manipulation than existing research would suggest.

In the ultimatum game, one player proposes a split of money between him- or herself and another player, who can accept the offer (and both players keep the allocated money) or reject the offer (and both players get nothing). The present study examined predictors of accepting unfair ultimatum offers. In Study 1, 184 participants responded to an unfair ultimatum offer, completed a measure of cognitive reflection, and completed a self-report measure of rational and experiential thinking. Slightly more than half of the participants (54.3%) accepted the unfair offer, and cognitive reflection was positively correlated with accepting unfair offers. The rational and experiential thinking scales were not significantly correlated with ultimatum decisions. In Study 2, 306 participants responded to 20 ultimatum offers that varied in fairness and completed an expanded measure of cognitive reflection. Performance on the cognitive reflection measure predicted the number of ultimatum offers accepted. These results suggest that rejecting ultimatum offers is related to intuitive, heuristic-based thinking, whereas accepting offers is related to deliberate, analytic-based thinking.

Previous studies have examined the impact of military service on the decision to engage in risky behavior. Yet most of these studies focused on voluntary recruits, did not distinguish between legal and illegal risky activities and did not compare combat and non-combat soldiers during and after service according to gender. The current study is unique because of the nature of Israeli compulsory army service. It examines the relationship between type of army service and five legal and illegal risky behaviors for three groups: non-combat, combat without fighting experience, and combat with fighting experience. We also examine differences in the propensity for risky behavior between men, most of whom are assigned to combat units due to the army’s needs, and women, who serve in combat units on a voluntary basis only. A questionnaire survey was randomly distributed at train stations and central bus stations in Israel among 413 soldiers and ex-soldiers between the ages of 18-30. The predictor variables include type of service or battle experience, the Evaluation of Risks scale and socio-demographic characteristics. In general, we found that high percentages of young people engage in risky behavior, especially illegal behavior. The results indicate that fighting experience is significantly and positively correlated with the consumption of illegal substances for currently serving men soldiers (but not for women) and this effect is mitigated after discharge from the army. Importantly, the use of illegal substances is not a result of the individual’s preferences for engaging in various risky behaviors. Thus, our results suggest that the effect of the increased propensity toward risky behavior following the experience of fighting overrides the combat unit’s discipline for men when it comes to the consumption of illegal substances. In addition, our findings indicate that serving in a combat unit as opposed to a non-combat unit affects the tendency of women ex-combat soldiers to travel to risky destinations, though this is probably related to their original higher risk attitude, since women must volunteer for combat units.

Cultures differ in many important ways, but one trait appears to be universally valued: prosociality. For one’s reputation, around the world, it pays to be nice to others. However, recent research with American participants finds that evaluations of prosocial actions are asymmetric—relatively selfish actions are evaluated according to the magnitude of selfishness but evaluations of relatively generous actions are less sensitive to magnitude. Extremely generous actions are judged roughly as positively as modestly generous actions, but extremely selfish actions are judged much more negatively than modestly selfish actions (Klein & Epley, 2014). Here we test whether this asymmetry in evaluations of prosociality is culture-specific. Across 7 countries, 1,240 participants evaluated actors giving various amounts of money to a stranger. Along with relatively minor cross-cultural differences in evaluations of generous actions, we find cross-cultural similarities in the asymmetry in evaluations of prosociality. We discuss implications for how reputational inferences can enable the cooperation necessary for successful societies.

This study provides the first comprehensive analysis of individual perceptions of tail risks. It focuses not only on the probability, as has been studied by Nicholas Barberis and others, but also on anticipation of damage. We examine how those perceptions relate to experts’ estimates and publicly available risk information. Behavioural factors—availability bias, threshold models of choice, worry and trust—are found to have a significant impact on risk perceptions. The probability of tail events is overestimated, which is consistent with probability weighting in prospect theory. Potential damage is underestimated, one reason why individuals do not invest in protective measures.

Genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer can help target prevention programs, and possibly reduce morbidity and mortality. A positive result of BRCA1/2 is a substantial risk factor for breast and ovarian cancer, and its detection often leads to risk reduction interventions such as increased screening, prophylactic mastectomy and oophorectomy. We examined predictors of the decision to undergo cancer related genetic testing: perceived risk, family risk of breast or ovarian cancer, and numeracy as predictors of the decision to test among women at high risk of breast cancer. Stepwise regression analysis of survey responses from 459 women registered in the Cancer Genetics Network revealed greater likelihood to test for women with more family history, higher perceived risk of mutation, or Ashkenazi descent. Neither subjective nor objective numeracy was associated with the decision to test, although we replicated an earlier finding that subjective numeracy predicted willingness to pay for testing. Findings underscore the need for genetic counselling that disentangles risk perception from objective information to promote better decision-making in the context of genetic testing. Highlighting these factors is crucial for public health campaigns, as well as to clinic-based testing and direct-to-consumer testing.