Introduction. In setting up his definition of analyticity, Carnap uses various non-constructive rules, of which we shall be concerned with only one. This one we shall call simply “Carnap's rule.” It can be roughly stated thus: If f(0), f(1), f(2), … are all provable, then (x)f(x) shall be provable.
In this paper will be briefly considered the logics got by starting with the system of Principia plus Peano's axioms and allowing one, two, …, ω, ω+l, and so on up to, but not including ω uses of Carnap's rule (interspersed with uses of the ordinary rules), as well as the system which includes Principia and Peano's axioms and is closed under application of Carnap's rule and the ordinary rules. Under suitable assumptions as to consistency, it is shown that in each of these logics there occur undecidable propositions and that a formula which states the consistency of the logic exists in the logic but is not provable in the logic. An interesting side result is that the logic got by allowing co applications of Carnap's rule is not closed under Carnap's rule.