In a recent paper Professor Wesley Salmon1 has shown that a certain class of c-functions, including the c-function c*. described by Rudolph Carnap2 yield incompatible results when applied to the same sentences in two languages systems which, though they have the same individual constants, do not have the same predicates. Each c-function of the class in question is characterized by a parameter λ which is a function of the number of Q-predicates in the language system in which the c-function is used.3 Taking c* as representative of this class of c-functions, I shall argue that Professor Salmon's results do not provide a reasonable basis for rejecting such c-functions in favor of others. More specifically, I shall argue (i) that such c-functions yield incompatible results in two languages because not both of the languages are sufficiently complete, (ii) that for any two languages in which such c-functions yield incompatible results there is a rule that will select either the more complete of the two languages or a language that is more complete than either of the two languages, and (iii) that it is impossible for such c-functions to yield incompatible results in two languages that are equally complete.

In [1] Dreben showed that the subclass K′ (described below) of the Suranyi reduction class is recursively solvable by showing that the subclass is finitely controllable; that is, by showing that any member S of K′ is satisfiable only if it is finitely satisfiable. Dreben's argument is very complex, but much of the complexity is due to his proving not merely solvability, but the deeper property of finite controllability. In the present note, by exploiting certain features of Dreben's technique, a simpler, direct proof of the solvability of K′ is obtained — that is, a proof in which the question of satisfiability in a finite domain plays no role.

This paper contains some results concerning the completeness of a first-order system of infinite valued logic

There are under consideration two distinct notions of completeness corresponding to the two notions of validity (see Definition 3) and strong validity (see Definition 4). Both notions of validity, whether based on the unit interval [0, 1] or based on linearly ordered MV-algebras, use the element 1 as the designated truth value. Originally, it was thought by many investigators in the field that one should be able to prove that the set of valid sentences is recursively enumerable. It was first proved by Rutledge in [9] that the set of valid sentences in the monadic first-order infinite valued logic is recursively enumerable.

In Smullyan [1], where recursive enumerability is defined in terms of elementary dyadic arithmetics (dyadic EA's), it is shown that for any number n, the parallel definition in terms of n-adic EA′s is equivalent. This proof at one stage uses the deep result of Godei that plus and times form a sub-basis for the recursively enumerable attributes (sets and relations)2. The aim of this note is to prove this equivalence in more pedestrian fashion.

C. I. Lewis intended his systems S1–S5 as contributions to the study of “strict implication”, but in his formulation, strict implication is so thoroughly intertwined with other notions, such as possibility and negation, that it remains a problem, to separate out the properties of strict implication itself. I shall solve this problem for S2–5 and von Wright's M. The results for S3–5 are given below, while the implicative parts of S2 and M, which are rather more complicated, are given in §5.

In this presentation, ‘⊃’ stands for strict implication, and missing brackets for ‘⊃’ are restored by association to the right. A strict formula is one of the form A ⊃ B. Axiom schemes are used throughout.

A system formalized within the first order predicate calculus either with or without the identity but without predicate or function variables we call simply a theory. We say that a theory T has a recursively enumerable complement (r.e. Comp.) if the set of all sentences of T not valid in T is recursively enumerable. This is equivalent to saying that there exists an effective, purely mechanical procedure for establishing the non-validity in T of precisely those sentences of T which are in fact not theorems of T. If in addition T is recursively enumerable, that is, if there is an effective procedure for establishing the validity in T of its theorems, then T is decidable. It will be shown here that several well-known results concerning decidable theories can be extended to cover theories with r.e. comps. In this respect it should be observed that there exist theories having r.e. comps. which are not decidable. An example is the theory which has as valid sentences just those which contain a given two-place predicate and which are valid in all non-void finite universes [3], [4].

In [1], Bemays gives an axiomatization of set-theory which represents the furthest development to date of the Zermelo-Frankel-Gödel tradition. The purpose of this note is to show that one of his axioms is redundant.

Primitives are ∈, set-abstraction (denoted [x/A(x)]) and the Hilbert selector (denoted σ). Different styles are used for free variables (a, b,c, …) and bound variables (x, y, z, …); both kinds of variables range over both sets and classes. Quantifiers and connectives are classical.

The infinite-valued statement calculus to which this paper refers is that of Łukasiewicz [10], whose axiomatization was proved complete in [5]. In [9], Rutledge extended this system to include predicates and quantifiers2 and presented a deductively complete set of axioms for the monadic predicate calculus. This paper represents an attempt to axiomatize the full predicate calculus; for the proposed axiomatization, a property akin to but weaker than completeness is proved. An attempt to prove full completeness along similar lines failed; it has since been shown [11] that the set of valid formulas of the infinite-valued predicate calculus is not recursively enumerable. The method of this paper was suggested by Professor J. Barkley Rosser.